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Cover
In the South China Sea in February
2022, the Independence-variant littoral
combat ship USS Tulsa (LCS 16) prepares
to conduct a replenishment at sea. Tulsa
was operating with the U.S. Seventh
Fleet to enhance interoperability with
partners and support a free and open
Indo-Pacific region. In “The Imperative
of Political Navigation: India’s Strategy
in the Indian Ocean and the Logic of
Indo-U.S. Strategic Partnership,” Yogesh
Joshi explains the dissonance between the
positions of different segments of India’s
strategic community regarding U.S. and
allied freedom-of-navigation operations
in the Indian Ocean, especially within
India’s exclusive economic zone.
Source: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Devin M.
Langer
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FROM THE EDITORS
American fascination with the High North is nothing new. The United States became an Arctic power in 1867 with its acquisition of Alaska, and intrepid American explorers helped map the new territory’s seas and islands. In “U.S. Maritime
Strategy in the Arctic: Past, Present, and Future,” James G. Foggo III and Rachael
Gosnell provide an informed look at this history and the present situation, with
a focus on the Arctic as a challenging environment for military operations. It
seems to be widely accepted that the inexorable progress of global warming will
make northern waters a more welcoming and active military theater. Certainly
the Russians seem to think so, as they continue to invest vast sums in refurbishing or expanding military and commercial infrastructure along their long Arctic
frontier. Yet, as the authors stress, the unforgiving physical environment will not
soon change, and our knowledge of that environment remains limited. The United States must commit itself, in cooperation with regional allies, to an upgraded
naval presence in the High North, the development of innovative technologies, and
the enhanced scientific knowledge to enable them. Admiral James G. Foggo III,
USN (Ret.), is a former commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Africa.
Commander Rachael Gosnell, USN, is a doctoral candidate at the University of
Maryland.
In “The Imperative of Political Navigation: India’s Strategy in the Indian
Ocean and the Logic of Indo-U.S. Strategic Partnership,” Yogesh Joshi offers
important insights into India’s strategic culture and behavior, using formerly classified materials and interviews with senior Indian officials. His argument is that,
in spite of its well-advertised neutrality between East and West, India for many
decades practiced what he calls “cryptic bandwagoning” with the United States,
and the West generally, on issues such as law of the sea negotiations and Western
naval operations in the Indian Ocean. However, more recently—as the Chinese
threat to India’s land and sea borders has metastasized—the partnership with the
United States (together now with Japan and Australia) has become a necessity
rather than a luxury. It is, then, startling but not surprising that India and the
United States are about to conduct joint military exercises in the foothills of the
Himalayas. Yogesh Joshi is a research fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore.
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Strategic culture, an elusive yet unavoidable concept in the theory of international relations, is also of considerable utility in understanding the evolution
of the Russian/Soviet navy from the nineteenth century onward. In “Russia’s
Twenty-First-Century Naval Strategy: Combining Admiral Gorshkov with the
Jeune École,” Johannes Riber traces the somewhat schizophrenic course of that
strategy’s development according to two distinct models, that of the French
“Young School” of the late nineteenth century and Admiral Sergey Gorshkov’s
blue-water Soviet navy of the 1970s and ’80s. He argues that in spite of Vladimir
Putin’s rhetorical commitment to maintaining or reviving the Gorshkov model,
Russia’s resources today (particularly given the ongoing Ukraine war) cannot sustain it; hence, the older model, using small ships, submarines, and cruise missiles
for local sea control in the Black and Caspian Seas (and for sea denial in parts
of the Mediterranean), will remain the key factor underlying Russian maritime
strategy going forward. Commander Johannes Riber is a serving officer in the
Royal Danish Navy.
The Jeune École developed as France’s response to the overwhelming superiority of Britain’s blue-water fleet—in other words, as an asymmetric strategy
befitting a weaker power. In “How the Weak Can Beat the Strong in War at Sea,”
Dustin J. Nicholson explores the options available to weaker naval powers to
challenge the strong and prevail. Major Dustin J. Nicholson, USMC, is a recent
graduate of the Naval War College.
Finally, in “Mission Command in the Age of Sail,” Josh Weiss develops an
analytic model of mission command based on the relationship of commander to
subordinate and illustrates it through a detailed case study of a little-known episode in British political-military operations in the Caribbean during Napoléon’s
Hundred Days. He suggests that today’s sailors can find a rich store of such
examples from that era that remain relevant for the present day. Josh Weiss is a
serving submarine officer in the U.S. Navy.
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Commander Robert M. Laske, USN (Ret.), 96, former editor of the Naval
War College Review (NWCR), passed away peacefully at his home on 28
May 2022.
Bob served in the Army Air Corps toward the end of World War II, graduated from college in 1949, then joined the Naval Air Corps, earning his
wings in 1951. His aviation career included assignments and deployments
to Coronado, California; Whidbey Island, Washington; Kodiak, Alaska
Territory; Japan (during the Korean War); Morocco; and Oklahoma and
Texas, as a naval aviator recruiter.
Bob attended the Naval Justice School in Newport, Rhode Island, the Naval
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, and the Navy Communications School in Newport. He then served in USS Forrestal as communications officer.
In 1962, Bob was reassigned to Newport, first as a Naval War College
(NWC) student, then as a member of the Correspondence School faculty.
At this time he obtained a master’s degree in international relations from
George Washington University. In 1964, he was called off the staff of the
College to Saigon, South Vietnam.
Bob returned to the College in 1965, took over the duties of NWCR managing editor in 1968, and in 1970 was named the Review’s first full-time
editor. He continued in that position until his retirement from the Navy
in September 1975. He rejoined the Review in 1982, serving as a civilian
employee from 1982 to 1988, when he retired.
Through Bob’s initiatives and professional outreach, the College’s publishing
policy took a major turn when the Review began to publish articles by civilian academics. He also laid the initial plans for the Press to publish books,
including the first volumes of the NWC Historical Monograph series.
Bob’s service to the Press, to the College, and to the nation set a high standard.
We offer our deep sympathies to his family and friends.
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Rear Admiral Shoshana Chatfield is the fiftyseventh President of the U.S. Naval War College and
a career naval helicopter pilot. A native of Garden
Grove, California, she graduated from Boston University in 1987 with a bachelor of arts in international relations and French language and literature.
She received her commission through the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps in 1988 and earned her
wings of gold in 1989. Chatfield was awarded the Navy’s Political/Military Scholarship and attended the
Kennedy School of Government, receiving a master
in public administration from Harvard University in
1997. In 2009, the University of San Diego conferred
on her a doctorate of education in leadership studies.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM

The Value of NWC’s International Programs

together in defense of common interests is a tradition going back centuries. The concept is as
valid today as it was in the days of the great full-rigged sailing ships of the past.
Throughout the College’s 138-year history, our institution has been at the forefront of encouraging and facilitating maritime-security cooperation. Our efforts
in the twenty-first century reach around the globe and to all levels of leadership.
The International Programs at the Naval War College (NWC) directly support
developing and strengthening robust global maritime partnerships. We seek
to emphasize the “Newport Connection” to enhance trust and confidence and
promote cooperation among partner nations. World events confirm the value of
developing and maintaining such friendships.
An international focus is not new to our College. The College’s first international officers—two commanders from the Royal Swedish Navy—arrived in
1894. But it was then–Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Arleigh A.
Burke who, in 1956, provided the vision for our modern-era international programs. He was prescient in understanding the value of maritime engagements
and fully cognizant that the global security environment presented an increasingly complex set of challenges and opportunities. Over the years, more than
five thousand allied officers have graduated from NWC’s formal educational
programs. More than 1,800 have gone on to earn flag or general officer rank, and
several have become elected heads of state.
At the core of our twenty-first-century international education efforts are a series of rigorous and demanding resident courses taught on our Newport, Rhode
Island, campus and in support of our fleet commanders globally. Currently, we
educate approximately 150 international military students from around the world
ALLIED NAVIES SAILING
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in Newport and dozens more away from our campus. We expect that number to
grow to over two hundred within a few short years. The following five international courses appear in our catalog:
• The Naval Command College (NCC) course is an eleven-month program
designed to prepare senior officers for the highest levels of command. It is
open to international naval officers in the grades O-5 and O-6 (commanders
and captains) from allied military forces that choose to accept an invitation
from the CNO. Students pursue a senior-level core curriculum in classrooms alongside their American counterparts, studying Strategy and Policy,
National Security Decision Making, Joint Military Operations, Leadership
in the Profession of Arms, and specialized electives in their areas of interest. This multifaceted curriculum meets the requirements levied by the U.S.
Joint Chiefs of Staff through which American students earn Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II (JPME II) certification. Students
also participate in a robust Field Studies Program that allows them to travel
around the United States to gain an increased understanding of our American institutions, values, and way of life. All graduates earn an NWC diploma.
Additionally, we offer the opportunity to pursue a master of arts degree in
national security and strategic studies to a limited number of NCC students
who meet all academic prerequisites and volunteer to undertake additional
study requirements. The course convenes annually in July and concludes the
following June.
• The Naval Staff College (NSC) course is an eleven-month program designed
to prepare midcareer officers for the challenges of command and major-staff
duty. It is open to international naval officers in the grades O-4 and O-5
(lieutenant commanders and commanders) from allied military forces that
choose to accept an invitation from the CNO. In addition to participating
alongside their American counterparts in the intermediate-level core curriculum—Strategy and War, Theater Security Decision Making, Joint Maritime Operations, and Leadership in the Profession of Arms—the students
complete specialized electives in their areas of interest. This curriculum is
based on requirements levied by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, through which
American students earn JPME Phase I (JPME I) certification. NSC students
also participate in a robust Field Studies Program that allows them to travel
around the United States to gain an increased understanding of American
institutions, values, and way of life. All graduates earn a Naval Staff College
diploma. Additionally, we offer the opportunity to pursue a master of arts
degree in defense and strategic studies to a limited number of NSC students
who meet all academic prerequisites and volunteer to undertake additional
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss3/1
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study requirements. The course convenes annually in July and concludes in
June of the following year.
• The International Maritime Staff Operators Course (IMSOC) is a twelveweek course designed to provide international naval officers with the knowledge and skills needed to support the planning and execution of maritime
operations and effectively integrate with existing operational planning
teams on national, allied, and coalition staffs. The course enables students to
comprehend, analyze, and apply maritime operational-level processes and
procedures necessary to plan, prepare, execute, and assess combined maritime operations. Students also participate in a tailored Field Studies Program
that includes traveling around the United States to understand our American
institutions, values, and way of life. This course is open to officers in the
ranks of O-3 to O-5 (lieutenants, lieutenant commanders, and commanders) from partner military forces that choose to accept an invitation from the
CNO. This course convenes twice a year, running in the fall from August to
November and in the spring from March to June.
• The Maritime Security and Governance Staff Course (MSGSC) is a new,
five-month staff course designed specifically for officers from smaller navies,
coast guards, and maritime-law-enforcement services. Rather than focusing on major combat operations, it provides graduates with the operational
knowledge and strategic perspectives needed to conduct maritime-security
operations effectively, evaluate a complex maritime threat environment,
formulate effective maritime-security strategies, and achieve good maritime
governance at national and regional levels. Students also participate in a
tailored Field Studies Program that includes travel around the United States.
The course is designed for midgrade naval officers but is open to all uniformed military personnel and government officials in the equivalent ranks /
pay grades of O-3 to O-5. It convenes in January and July.
• The Combined Force Maritime Component Commander (CFMCC) course
is a flag-level professional military education program focused on command
and control of multinational maritime forces. The course is designed to prepare U.S. and partner-nation officers for regional leadership responsibilities
and to give them a broad perspective of the operational level of war. Periodically, the CNO extends invitations to nations for selected students to participate in this program. Candidates are U.S. and international flag officers (O-7
and above) or service equivalent. The one-week course is taught three times
a year at the site of a regional headquarters for U.S. forces. The desired goal is
for CFMCC graduates to develop stronger international relationships among

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2022

15

10

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 75 [2022], No. 3, Art. 1

partner nations while deepening their understanding of combined maritime
command-and-control concepts and mechanisms.
In addition to formal coursework, NWC supports other major activities and
initiatives designed to increase the effectiveness and interoperability of the free
world’s maritime forces. These efforts include the following:
• The International Seapower Symposium (ISS), held in Newport biennially
since 1969, offers a unique opportunity for the world’s maritime leaders to
discuss and promote international maritime-security cooperation. These
discussions provide opportunities for future voluntary regional and international collaboration in seeking solutions to challenges facing the global
network of maritime nations. These landmark events often have been called
“the largest gathering of maritime leaders in history.” ISS-24 was completed
in September 2021, with delegates from over one hundred nations in attendance. CNO Admiral Mike Gilday, USN, hosted the chiefs of navies and
coast guards from around the globe to seek their respective thoughts and
proposals for enhancing regional and global maritime security. Reflecting on
the event, Admiral Gilday noted the following:
Providing a safe, secure, and stable maritime system is an imperative to all of mankind, and it is an essential part of what our navies do every day. I believe that robust,
resilient, and responsible sea power is an international consortium of like-minded
nations. We are the primary guarantors of peace, prosperity, and the open flow of
goods along the oceans. Our navies provide these benefits to the citizens we serve
every day in peacetime and especially during these times of competition—not just in
rare moments of conflict.

• The Regional Alumni Symposia (RAS) are cohosted by the President of the
NWC and a regional partner navy. Participation is open to all international
and U.S. graduates of the College. These academic conferences reinforce
the notion that military education continues long after students finish the
formal, in-resident education programs at the College, as part of a lifelong
pursuit of knowledge about the profession of arms. Symposia include keynote speeches by prominent military leaders and faculty-led panels addressing current strategic and operational issues. All participants are invited to
exchange their insights and perspectives. Symposia also serve to facilitate
professional interaction among rising military leaders and allow graduates to take advantage of and foster the Newport Connection across many
classes. This networking develops professional linkages among military
officers useful at critical junctures later in their careers when international
relationships prove invaluable. World events continue to confirm the value
of working with partners and friends. Our RASs have taken place in many
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss3/1
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areas around the globe, including Brazil, Germany, Oman, Peru, Philippines, and here in Newport. We will hold our nineteenth annual Regional
Alumni Symposium for African nations in Newport from 13 to 15 September 2022.
• The CNO Distinguished International Fellows provide critical support to
all the NWC international courses and initiatives discussed in the previous
paragraphs. We are fortunate to have former service chiefs from three of our
oldest and most respected partner nations on our faculty: Admiral Guillermo Barrera, former commander of the Colombian navy; Admiral Nirmal
Verma, former chief of the naval staff of the Indian navy; and Rear Admiral
Lars Saunes, former chief of the Royal Norwegian Navy, provide in-depth
knowledge of the regional areas in which they served, as well as providing insights into how decisions are made in an international context. This program,
which was piloted in 2011 under the sponsorship of CNO Admiral Gary
Roughead, is now an enduring and integral component of faculty engagements across the continuum of international programs.
Over the course of the past sixty years, Newport has become a neutral ground
for the international maritime community, a place where naval officers from
around the world can come to study and, working together, tackle the most
pressing security and governance challenges. The Naval War College is the only
institution in the world with the facilities, faculty, and reputation for impartiality
required to play that critical role. Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro recently noted,
“Meeting and working with our ally and partner nations to protect our mutual
interests and sustain the open, rules-based international system continues to be
an important and pressing challenge.” I salute everyone at the College who labors
tirelessly to meet this challenge.

SHOSHANA S. CHATFIELD

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College
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U.S. MARITIME STR ATEGY IN THE ARC TIC
Past, Present, and Future
James G. Foggo III and Rachael Gosnell

May I be allowed to wish the rising generation of American naval officers all success in
the noble profession they are entering, and to express a hope that America, and especially
the American Navy, will maintain the place she has won in the front rank of Arctic
explorers.

T

LIEUTENANT JOHN W. DANENHOWER, “THE POLAR QUESTION,” 1885

he U.S. Navy has an enduring legacy in the Arctic. From the earliest days
of the United States as an Arctic nation following the purchase of Alaska in
1867, our Navy has patrolled the region to protect national interests. As the area
becomes increasingly accessible to maritime traffic, the Arctic will form a crossroads where geopolitical, economic, climate, technological, and security trends
meet. As noted in a document published in January 2021 laying out an Arctic
strategy for the Navy, warming waters and the resultant melting sea ice will create
new challenges off our northern shores, and the Navy and Marine Corps must
be prepared.1 Aggressive Russian militarization and expanding Chinese interest
in the region are giving rise to greater strategic competition in the Arctic. An
American naval presence in the Arctic will ensure peace and prosperity.
Lessons from America’s Arctic past can illuminate what needs to be done to
help meet the demands of the Arctic of the future, ensuring integrated deterrence while also enabling adherence to the international rules and norms that
are the backbone of our global economy. The Navy has a robust history in the
region, dating back to the earliest American Arctic explorers. From USS Nautilus (SSN 571) onward, the Arctic has played an important role in U.S. Navy
operations. During the Cold War, Navy Secretary John F. Lehman Jr.’s Maritime
Strategy provided a forward-thinking approach that served to stretch the Soviet
navy.
The competitors of the future will present threats far more complex than
those the Navy faced previously, given the emergence and prevalence of
advanced technologies, the cyber and space domains, hybrid warfare, and
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increasingly bold state and nonstate actors. Our Navy must continue to look
northward to ensure regional stability and prevent competitors from dominating an increasingly blue (as opposed to white) Arctic. The international norms
that enable global economic prosperity—particularly freedom of the seas—increasingly are being challenged in the Arctic, setting a disquieting precedent for
other global hot spots.
But Arctic operations are challenging in themselves. Although the region is
warming and the ice cover is diminishing, operating in the polar environment
will continue to be arduous. Conditions of extreme cold, icing, frequent storms,
and near-complete darkness during parts of the year all serve to challenge mariners. Adding to these complexities, there are few deepwater ports and there is
limited infrastructure to support and sustain operations. Communications challenges, lack of adequate hydrographic surveys, and a paucity of airfield options
for search-and-rescue (SAR) and other emergency diversions increase risk to
those operating in the region.
Confronting these hostile operating conditions, the Navy is materially and
operationally underprepared now compared with during the Cold War. To help
the service regain lost proficiency—and send a clear message to any nation seeking to challenge international norms in the region—this article will reflect on
the Navy’s history to gain innovative insights into ensuring maritime superiority
in this challenging region. The article first will examine the service’s history in
the Arctic; next it will consider current geopolitics and naval operations; then
it will provide specific recommendations for ensuring the establishment and
continuation of American naval superiority in the evolving Arctic region.
LESSONS FROM THE PAST
The U.S. Navy is no stranger to the Arctic. The Navy Department administered
the newly acquired Department of Alaska from 1879 until the territory’s reorganization under civil administration in 1884. The Navy stationed the sloop
of war USS Jamestown in Sitka, Alaska, to “preserve order among the Indians
and to prevent threatened conflicts.”2 In an era of increasing exploration in the
Far North, naval officers were eager to improve their Arctic expertise. The first
article written in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings about the Arctic, a discussion on ice navigation by Lieutenant Frederick G. Schwatka, USA, appeared in
October 1880. Schwatka provided exceptional detail on the dangers posed by
“ice-packs, ice-floes, icebergs, tides, storms, currents, and other obstacles,” as well
as instructions for ships’ “care and preservation when securely anchored by the
cold clutches of the ice, for the long dreary winter night of the Arctic, [and] their
liberation when the summer’s sun has broken up the great ice fields.”3 Five years
later, Lieutenant John W. Danenhower, USN, provided a comprehensive account
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss3/1
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of Arctic exploration in Proceedings.4 This insightful piece discussed the difficult
conditions mariners faced in the High North and which maritime routes were to
be preferred in the region.
The Navy pioneered America’s earliest forays as an Arctic nation. The service’s
archives and histories document both the perils of operating in the Arctic and
how those challenges could be overcome. These were important topics for naval
officers seeking to defend and promote U.S. national interests in the northern
latitudes. Then-Commander Robert E. Peary Sr., USN, a Civil Engineer Corps
officer, became the first explorer to reach the North Pole, on 6 April 1909. His
motto—“I will find a way or make one!”—reflects his impressive resilience.5 He
dedicated years to understanding the Arctic’s weather patterns and ice conditions, often relying on the indigenous Inuits’ extensive knowledge and experience. Less than two decades later, on 9 May 1926, Lieutenant Commander
Richard E. Byrd Jr. navigated the first (although some dispute this) flight over the
North Pole, beating Norwegian explorer Roald Amundsen’s attempt by airship by
a few days. Byrd and the pilot, Floyd Bennett—who had served in the Navy previously—received the Congressional Medal of Honor for their intrepid expedition.
The flight would not have been possible had it not departed from Svalbard, in
Norway’s northernmost archipelago. This highlights the enduring importance of
international cooperation and the value of regional partnerships. The Arctic long
has fostered international interest and unique levels of cooperation. U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing discussed the “perplexing situation” encompassing
the Spitsbergen (later called Svalbard) Archipelago—from which Byrd, Amundsen, and many other Arctic explorers launched their expeditions—in a 1917
article in the American Journal of International Law, “A Unique International
Problem.” He noted that Spitsbergen’s sovereignty question arose “as a result of
American enterprise and energy, which, overcoming Arctic ice and barrenness,
proved to the world the wealth of the islands.”6 Lansing was referring to the successful Svalbard operations of the Arctic Coal Company, a U.S. mining company
that later was purchased by a Norwegian concern. The secretary’s efforts to forge
a resolution to Spitsbergen’s status while a member of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace and his participation at the 1919–20 peace conference at
Versailles reflected American economic and political interests in the archipelago
and the Arctic access it provided. In 1920, global leaders gathered in Paris to sign
the Spitsbergen (Svalbard) Treaty, which recognized Norway’s sovereignty over
the archipelago but stipulated that all signatories—fourteen originally, now fortysix—had equal rights to engage in commercial and research activities there. The
archipelago was declared a visa-free zone and naval bases were prohibited, as was
any use of Svalbard for warlike purposes. President Woodrow Wilson endorsed
the treaty and the Senate ratified it in 1924.7
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Although many at first had called America’s 1867 purchase of Alaska “Seward’s
Folly” (it was spearheaded by U.S. Secretary of State William H. Seward), the
Arctic territory’s economic potential became clear during the 1896–99 gold
rush, and its strategic importance became clear during the lead-up to World War
II. In 1935, General William L. “Billy” Mitchell, USAAC, declared to Congress
that “he who holds Alaska will hold the world”; he famously proclaimed that
Alaska was the “most strategic place in the world.” With his views colored by
his assignment to Alaska as a
U.S. strategic interests in the Arctic—including junior officer, Mitchell urged
economic, military, and geopolitical—will in- the construction of military
crease as regional activity rises. The U.S. Navy bases to enable a northern air
defense. This argument later
must be prepared.
became more urgent during
the Cold War, since the shortest and most likely route that Soviet bombers or
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) would take to attack the United States
lay across the Arctic.
The Soviet government, meanwhile, was developing Arctic navigation and
aviation capabilities. The Soviets opened the Northern Sea Route in the early
1930s as a means to resupply isolated coastal communities. British journalist H.
P. Smolka noted in 1938 that “[o]nly in the last few months has the world begun
to be conscious of Russia’s energetic efforts to push open her frozen window in
the North and develop a Polar Empire.”8 Russian president Vladimir V. Putin’s
modern polar-great-power ambitions reflect Russia’s historical interest in the
region, but they are facilitated by a thawing Arctic.
At the time, Smolka also highlighted a perceived northern strength—one
that today’s Arctic thawing is diminishing. Relying on his extensive travels in
the region studying its geography and inhabitants, he assessed that in a potential
conflict Russia could be “bottled up” on three sides, but that the north was an
“independent, continuous and all-Russian coastline, unassailable by anyone.”9
Indeed, while World War II was devastating to the Soviet Union, the frozen north
did provide an unassailable border. Smolka had identified an important component relevant to Russia’s present-day strategy in the High North. Russia’s Arctic
border—the world’s longest national coastline—traditionally was considered
impenetrable to invasion, but now the opening of the Arctic heightens the sense
of paranoia that characterizes Russia’s views about potential invasions and has led
to increased militarization in the region.10
The 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty exemplified the spirit of international cooperation that has been a feature of the modern Arctic. Yet, not so long after it first
was signed, growing wariness of Germany and the Soviet Union motivated the
next round of Arctic diplomacy and military cooperation. The United States
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss3/1
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and Canada signed the Ogdensburg Agreement in August 1940 to provide for
closer defense cooperation against airborne threats emanating from the polar
region. Although devised even as another world war was engulfing the globe, it
established a Permanent Joint Board on Defense that was intended to outlive the
conflagration, which became important later as wariness of Soviet Communism
grew and the Cold War emerged.
In June 1942, the Japanese bombed U.S. bases at Dutch Harbor and Fort Mears
in Alaska and seized the Aleutian islands of Attu and Kiska, making the Aleutians
the only World War II battleground where U.S. soil suffered foreign occupation.
The Alaska Territory played an important role as a transfer site for executing
Lend-Lease Act programs designed to bring desperately needed food, oil, and
matériel to American allies during the war.11 The Allies used Arctic routes to
resupply the Soviet Union, shipping nearly four million tons of cargo through
the Barents Sea and nearly five hundred thousand tons through the Bering Strait
during the war.12 German forces, also recognizing the strategic value of the High
North, established naval and air bases in Norway after their successful invasion
in April 1940.
Alaska’s strategic value prompted the construction of the Alaska-Canadian
Highway and other significant infrastructure projects during World War II. The
war made an enormous impact on Alaska’s population; thousands of people
moved north to support the war effort, and many remained afterward. By 1945,
the military population had skyrocketed to nearly sixty thousand, from around
five hundred in 1940.13 Alaska’s total population in 1950 was nearly double its
1940 population of 129,000.14 The military expansion in Alaska during World
War II, which was extended by the onset of the Cold War, fueled the state’s economic growth; by 1955, uniformed military personnel made up nearly a quarter
of the population, and as much as 80 percent of Alaskan employment was related
to the defense industry.15
During the Cold War, Alaska was key to implementing a so-called damagelimitation strategy to deter a potential Soviet nuclear attack against the United
States. In theory, under such strategies nuclear attacks are deterred by providing
the capability to limit the damage they could wreak sufficiently to render them
strategically pointless. This would be achieved by providing an air defense robust
enough to destroy a substantial portion of Soviet nuclear bombers and missiles
before they reached the continental United States (CONUS). Alaska was (and
remains) ideally situated to provide early warning of attacks against the United
States from the Soviet Union (and Russia today) because the shortest air routes
between the two countries cut across the Arctic Ocean. (It is instructive to reinforce this fact using a globe or by looking at a polar projection instead of the standard Mercator one.) Once the Arctic was deemed vulnerable to Soviet nuclear
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bombers, the Distant Early Warning (i.e., DEW) Line—consisting of more than
fifty radar and communication stations stretched across three thousand miles—
was established to allow the Strategic Air Command (SAC) to respond appropriately to any threat.16
In 1957, the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD)—a combined
U.S.-Canadian defense organization—assumed responsibility for continental air
defense, focusing on Soviet threats from the polar region. Technological developments shifted the focus of defense efforts from bomber attacks toward ICBM
threats. Alaska hosted one of NORAD’s first ballistic-missile early-warning stations, designed to provide approximately fifteen minutes’ warning of a missile
attack against CONUS. The U.S. Arctic region became strategically critical for
identifying inbound Soviet bombers and missiles and providing an opportunity
for defense in depth against nuclear attack.
U.S. naval leadership in exploring the Arctic again became global news when
Nautilus completed its record-breaking voyage, becoming the first submarine to
circumnavigate the globe under the polar ice cap. On 3 August 1958, the boat’s
captain, Commander William R. Anderson, USN, addressed his crewmembers
at the historic moment they reached the North Pole: “For the world, our country, and the Navy—the North Pole.” Once Nautilus was clear of the ice pack, the
message “Nautilus 90 North” was relayed in Morse code to President Dwight
D. Eisenhower via a Navy radio station in Hawaii. This demonstration by the
nuclear-powered submarine made it clear that extensive under-ice operations
were possible. Indeed, as Commander Robert D. McWethy, USN, one of the
Navy’s early advocates for the value of submarine operations in the Arctic to
monitor the Soviet Union, noted in 1958, “The ice pack in the Arctic Ocean
region lends itself to exploitation by submarine.”17 Commander Anderson later
would envision the maritime shipping potential of the region, considering the
shorter maritime route connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. However,
he did not anticipate a thawing Arctic, instead predicting a future in which
cargo-laden submarines shipped goods along the Arctic route.18 Like many
Arctic endeavors, his vision of submarine cargo vessels never was realized in
a region that continually proves to be important strategically but challenging
operationally.
Nautilus’s notable achievement of sailing successfully under the ice cap elicited
great pride from Americans at the height of the Cold War—especially since the
Soviets were pulling ahead in the space race. Its accomplishment highlighted
American naval ingenuity and demonstrated to the Soviets that American submarines could operate in their icy back yard. In 1959, USS Skate (SSN 578) sailed
north with the mission of breaking through the thick polar ice. Skate’s captain,
Commander James F. Calvert, reflecting on the perilous task, claimed that his
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crewmembers were “immune to fear and desperation” as a result of their training
and their trust in one another.19 Nautilus’s and Skate’s polar successes built on
American inventor Simon Lake’s early efforts to develop submarines capable of
“navigating in water covered by surface ice.” Indeed, the Lake-designed submarine Protector became the first submarine to cruise under, and to surface through,
sea ice, in 1903, off the coast of Newport, Rhode Island.20 The submarine’s success
attracted attention, and five years later, in 1908, the Lake-designed submarine Kefal, built for tsarist Russia, became the first Russian submarine to surface through
ice, near Vladivostok.21
The Arctic saw a dramatic increase in military operations during the Cold
War, primarily conducted by submarines. Soviet and U.S. submarine activity during the Cold War was robust, although details largely remain classified. U.S. submarines were tasked with tracking Soviet missile submarines from their northern
bases on the Kola Peninsula east of Finland into Arctic waters, whose ice cover
provided exceptional shelter from detection. The Arctic remained a critical strategic region throughout the Cold War, including playing a part in President
Richard M. Nixon’s “madman theory” of deterrence. This theory originated with
the nuclear brinkmanship practiced by President Eisenhower and was designed
to sow doubt regarding the degree of irrationality and volatility that should be
attributed to the United States. The intent was to diminish a potential Soviet
provocation by raising the possibility of a stronger U.S. retaliation than Soviet
leaders expected. To demonstrate both capability and unpredictability, SAC flew
nuclear-armed airborne-alert flights over the Arctic Circle.22
In December 1971, Henry A. Kissinger, then assistant to the president for national security affairs (i.e., national security advisor) under Nixon, promulgated
a national security decision memorandum on U.S. Arctic policy. The memorandum stated that “the President has decided that the United States will support
the sound and rational development of the Arctic, guided by the principle of
minimizing any adverse effects to the environment; will promote mutually beneficial international cooperation in the Arctic; and will at the same time provide
for the protection of essential security interests in the Arctic.”23 It further stated
that these security interests included preservation of the principle of freedom of
the seas and of airspace. The strategic importance of the Arctic region—primarily
owing to the potential flight paths of strategic bombers and ICBMs—finally had
warranted issuance of a defined U.S. Arctic policy. Yet the policy also reflected
the growing understanding that the region was important for more than just
strategic defense. Concern for environmental issues in the Arctic prompted the
1973 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears among the United States,
the Soviet Union, Norway, Denmark, and Canada. Thus, scientific cooperation in
the region continued despite ongoing strategic tensions.
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The Arctic, in fact, long has seen the juxtaposition of cooperation and
competition. Following Nixon’s efforts in the region, national attention
largely turned elsewhere, although the Arctic remained strategically vital for
early warning of ICBM threats. Then, in the 1980s, the Reagan administration
redoubled American efforts to attain a strategic advantage over the Soviet
Union, particularly in the maritime domain. The Maritime Strategy charted a
bold new course for the Navy. Secretary of the Navy Lehman and Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) Admiral James D. Watkins, USN, proposed an innovative forward global strategy, in which
the Arctic played a small but
Russia’s Arctic border . . . traditionally was
considered impenetrable to invasion, but now important role. With contrithe opening of the Arctic heightens the sense of butions from brilliant strategists such as Captain Peter M.
paranoia that characterizes Russia’s views
Swartz, USN (now retired),
about potential invasions and has led to inthe strategy was designed and
creased militarization in the region.
implemented to demonstrate
to the Soviet Union that the U.S. Navy and allied forces had the ability to defeat
the Soviet navy in a potential conflict and strike hard into the Soviet homeland—
namely, the Soviets’ strategic bastions in the High North. Improving the Navy’s
ability to operate in the difficult region was critical to pressing the Soviets and
deterring aggression through a cost-imposing strategy. This approach helped
lead to the ultimate downfall of the Soviet Union.
This concept led to Exercise O CEAN VENTURE in August–October 1981,
which brought together from fifteen nations about 120,000 personnel, 250
ships, and a thousand aircraft. The Navy exercised offensive and sea-control
operations north of the Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom gap—through
which Arctic-based Soviet fleets and ballistic-missile submarines would have
to pass to break out into the North Atlantic to threaten NATO forces. Sustained operations in these frigid waters posed significant challenges to the
naval forces, with sailors confronting reduced visibility, subzero temperatures,
dangerous icing conditions, and freezing of equipment. These challenges complicated war fighting and made it more difficult for participating ships and
aircraft to fulfill their missions. Using innovative tactics to overcome both the
Arctic conditions and the challenges embedded in the exercise scenario, the
fleet succeeded in sailing to within striking distance of Murmansk—the heart
of the Soviet strategic-submarine fleet. Although the U.S. fleet had operated
in the Arctic before, the principles of the developing strategy called for allied
surface ships to operate in northern latitudes more frequently to balance the
routine presence there of Soviet naval forces.24 Doing so would force Soviet
planners to reconsider their own force deployments to ensure they had enough
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assets available to protect their strategic bastions, which was vital to the costimposition strategy.
As the new strategy expanded the priority of Arctic naval operations, the
Assistant Deputy CNO for Surface Warfare observed in 1985 that the Navy’s
“limited operations in the Arctic have revealed a number of problems that
must be overcome if we are to successfully send our ships into these waters
on a routine basis.”25 Therefore the Navy established an Arctic / Cold Weather
Program for Surface Ships to provide the fleet with instructions and hardware
to operate effectively in the northernmost latitudes. The 1988 U.S. Navy Cold
Weather Handbook for Surface Ships was published to establish procedures
for Arctic operations; it provided guidance on everything from Arctic meteorological conditions to maneuvering in sea ice. It even noted the importance
of ensuring excellent dental health prior to cold-weather operations, lest the
thermal stresses on teeth from drinking hot coffee after being outside cause
cracking!26
While the Navy’s surface community was improving its ability to operate in the
challenging Arctic region, underneath the seas its submarines remained dominant. During the Cold War, the Arctic quickly became a submarine playground,
with the Russians deploying their ballistic-missile submarines into protected
launch bastions in the High North.27 To operate in or close to Russia’s Arctic submarine bastions, the United States needed attack submarines that could operate
effectively under the ice pack while eluding detection themselves. This required
a significant investment in both infrastructure and training. The Sturgeon-class
submarines were designed for the Arctic environment, with systems capable of
prolonged operation in extreme cold, top and bottom sounders to enable navigation under the ice, and a hardened sail that worked as an “ice pick” to allow the
boat to break through ice.
Crews that deployed in the Arctic Ocean and High North underwent months
of predeployment training, and the submarines were assigned civilian ice pilots with significant experience navigating those waters. The training included
theoretical, scientific, and practical exercises that introduced crews who were
accustomed to much warmer waters to the idiosyncrasies of the general Arctic
environment, such as differences in temperature and salinity—and the nearconstant presence of bearded seals, whose moans could be heard through the
hull and in the sonar.
For example, changes in salinity were not to be taken lightly on platforms
that approached eight thousand tons submerged. A submarine’s neutral buoyancy is obtained by trimming the ship and loading or pumping off seawater
ballast from trim tanks to maintain the diving officer’s ever-elusive “zero
bubble,” or optimal trim. However, as a submarine approaches areas of melting
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ice (which produces fresh water), the density of the ocean water changes, so
buoyancy does as well. In such waters, watch teams had to be (and still must
be) alert at all times and take quick action to avoid a sudden “depth excursion.”
Keeping track of such environmental factors is essential to safe operation in the
Arctic environment.
Likewise, sailors became proficient in wearing cold-weather gear and avoiding the perils of frostbite and hypothermia when exposed to Arctic conditions,
whether on the bridge or out exploring on the ice. Commercial hunting ammunition was provided to personnel to defend themselves against any rogue polar
bears or arctic foxes; the latter often suffered from rabies, which made their
behavior erratic and unpredictable.
Operating a submarine in the open ocean is challenging enough for a welltrained crew, but in the Arctic crews did so in an environment in which the
hazards above them when submerged were not limited to adversary aircraft and
surface ships. Floating icebergs pose a danger owing to the considerable depth
to which they extend beneath the surface. Additionally, surface ice can come in
the form of either multiyear or first-year ice; the latter tends to be less difficult to
break through. As part of the seasonal ice zone, the marginal ice zone, extending
from the ice edge into the ice pack, varies in width from sixty to 120 miles.28 Simply put, ice is variable, and the uncertainties involved pose significant operational
challenges to vessels operating both above and below the ice, requiring frequent
updating of procedures. For instance, in temperate climates a submarine can
refresh its air by raising its snorkel mast and ventilating, but this is problematic
when there is pack ice overhead. In sum, standard operating procedures were
no longer “standard” under the ice, so submariners had to find new ways to do
normal things.
Navigation in the Arctic proved challenging as well. Magnetic compasses are
useless at the polar ice cap, as crews discovered during the Cold War. Before
GPS, existing radio-navigation systems used to obtain a ship’s position, such as
LORAN-C and Omega, were unavailable in the Arctic. Even the service’s pioneering Navy Navigation Satellite System (known as NAVSAT) was unreliable
in high latitudes, despite relying on satellites. These limitations resulted in the
navigator’s best friend becoming the Mk 19 gyrocompass; a warship’s navigator
and quartermasters would monitor the Mk 19 carefully as the boat approached
the pole, hoping that the gyro did not tumble and lose its ability to provide a
direction for the ship’s track.
Sailors faced many challenges to operating in the Arctic back then, more so
than they do when operating up north today. But our Navy was innovative and
determined, and the Soviet Union could not help but take note. Therefore, to
protect their Arctic submarine bastions, the Soviets sought to build stealthier and
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Members of the wardroom of USS Sea Devil (SSN 664) surfaced through the Arctic sea ice in 1985.

more-capable submarines to counter the threat of American fast-attack submarines in their back yard.
Although the Navy became proficient at operating in the High North even on
the surface, the end of the Cold War left the Arctic largely to those operating in
the undersea domain. The figure shows the members of the wardroom of USS
Sea Devil (SSN 664) when the boat was surfaced in a polynya—an opening in the
sea ice—on the first visit of one of the authors to the polar region. Fifteen years
after the author’s first voyage to the High North, his second deployment, for
LANTSUBICEX 2001, was less stressful. Training was about the same and an
ice pilot was assigned to ensure safe Arctic operations. However, it was remarkable how much less ice there was in both the marginal ice zone and within the
traditional demarcation of the pack-ice zone. Similarly, much to the author’s
chagrin, man-made pollution, particularly in the form of plastics, was much
more noticeable—a disconcerting shock amid the serene, azure-blue waters of
the Arctic.
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THE ARCTIC TODAY
The Arctic now resides at the intersection of rapidly evolving geopolitical,
economic, climate, and security trends. Although the world’s polar sailors long
characterized the region with the adage “High North, low tension,” today’s era of
competition is casting doubt on the continued applicability of this catchphrase;
instead, the Arctic is being catapulted into key security discussions. With just
about four million inhabitants, the Arctic region accounts for only a small fraction of the global population, but its strategic location and economic potential
and the stakeholders involved mean it has a disproportionate impact on global
security. Despite including the world’s smallest ocean, the Arctic region has the
potential to connect nearly 90 percent of the world’s economy.29 What happens in
the Arctic will not stay there. Melting Arctic ice is causing significant worldwide
changes, particularly in sea level / depth and salinity. The fragile Arctic ecosystem is changing as temperatures rise, bringing new fishing stocks north even as
some regional flora and fauna face endangerment. Climate and technological
trends are enabling greater access to abundant natural resources while also having a profound impact on human and military security. Geopolitical trends are
shaping the region further, in such a way that the Arctic no longer will remain an
isolated region of cooperation; some states will engage in competitive strategies
to maximize their national interests.
Russia
Russia has pursued an aggressive strategy in the Arctic. About half the Arctic
coastline and Arctic population lie within Russia’s borders, and the country is
increasingly reliant on the Arctic for economic benefits, from which it derives
about 10 percent of its gross domestic product and 20 percent of its exports.30
Russia established a joint strategic command (somewhat similar to the U.S.
geographic combatant commands, but with boundaries aligned to Russian territory) for the Arctic in 2014, has refurbished old Soviet-era military bases, and
has built fourteen new airfields and sixteen deepwater ports in the region.31
Russia has modernized both the Northern Fleet and its Arctic naval bases and
has shifted additional military assets to the region, bringing the share of the
country’s modern weapons, military, and special equipment in the Arctic zone
from 41 percent in 2014 to 59 percent in 2019.32 The Northern Fleet remains
Russia’s principal entity responsible for strategic deterrence, and it is committed
to protecting the Arctic bastions to ensure it retains a credible retaliatory capability. Alongside Russia’s established defensive capabilities, which include the
advanced S-400 missile system, the country also is pursuing more-disconcerting
offensive capabilities, as demonstrated by its stated intent to station the first
squadron of nuclear-capable Kinzhal-missile-equipped MiG-31K fighters on
the Kola Peninsula.33
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Russia also has invested heavily in infrastructure, including building more than
forty icebreakers to service its Arctic ports and towns, nearly a dozen of which
are nuclear powered. The naval icebreaker Ivan Papanin—equipped to carry the
highly capable Kalibr antiship cruise missile—was launched in October 2019 to
much fanfare, which noted the ship’s multiple roles as a tug, icebreaker, and patrol
vessel.34 These icebreakers will
Russia’s aggressive actions elsewhere—particu- be employed heavily along the
Northern Sea Route, which
larly in Ukraine—and its clear prioritization
connects Asia and Europe
of dominating the Arctic compel the United
across Russia’s northern borStates to ensure its capability to counter Rusder. Russia claims that the exsia in any domain.
tent of its exclusive economic
zone includes all the waters of the Northern Sea Route; even further, it considers
the entire route to fall within its historic internal waters. Relying on article 234 of
the 1984 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (known as UNCLOS),
it justifies setting rules and regulations for the route—an exercise of authority that
the United States and other nations do not recognize.35 Russia promotes the route as
a shorter alternative to the traditional commercial sea route that goes through the
Suez Canal and Strait of Malacca, although treacherous weather and sea conditions
and water-depth limitations diminish the northern route’s attractiveness. Work
along the route has provided Russia’s commercial and naval fleets extensive Arctic
operational experience.
As of 1 January 2021, Russia elevated the Northern Fleet to constitute its own
military district, the first time a fleet has held status equal to that of the existing
four predominantly land-focused military districts (designated West, South, East,
and Central).36 Military districts provide administrative and operational headquarters for Russian armed forces. The new district is tasked with ensuring Russian interests and territorial integrity in the Arctic, including Russia’s Arctic coast
and the Northern Sea Route. Admiral Aleksandr A. Moiseyev, Russia’s Northern
Fleet commander, noted that the joint strategic exercise ZAPAD, held annually in
a different military district, most recently in September 2021, will continue to
serve as the fleet’s main training effort.37 Russia’s prioritization of the Northern
Fleet indicates that in the High North the Russian navy will have the primary
responsibility for upholding Russian interests, in contrast to the prioritization
that ground forces receive in the rest of the nation.
China
Russia is striving to hold on to its commanding position in the Arctic domain, but
China is increasingly active in the region. The latter country long has maintained
a research station on Svalbard, and increasingly it has invested in Arctic maritime
capabilities, including building two icebreakers and making plans for additional
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icebreaking capability. China’s interest in the Arctic has been rising for years; its
January 2018 Arctic policy white paper introduces China as a near Arctic state—
an undefined term—and makes it clear that China intends to pursue interests in
the region, including adding to its Belt and Road Initiative a “Polar Silk Road”
component, as a northern route to European markets.38
Western sanctions against Russia for its annexation of Crimea in 2014 have
motivated increased cooperation between China and Russia in the Arctic, including significant Chinese investment in Russia’s Yamal Liquefied Natural Gas joint
venture. The Chinese drilling rig Nan Hai VIII (also known as Nan Hai Ba Hao),
in partnership with Gazprom (Russia’s state-owned energy corporation), has
explored fields in the Kara Sea, discovering some of the region’s largest gas fields.
To bring liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the Yamal terminal, the Christophe de
Margerie–class icebreaking LNG carriers were constructed at South Korea’s Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering in a joint venture among Sovcomflot
(Russia’s largest shipping company), Teekay Tankers of Bermuda (in partnership
with China LNG Shipping), the Greek concern Dynagas, and Mitsui OSK Lines
of Japan (in partnership with China Shipping Group).39
China has invested in infrastructure throughout the Arctic, with particular
attention to natural resources and Arctic infrastructure. China has demonstrated special interest in the shipping potential of the region, sending a small
number of commercial vessels through the Northern Sea Route each year,
including fourteen in 2021, according to Russia’s Northern Sea Route Administration. A three-month expedition in the summer of 2021 by the indigenously
built Chinese icebreaker Xue Long 2 marked China’s twelfth Arctic deployment
for scientific research, and provided China ample additional opportunity to
study the region’s characteristics to guide future civilian and military pursuits
in the Arctic.40
Skepticism from Others
Although Russia and China are pursuing ambitious plans in the Arctic, the
difficulties of operating in the region have tempered global commercial interest. While President Putin set a goal of 80 million tons of shipping through the
Northern Sea Route by 2024, 2021 saw just 35 million tons. So far, shipments predominantly consist of natural resources heading to Asian and European markets
rather than transit shipping of cargo, which totaled just 1.5 million tons in 2021
(compared with more than a billion tons through the Suez Canal).41
Yet there is no doubt that the thawing ice will continue to have effects. As new
shipping corridors become more viable, maritime traffic increasingly will be
drawn to the region. Fishing stocks will continue to move northward, and other
natural resources will be explored.
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THE OPENING ARCTIC IS A MARITIME DOMAIN
U.S. strategic interests in the Arctic—including economic, military, and geopolitical—will increase as regional activity rises. The U.S. Navy must be prepared to
uphold national interests, demonstrate credible presence, and ensure freedom of
navigation through the region. As the Arctic Ocean opens, strategic competition
for regional sea control will increase. The Navy must be ready.
The Department of the Navy will continue to fulfill a critical role in the Arctic
efforts of the Department of Defense. With their newly released Arctic Blueprint,
the Navy and Marine Corps have taken a forward-leaning approach to improving regional presence, partnerships, and capabilities.42 The U.S. Navy needs to
build on the lessons of the past to provide insights on how to compete more effectively in the High North, uphold international norms, and prepare to counter
the increasingly aggressive polar ambitions of Russia and China. And it must
prepare to defend American economic and strategic interests even more directly,
if necessary.
Although not yet “full speed ahead” in the Arctic, the Navy clearly is learning.
Inspired by the 1981 Exercise OCEAN VENTURE, Exercise TRIDENT JUNCTURE
2018 provided significant learning opportunities, as more than fifty thousand
sailors, soldiers, airmen, and Marines on nearly seventy warships, 250 aircraft,
and ten thousand tracked or rolling vehicles, including assets from every NATO
ally and two partner nations, conducted an article 5 collective-defense scenario
in Norway and nearby Arctic waters.43
The exercise, which was enabled by Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis’s
“dynamic force employment” concept that sent the Truman carrier strike group
north, was highly successful, but it also demonstrated the need to sharpen skill sets
for those contending with harsh northern environments. No U.S. aircraft carrier
had operated in the Arctic in nearly three decades. The weather was challenging,
so aircraft were launching at the margins of permissible conditions: twelve-toeighteen-foot seas and high winds. Yet sailors on board were innovative and found
creative solutions to problems. When CNO Admiral John M. Richardson embarked in USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75), he noticed Louisville Slugger baseball
bats lined up in a passageway; curious, he inquired what they were for. One of the
enterprising sailors explained that the bats were critically necessary—for breaking
ice off the deck.44 But while TRIDENT JUNCTURE demonstrated the ingenuity of
USN forces, it also revealed the complexity of Arctic operations. As USS Gunston
Hall (LSD 44) transited through heavy seas from Iceland to Norway, the ship
sustained damage to its well deck and several sailors were injured; instead of completing the exercise, Gunston Hall returned to Reykjavík and subsequently to the
United States, escorted by USS New York (LPD 21) as a precautionary measure.45
Aboard Truman, Rear Admiral Eugene H. Black III, the strike group commander,
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noted the key lesson learned: “You’ve got to be agile.”46 The experience reinforced
that extremely cold temperatures, frequent icing conditions, high sea states, unpredictable weather patterns, limited daylight, and greater distances to ports and
emergency divert fields make even basic operations more dangerous in the Arctic
than elsewhere.
The U.S. Navy must do more to remain competitive in the Arctic, given that
Russia has maintained a clear focus on achieving dominance in a region that is strategically located but incredibly difficult to operate in—for both sides. Hostile environmental conditions demand updated operational procedures, cold-weathertested gear, and special training to ensure not only war-fighting proficiency but
survival.
Russia has been improving its military capabilities and adding bases in the
region. In late April 2020, Russian paratroopers demonstrated operational proficiency in the challenging environment as they jumped out of an Il-76 transport
plane at a height of ten thousand meters above the Eastern Hemisphere’s northernmost archipelago, Russia’s Franz Josef Land, then conducted three days of
combat-training missions on Aleksandra Land, one of the archipelago’s largest
islands. There, at 80 degrees north latitude, Russia’s Arctic forces have expanded
Soviet-era Arctic infrastructure and built the world’s northernmost military
complex. The expansion of the Nagurskoye air base was designed to better secure approaches to the Russian coastline, protect natural resources, and improve
monitoring of Northern Sea Route traffic. The base includes a new 2,500-meter
runway.47 It also is home to an S-300 antiaircraft missile system, as well as to
troops equipped for Arctic warfare with snowmobiles, helicopters, radar systems,
and unmanned aerial vehicles designed for the harsh environment.48 General
Valery V. Gerasimov, Russia’s chief of general staff, has noted that the airport also
can host the new hypersonic Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile.49 The operating range of the missile is reported to be more than a thousand miles, which
means it can hold many European capitals at risk with either a conventional or
a nuclear-armed warhead.50 Indeed, Russia carefully is constructing a series of
bases in the region to ensure its coverage of the country’s northern flank as well
as the international waters of the Northern Sea Route.
While there is no issue with an independent state enacting defensive measures
to protect its sovereignty, Russia’s buildup includes offensive capabilities that
could hold not only the United States but also its regional allies and partners at
risk. Russia’s aggressive actions elsewhere—particularly in Ukraine—and its clear
prioritization of dominating the Arctic compel the United States to ensure its
capability to counter Russia in any domain.
In May 2020, a couple of weeks after Russia’s April 2020 exercise, a surface action group (SAG) of four USN warships and a British Royal Navy frigate patrolled
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the Barents Sea, the first such combined patrol since the Cold War. This was
meant to signal to the Russians that—as one of the authors explained, in his capacity as commander of U.S.
naval forces in Europe—the
The learning curve for Arctic operations is
Arctic was “nobody’s lake.”51
steep; mistakes can be costly. . . . [T]he U.S.
Navy [must] prepare now to be able to operate He went on to warn Russia
and China that access to the
in a region that is increasingly important; to
Arctic should be free and fair.
do so, the service must draw on the lessons of
The Barents Sea SAG disthe past.
played the strengthening U.S.
commitment to operating in the Arctic, and USN warships operated in the Arctic
consistently from May to November 2020.
NATO’s Exercise TRIDENT JUNCTURE and other USN and U.S. Marine Corps
exercises in the region have improved the services’ capabilities to operate in arduous conditions while demonstrating the need to build further on those foundations. The complexity involved in conducting military exercises in the region is
increasing as other Arctic states prepare to protect their interests against potential
security challenges.
During UMKA-21 in March 2021, Russia coordinated a first-ever surfacing of
three ballistic-missile submarines within three hundred meters of one another
off Aleksandra Land in the Franz Josef Land archipelago. The submarines carried a combined forty-eight ballistic missiles. Given the complexity and dangers
of operating in such an environment, the simultaneous surfacing demonstrated
a high level of crew training.52 The exercise—Russia’s most advanced military
drill in the Arctic yet—included forty-three events that took place at Franz Josef
Land and in nearby waters. Admiral Nikolay A. Yevmenov, commander of the
Russian navy, announced that “[u]nder the leadership of the Headquarters of
the Navy, the integrated Arctic expedition UMKA-2021 is being conducted. For
the first time, in accordance with a single concept and plan, complex combat
training, research, and practical measures of various directions is carried out in
the circumpolar region.”53
Since the region is attracting increasing global interest from states and corporations alike, the Navy must prepare to uphold U.S. strategic interests in the region,
particularly protecting the homeland and ensuring freedom of navigation. While
Russia long has been the most formidable Arctic state with which the United States
and like-minded allies have contended, there is increasing alarm over China’s keen
desire to be present in the Arctic. China’s issuance of its 2018 Arctic white paper,
participation in Arctic forums, conduct of scientific research, and investment in
the High North have demonstrated a firm commitment to exploring the region’s
economic potential. Scientific research conducted from its Svalbard research
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station and during icebreaker deployments yields data that will benefit both its
commercial and military ambitions in the region.54 The Arctic deployment of China’s indigenously built (though Finnish-designed) icebreaker Xue Long 2 in July
2020 marked China’s eleventh Arctic research expedition. It covered more than
twelve thousand nautical miles and conducted hydrographic surveys and mapping
of the ocean bottom—dual-use research that could signify preparation either to
conduct natural-resource exploration or send Chinese submarines north.55
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
Mariners throughout history have attested to the immense difficulty of operating in far-northern latitudes. The learning curve for Arctic operations is steep;
mistakes can be costly. It is imperative that the U.S. Navy prepare now to be able
to operate in a region that is increasingly important; to do so, the service must
draw on the lessons of the past.
The Navy Department’s January 2021 Arctic Blueprint offers a thoughtful
strategic approach to the region, and if the Navy and Marine Corps achieve the
goals it lays out they will be positioned well for a thawing Arctic. The publication
establishes three primary objectives: maintain enhanced presence, strengthen
cooperative partnerships, and build a more capable naval force.56 The strategy
provides a broad overview of each objective, and the relevant recommendations
are both sound and necessary; the authors will not repeat them here.
However, there are key areas on which naval forces should focus in the Arctic,
and as the strategy is implemented we must continue to do so if we are to achieve
the stated objectives fully. Our survey of the Navy’s history in the Arctic suggests
six areas of focus for naval forces today as they prepare to meet growing operational demands in the region.
Prepare for the Cold. The history of the Arctic is replete with stories of the devastating effects of the region’s notoriously harsh environment. Although the ice is
diminishing, the Arctic remains hostile. Sailors must prepare for intense cold—
dropping to minus forty degrees Celsius in winter—that hinders the functionality
of machinery and poses dangers to personnel.
The increasingly open waters of the Arctic have amplified the unpredictability of ice floes; the rapid melting of one-year ice can cause large blocks of
thicker multiyear ice to flow into sea-lanes, with conditions varying seasonally.
Furthermore, weather conditions compound the challenges posed by ice, as severe storms often further hinder transits. In the summer, heavy fog is common,
obscuring visibility and requiring vessels to slow down to avoid colliding with
unexpected ice and one another.57
The nearly four decades that have elapsed since the Navy published its Cold
Weather Handbook for Surface Ships have seen extraordinary and rapid changes
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to the Arctic environment and dramatic advances in maritime and cold-weather
technology, and there has been a significant evolution in naval operations and
procedures since the Cold War. These developments demand a comprehensive
update to the handbook so that naval forces can invest in the right gear and
focus their training to enable successful cold-weather operations.
Innovate. Early Arctic explorers were known for their resilience and innovation.
When something went wrong—which it often did—the most successful explorers
relied on their training and knowledge to apply or invent effective solutions. As
Commander Calvert of USS Skate noted, to succeed in the harsh Arctic environment it is essential for crewmembers to have both the appropriate training and
trust in one another.
The Navy should enhance support of similar innovation by sailors operating
in the High North via enhanced training and professional military education opportunities. It also should reward innovators—including by forgiving mistakes
made in the course of innovations attempted in good faith.
Everyone Is a Scientist. Intrepid naval officers who first explored the Arctic quickly realized the importance of understanding better the environment in which
they were operating; early journal articles on the region are filled with scientific
findings developed from naval voyages. Yet the Arctic remains one of the least
understood regions of the world.
To improve understanding of the Arctic’s meteorological and hydrographic
conditions, all Navy assets operating in the region should collect data, just as
Nautilus and Skate did on their early voyages to the North Pole. Embarking Naval
Meteorology and Oceanography Command (referred to as METOC) detachments on Arctic-bound vessels would help to ensure rigorous observation of the
Arctic environment. Data collected should be compiled into carefully managed
databases, both to preserve historical records and to enable trend analyses to
inform units operating in the region in the future.
Enhance Presence. As strategic competition among great powers intensifies, the
Navy must protect national interests, reassure allies and partners, and provide a
credible deterrence. Operations in the High North should be coordinated with
allies and partners to achieve these goals. In particular, the U.S. Navy can learn
from countries such as Norway and Denmark, which have the expertise that
comes from centuries of Arctic maritime experience. Allies such as the United
Kingdom will continue to sail alongside the United States into the frigid Arctic
waters, and enhancing our exercises in the region will continue to improve our
collective ability to operate there.
Key Arctic enabling capabilities such as icebreakers are “high-demand, lowdensity” assets, so the Navy must seek creative solutions, including by training
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crews of surface ships and providing the technology necessary for them to operate their vessels safely while sailing in icy Arctic waters. The Danes and Norwegians have proved that non-ice-strengthened ships can operate safely in the
region. Leasing civilian icebreaking assets could be considered to fill gaps until
the U.S. Coast Guard’s new polar security cutters are operational; delivery of the
first new U.S. heavy icebreaker has slipped to 2025.58 Creative options, such as a
combination of manned and unmanned platforms, can enhance the American
presence in the Arctic further.
Allies and Partners Matter. Early Arctic expeditions were known for their reliance on indigenous partners, owing to the latter’s knowledge and understanding of the region’s challenging environment. Just as Rear Admiral Peary relied
on Inuit expertise during his successful mission to the North Pole, today’s Navy
should increase exercises, operations, and personnel exchanges with Arctic allies and partners to enhance understanding of regional operations while building
interoperability.
Cooperation Is Essential. The arduous environmental conditions of the Arctic
long have made operations in the region conducive to cooperation. Whether
sharing data from scientific missions or conducting SAR operations, mariners in
the High North long have worked together to survive. Even among states engaged
in great-power competition, it is necessary to build on cooperative mechanisms
that can enhance transparency and reduce the potential for misunderstanding or
misperception.
The U.S. Navy has an impressive history of operating in the Arctic. Admiral
Peary, Admiral Byrd, and Captain Anderson achieved significant Arctic milestones, but their successes were enabled by the contributions of sailors such
as Commander Henry Glass and Lieutenant Danenhower, who meticulously
documented Arctic conditions during earlier Arctic expeditions. Given the
complexities of today’s dynamic strategic environment, it is imperative that the
Navy be prepared to operate in any domain—even the harshest region in the
world.
The opening of the Arctic Ocean and the increasing interest in the High North
by Arctic and non-Arctic states alike demand the application of past lessons to
enhance operations in the future. To secure America’s long-term strategic interests while supporting the broader goal of collective defense among allies and
partners, it is critical for the Navy to examine the lessons from its Arctic history
and apply them to ensure maritime superiority.
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THE IMPER ATIVE OF POLITIC AL NAVIGATION
India’s Strategy in the Indian Ocean and the Logic of Indo-U.S.
Strategic Partnership
Yogesh Joshi

W

hen in April 2021 USS John Paul Jones (DDG 53) conducted a freedomof-navigation operation (FONOP) in India’s exclusive economic zone
(EEZ), a section of India’s highly vocal strategic community erupted with indignation and criticism.1 Steeped in the precepts of nonalignment, these passionate
defenders of India’s strategic autonomy and modern purveyors of a Nehruvian
foreign policy accused the Seventh Fleet of violating India’s domestic law.2
The U.S. Navy (USN) actions raised significant doubts regarding India’s capability to safeguard its maritime interests.3 Some even argued that such FONOPs
diminished India’s credibility to deter China’s encroachment into India’s maritime zone of influence. After all, the legitimacy of India’s position hinged on an
equal application of the law to all, whether friend or foe.4 FONOPs challenged
two salient aspirations of Nehruvian foreign policy: Indian leadership of the
South Asian region and recognition of the same by other great powers. The
Indian government’s pallid response to this unwanted foray into the country’s
“sphere of influence” could signal to the region that New Delhi has forfeited its
leadership role to Washington.5 As one commentator argued, by “encouraging the
United States to assume a dominant role in South Asia, India might be on a path
to relinquish its security commitments in the neighborhood.”6
The furor the Nehruvians raised even rubbed
Yogesh Joshi is a research fellow at the Institute of
raw
the sensibilities of some of the more-pragmatic
South Asian Studies, National University of Sinmembers of the Indian strategic community,
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an and American conceptions of the “rules-based
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order” in the Indo-Pacific differ substantially, but, as Admiral Arun Prakash
warned, instead of “deterring adversaries” FONOPs can “alienate friends” in the
Indo-Pacific.7 For Vice Admiral Pradeep Chauhan, the FONOP in India’s EEZ
reflected the propensity of the United States to “shoot itself in the foot,” considering the damage it had done to the otherwise rising trajectory of the bilateral
relationship.8 The incident, therefore, was construed as highly detrimental to the
Indo-U.S. strategic partnership.
As if these recriminations were not enough, the “breathtaking inanity” (as
Prakash had dubbed it) of the Seventh Fleet’s actions managed to resurrect yet
again the haunting memories of American gunboat diplomacy during the 1971
Bangladesh war, when President Nixon dispatched the Seventh Fleet to the Bay
of Bengal in support of Pakistan. As Manish Tewari, a senior leader of the main
opposition party, the Indian National Congress, observed, “In the fiftieth year of
the creation of Bangladesh, to sail a Seventh Fleet vessel in defiance of Indian law
through our EEZ, and then advertise it is downright obtuse, if not intended to
send out a message to India and the larger Indo-Pacific region.”9
Therefore, at stake were not only India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity
but also its prestige as a major regional power in the Indian Ocean and the future
of the Indo-U.S. strategic partnership.
Yet while the proponents of strategic autonomy and nonalignment within
the strategic community wanted the Indian government, led by the right-ofcenter Bharatiya Janata Party, to save India’s honor and defend its interests, India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) merely conveyed concerns “regarding
this passage through our EEZ to the Government of USA through diplomatic
channels.”10 And Admiral Karambir Singh, the chief of naval staff, simultaneously
was declaring the capability and intentions of the Indian navy to coordinate and
interoperate with the navies of the other Quad countries, of which the United
States is one.11 Seemingly, the Indian government neither shared the humiliation
felt and expressed by the analytical community nor appeared to be concerned
over the purported violation of India’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, or domestic law—or, for that matter, its material interests and status concerns in the
Indian Ocean.
What can explain this dissonance between the positions of India’s highly vocal
Nehruvian strategic community and those of the Indian strategic establishment?
Or what explains “the enduring reluctance of Delhi’s foreign policy community,” as C. Raja Mohan puts it, to understand the praxis of Indian foreign and
national-security policy, both in the Indian Ocean and vis-à-vis its relations with
the United States?12
The question acquires additional importance when one considers the following facts. First, given that the U.S. Navy has conducted FONOPs in India’s EEZ
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regularly since 1992, successive Indian governments—of all ideological dispositions—can be considered complicit in not defending India’s interests and honor;
the absence of a firm response is not the policy of the current government alone.13
Second, the Indian government’s statement clearly outlined that even though
Washington had not notified New Delhi of the drill, the Indian navy “continuously monitored [USN ships] transiting from the Persian Gulf towards the Malacca Straits.”14 The FONOP was not conducted in secrecy. If the government had
wanted to do so, it could have raised the issue diplomatically; and, given how seriously it takes such violations even by friendly navies, it might have “challenged”
such navigation physically.15 Yet New Delhi was interested in doing neither.
The critics within the Indian strategic community fail to account for New
Delhi’s policies for four principal reasons. First, they underestimate the strength
of the realpolitik tradition in India’s foreign and security policies in the Indian
Ocean. Irrespective of the idealistic and normative overtones of India’s foreignpolicy pronouncements—whether on the presence of great-power navies in the
Indian Ocean, the question of the so-called Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZP),
the matter of Diego Garcia, or, for that matter, the law of the sea—Indian foreign
policy always has been highly pragmatic.16 This pragmatism is engendered by an
acknowledgment of the incompatibility between the desirability and the feasibility of India’s preferred position, by a similar disconnect regarding attempts to use
normative arguments to secure India’s material interests, and also by the realization that today’s commitments could become tomorrow’s constraints. India’s strategic community regularly has underestimated New Delhi’s “capacity to rework
its great power relations to meet India’s changing interests and circumstances.”17
Second, those in this community misunderstand the relationship between international law and politics. Both the codification and the application of law are
determined by what is politically desirable, negotiable, and feasible in a particular
historical context. It is politics that determines how the law will be applied and, if
need be, altered, depending on the state’s interests. India’s Maritime Zones Act of
1976, which lays out India’s legal position on foreign military presence in the EEZ,
is also subject to the vagaries of the country’s political interests.18 In international
politics, the legal tail seldom wags the political dog.
Third, China’s rise as a great power in India’s immediate neighborhood has
shifted New Delhi’s motivation fundamentally toward a robust Indo-U.S. strategic
partnership. Even during the Cold War, India leveraged the great powers—both
the United States and the Soviet Union—to ensure that its security requirements
were met, yet while doing so it could continue to feign nonalignment because
both great powers were geographically distant in the maritime realm and had no
fundamental conflict of interest with India. The rise of China has changed India’s
geopolitical imperative. For the first time in the history of the Republic of India,
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it faces a hostile great power on its immediate borders. In the post–Cold War
period, India “bandwagoned” with the United States for economic and military
gains; today, however, the issues at stake are much more existential. Both Indian
political survival and the avoidance of Chinese hegemony in Asia necessitate a
closer alignment with the United States.
Last but not least is the lack of a deeper historical understanding of India’s
foreign-policy positions.19 Any immersive engagement with archival sources
reveals the inherent contradictions between India’s foreign-policy pronouncements and its practice, but in the absence of such careful study the analytical
community often has erred by taking India’s public declarations as representing
its intended policy and its foreign-policy principles as denoting the limits of
potential behavior.
However, extensive documentary evidence from Indian archives is now available. Using those resources, along with interviews with government officials, this
article aims to explain the above-mentioned dissonance between the students and
the practitioners of Indian security policy in the Indian Ocean, especially with
regard to the role of the United States in the region. It argues that, unlike those
making up a large section of the strategic community, which remains embedded in the Nehruvian rhetoric of nonalignment and strategic autonomy, India’s
foreign-policy mandarins and its national-security managers always have
adopted a realpolitik approach to security concerns in the Indian Ocean and the
involvement of great powers in the region. In doing so, the article also traces the
many twists and turns in the Indo-U.S. relationship and explains the current trajectory of the two nations’ burgeoning partnership in the Indian Ocean.
GREAT-POWER PRESENCE AND INDIA’S REALPOLITIK IN THE
INDIAN OCEAN
As India and China were engaged in a crisis over eastern Ladakh in July 2020, an
aircraft carrier strike group (CSG) led by USS Nimitz (CVN 68) under the U.S.
Navy’s Seventh Fleet transited through the Indian Ocean.20 Nimitz’s foray into the
Bay of Bengal and the ensuing passing exercise (known as a PASSEX) with warships from the Indian navy’s Eastern Naval Command hardly was accidental.21
Irrespective of whether Nimitz’s transit had any direct impact on Beijing’s calculations on the Sino-Indian crisis, it did help to ventilate emotions stirred up by
China’s heavy-handedness in the region. China should not commit the mistake
of “underestimating the strength of free democracies,” warned then–U.S. Defense
Secretary Mark T. Esper.22
However, the significance of Nimitz’s passage through the Indian Ocean
was far greater. The Seventh Fleet finally had “eclipsed” the emotional baggage
weighing on Indo-American relations owing to its past actions.23 In December
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss3/1
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1947

India gains independence, Indian navy established

1958

UNCLOS I held

1960

UNCLOS II held

1962

First assistance to India by USN CSG, during India-China
war

1963

U.S. extends operational area of Seventh Fleet to include
Indian Ocean; U.S. and India sign port visit MOU

1964

China explodes first nuclear device

1966–69

Britain withdraws naval forces from east of Suez

1967

India extends territorial sea claim to twelve miles

1971

U.S. begins rapprochement with China

1971

Bangladesh war partitions Pakistan; India intervenes in Bangladesh; USS Enterprise CSG enters Bay of Bengal, attempting
to coerce cessation

1971

India and USSR conclude treaty of friendship

1971

IOZP proposed in UN General Assembly

1973–82

UNCLOS III held

1974–76

USN aircraft buzz Indian navy ships

1977

India’s Maritime Zones Act goes into effect

1982

UNCLOS completed and ratification begins
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1986, 1988 India intervenes in Seychelles/Maldives
1989–92

End of Cold War and USSR

1992

First Exercise Malabar held, between U.S. and India in
Indian Ocean

1992

USN begins regular FONOPs in India’s prospective EEZ

1995

India ratifies and issues declaration on UNCLOS

2007

India, U.S., Japan, and Australia establish the Quad and
hold Exercise Malabar-2007 in Bay of Bengal; China
protests

2010–13

The Quad quiescent

2013

India scuttles U.S.-Maldives agreement

2014

PLAN nuclear submarine transits Indian Ocean en route to
Pakistan

2017

Members agree to revive Quad

2019

Indian navy forces PLAN research vessel to depart Andaman Sea

2020

Galwan / eastern Ladakh crisis between India and China;
USS Nimitz CSG conducts PASSEX with Indian navy in Bay
of Bengal

2020

India fosters U.S.-Maldives agreement

2021

USS John Paul Jones CSG conducts FONOP in India’s EEZ

Notes: CSG = carrier strike group; EEZ = exclusive economic zone; FONOP = freedomof-navigation operation; IOZP = Indian Ocean Zone of Peace; MOU = memorandum of
understanding; PASSEX = passing exercise; PLAN = People’s Liberation Army Navy (China);
UNCLOS = UN Convention on the Law of the Sea; UNCLOS I, II, III = First, Second, Third
UN Conference on the Law of the Sea; USN = U.S. Navy; USSR = Soviet Union

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2022

47

42

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 75 [2022], No. 3, Art. 1

1971, President Richard M. Nixon ordered USS Enterprise (CVN 65) to sail
into the Bay of Bengal to coerce India to cease its intervention in Bangladesh.24
Nixon’s gunboat diplomacy could not stop Pakistan’s dismemberment; however, ever since then the Seventh Fleet has retained an infamous reputation
in India’s strategic consciousness. Nixon’s actions ensured that New Delhi remained both disagreeable and distrustful regarding any U.S. military presence
in the Indian Ocean. And in the post–Cold War period, the incident has provided the reference point for domestic opposition to the strengthening IndoU.S. strategic partnership. In this context, the show of solidarity by the Nimitz
CSG during the Galwan crisis was perceived not merely as an act of support
for India’s resistance to China but also as granting the Seventh Fleet absolution
for the sins committed in December 1971. Even so, against the backdrop of the
recent FONOPs, comparisons to the 1971 Enterprise incident were back in vogue.
For the domestic critics of the Indo-U.S. strategic partnership, Nixon’s gunboat
diplomacy remains the gift that simply keeps on giving.
However, considering December 1971 to be the reference point for the Seventh Fleet’s entry into the Indian Ocean—and India’s strategic memory—is erroneous. The Seventh Fleet first was ordered to the Indian Ocean by President John
F. Kennedy in November 1962, in response to an explicit request from Indian
prime minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to provide air support against Communist China.25 On receiving Nehru’s request for assistance, the “aircraft carrier
[USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63)] of the Seventh Fleet was detailed to steam at full speed
for the Bay of Bengal.”26 However, the war ended before the Seventh Fleet units
could arrive in the region.
Although this was the first time since independence that India had welcomed
American intervention in the region, the presence of friendly great powers in
the Indian Ocean on which New Delhi could bandwagon for the sake of Indian
maritime security was part and parcel of the government’s security policy in the
Indian Ocean from the very beginning.27 In August 1947, the Royal Indian Navy
prepared its first planning paper for postindependence India. For Naval Headquarters in New Delhi, “a navy commanding the respect of the world” was not
a “luxury” but an “essential” prerequisite for “pre-eminence and leadership” in
South and Southeast Asia and for maintaining its “position in world strategy as
the focal country of the Indian Ocean.” The navy’s outlook was driven by a Mahanian vision of the service’s role in India’s future wars and the country’s aspiration to
take over the British mantle in the Indian Ocean; India’s maritime security could
be achieved best by “destroying or neutralising the enemy naval forces and by
ensuring that enemy shipping is deprived [of] the use of the seas.”28
The plan prepared by Naval Headquarters was one of the most ambitious in the
entire Third World; it also was detached entirely from India’s political, economic,
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and strategic realities. Politically, Indian decision makers neither shared the navy’s
vision of India’s strategic objectives nor appreciated the role of the navy in India’s
military strategy. Skeptical of the claims that India would become a significant
military power in the next decade, Nehru limited the country’s military objectives to ensuring “internal and frontier security.” For such limited aims, India
required “land forces not greater than the pre-war level,” and of course “the air
forces,” which Nehru saw as the “most efficient weapon” for “immediate action”
against any external “aggression.”29 The navy did not fit into Nehru’s vision for the
future of India’s armed forces, mainly owing to the absence of any specific maritime threat and the presence of friendly great powers in the Indian Ocean. British
military strategists such as Patrick M. S. Blackett, to whom Nehru often turned
for advice regarding India’s defense requirements and posture, reinforced this
belief. In a top secret report submitted to the Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD)
in September 1948, Blackett argued that the Indian navy should “look after the
coastal and local defences, and the escort of convoys in the Indian Ocean, leaving
the major fighting units to be provided by the great powers.”30
It also was easy for New Delhi to adopt a “cryptic,” or unstated, bandwagoning
strategy because there were only minimal associated costs to pay. In public, Nehru continued to oppose any great-power presence in the Indian Ocean; proclaim
the policy of nonalignment; and refuse to sanction explicit security cooperation
with the British and the Americans, not only because of their existing presence in
the region, but also owing to a belief that, if need be, they would come to India’s
aid anyway. Nehru, therefore, rejected any explicit defense talks with the British
and the idea of a Commonwealth security pact. However, the inherent dichotomy
in India’s nonalignment policy—that the political leadership in New Delhi considered India “too important to be a junior partner in a military alliance yet too
weak to be left alone to its resources”—was captured in Nehru’s defense minister
Baldev Singh’s reassurance to the British that, irrespective of the Indian prime
minister’s public position, “his colleagues in the cabinet fully realise that India
cannot stand alone in defence matters.”31 Therefore, in the postindependence
period India chose to bandwagon on the dominant Western naval forces instead
of developing itself into an independent naval power. However, the perceived
absence of maritime threats was reassuring only in a context in which no threat
could materialize from over the horizon, given the dominance of Western naval
forces in the Indian Ocean.
India’s dichotomous approach toward Western naval powers in the region also
was evident in the positions its government took during the first United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, in 1958. India’s diplomatic position was torn
between its cryptic bandwagoning strategy and its public rhetoric supporting
Third World solidarity and sovereignty. On three major dimensions of the debate
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during the 1958 conference, India opted for a course closer to that of the Western states than of its Third World colleagues. The first concerned the expansion
of the limits of territorial seas from three to twelve nautical miles. The second
pertained to the right of innocent passage and the requirement for “authorisation
and/or notification” by foreign warships sailing through the territorial seas. The
third concerned the rights of coastal states in the contiguous zone adjoining the
territorial seas, and the status of those waters as high seas.
Whereas the major maritime powers, led by the United States, wanted to limit
the extent of territorial seas to three nautical miles, many Latin American and
Afro-Asian countries wanted to assert their sovereignty to twelve nautical miles,
and even beyond.32 The Soviet Union had lobbied vigorously for the new limits,
as they would complicate the projection of naval power by the Western maritime
powers. India, however, supported a compromise advanced by the United States
and Britain to limit the extent of territorial seas to six nautical miles. Although
the compromise solution was defeated by a narrow margin and none other could
be agreed on under the 1958 convention, President Dwight D. Eisenhower fulsomely stated American appreciation for India’s position, asserting that it was
owing only to that country’s “gratifying support” that “such a proposal came close
to adoption at the last conference.”33
On the question of innocent passage, during the deliberations at the 1958
Geneva summit India supported the requirement for “authorisation [of] and/
or notification [by]” foreign warships and commercial ships passing through
a state’s territorial waters. Scholars have claimed that this was India’s position,
and that it was one of the primary reasons for the government’s nonsignature.34
However, archival documents now available indicate that both the MoD and
the MEA instead had recommended signing the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, which required only notification, not
authorization. The Indian government delayed taking a firm position on this
requirement even after the 1958 convention. This was both because “they [the
conventions] were incomplete” and because the forthcoming second conference, in 1960, could look at these “unsettled questions,” so there was no need
to sign the conventions “in haste.”35 Moreover, during the deliberations in
Geneva the Indian representative had urged caution on the drafters regarding
some of the provisions sought by other developing countries, arguing that “the
coastal state could not act with impunity” to restrict innocent passage, as any
such “suspension” had to be “bonafide,” and the “burden of proof ” lay with
the coastal state.
Lastly, India also argued against extending the full rights of the coastal state
to the contiguous zone. The government held that “the contiguous zone was not
part of the territorial sea of the coastal state.”36
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One of the main reasons for this alignment closer to the Western states during
the Geneva conference was the fear of misuse of territorial seas by both adversaries and other coastal states. India’s MEA reasoned that many developing states
with very few naval resources would not be able to shoulder the responsibility “to
prevent any violation of their territorial sea by other states, particularly in wartime when the territorial waters of the neutral states could give refuge to unscrupulous belligerents.” Second, even though “innocent passage” through territorial
waters might be codified in law, “different states interpret these rights differently,”
which might lead to “considerable harassment” of foreign ships sailing through a
state’s waters. Lastly, extending the territorial seas to twelve nautical miles would
incorporate many areas of the high seas into national jurisdictions. This was
particularly problematic for crucial international waterways such as the Red Sea
and Strait of Malacca, “which would remain high seas under a 6-mile width” but
“would become closed by an extension of territorial waters to 12 miles.” For the
MEA, the “fears of harassment” in connection with Indonesian claims along the
Strait of Malacca, which historically have become more vociferous during internal troubles in the country, were of particular concern.37
New Delhi demurred from signing any of the four proffered conventions or
the optional protocol, even though all the ministries concerned—Defence, External Affairs, Agriculture, and Law—“recommended signatures without reservations.” Even Nehru had assured Eisenhower, during the president’s trip to India
in 1959, of India’s support in the forthcoming second conference, in 1960.38 This
(negative) action was taken largely because of the blowback received from the
Soviet Union and Afro-Asian countries, and the criticism the 1958 document
received from Nehru’s newly appointed—and influential—defense minister,
V. K. Krishna Menon. As Menon wrote to Nehru, “in this battle between haves and
have-nots,” India’s position should not constitute a “considerable departure” from
our policy of not “lining up with the power alignment with the powerful nations
[sic].” Menon built his central thesis on the assumption that the UN Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) process supported the interests of major maritime
powers and was not in the long-term interests of a large coastal state such as India.39
As we will see in the next section, India’s rise as a naval power in the 1970s
and ’80s fundamentally contradicted Menon’s thesis; however, during the 1960s
India’s approach to UNCLOS remained ambivalent. India neither created a
domestic law to assert its sovereignty within its territorial seas nor extended its
territorial seas to twelve nautical miles (until 1967, as a reaction to Pakistani
claims), in contrast to the actions of many other Afro-Asian and Latin American
states. As one scholar of India’s international legal practice has argued, “India,
unlike [with] disarmament and other regimes, at various junctures, maintained
a low profile in the Law of Sea Convention negotiations because its interests in
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freedom of navigation and security were identical to the interests of the major
maritime powers.”40
Yet to come to this realization entirely, India still had to experience the trauma
of defeat at the hands of China and the exultation of victory at Pakistan’s expense.
As Srinath Raghavan has argued, Nehru’s unfounded realism—the belief that the
great powers would not let India fall by the wayside even without security commitments—came crashing down during the Sino-Indian border war of 1962.41 If
New Delhi’s strategy of bandwagoning with friendly great powers in the Indian
Ocean had been driven earlier by an assessment of their interests and of India’s
place in the Cold War, the China threat, along with the emergence of the Pakistani and Indonesian navies, lent a sense of desperation to India’s perception of
its security requirements in the Indian Ocean. Therefore, when in December
1963 Washington formally announced its decision to “extend the operational
area of the Seventh Fleet to the Indian Ocean,” Nehru welcomed American ships
to Indian ports gladly.42 India and the United States also signed a memorandum
of understanding that facilitated visits by USN warships to Indian ports every six
months.43 By 1964, when China conducted its first nuclear test, India’s security
reliance on the U.S. Navy extended from conventional deterrence even to nuclear
deterrence. The presence of nuclear-weapons-capable U.S. ships and submarines
was construed as providing an implicit nuclear deterrent and was perceived as
reassurance vis-à-vis India’s hostile Himalayan neighbor.44
Even so, New Delhi could not support the U.S. presence explicitly, in public,
for three reasons.45 First, it needed to retain a semblance of the nonaligned foreign policy it supposedly shared with its Third World colleagues. Second, China
already had started canvassing for a more significant role in Indian Ocean politics
by championing the cause of anti-imperialism in the region. Not only did the issue of foreign military bases rankle within the domestic politics of Indian Ocean
states; it also provided fertile ground for Maoist revolutionary ideas exported into
Afro-Asia.46 Lastly, Moscow had warned New Delhi against providing any justification for the “US to consolidate its nuclear presence in the Indian Ocean area
on the pretext of offering nuclear protection to India [and other countries].”47
In private, however, New Delhi not only encouraged the U.S. Navy to bolster
its presence in the region; it also rejected the suggestions of Afro-Asian countries
to oppose actively the movements of USN ships within the Indian Ocean.48 As
L. K. Jha, principal secretary to India’s second prime minister, L. B. Shastri, advised in a top secret note of March 1965, even when the “Afro-Asian powers are
averse to the idea of nuclear weapons being carried in the Ocean close to their
borders,” India has to “live with a hostile nuclear power on its borders.” For India,
therefore, it was “difficult” to be “equally averse to movements of nuclear weapons
of Powers more friendly to us in the Indian Ocean.”49 Y. D. Gundevia, India’s then
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foreign secretary, took a similar position on the issue of the U.S. military base
on Diego Garcia, a British-controlled island in the Indian Ocean. In a strongly
worded memo, he argued against those of his colleagues favoring more-robust
opposition against the U.S. base: “If Mrs. Bhandaranaike shouts about Chagos
because it is nearer to Ceylon than Lop Nor; the same argument must apply, in
reverse, to Lop Nor, which is a slap across our northern borders. We cannot talk
about islands in the Indian Ocean, without condemning Chinese Nuclear land
bases, nearer to our borders; and if our friends want us to join in the howl against
Indian Ocean bases, we must expect them to not remain silent on the Chinese
nuclear bases, much closer to us.”50
For many in India, the Diego Garcia base and the subsequent stationing of
Polaris submarines in the Indian Ocean reflected a joint Western understanding
to provide a nuclear umbrella against the Chinese.51 Rather than reeking of antiAmericanism, India’s approach to the Indian Ocean was premised principally on
bandwagoning with the great powers.
The policy of cryptic bandwagoning continued even after the British withdrawal from the Indian Ocean. Britain’s 1966 defense white paper recommended
relocating British naval assets then operating east of Suez. As the British prepared
to leave the Indian Ocean in the late 1960s, the Indian navy feared that hostile
powers would try to gain a toehold in the Indian Ocean. The British move motivated the Indian naval staff to argue a “vacuum of maritime power” theory: that
in the face of British withdrawal inimical forces would take over custody of the
Indian Ocean. The concern was whether the vacuum the British left would allow
China to “extend her influence” by cooperating with Pakistan in the region.52 Not
without reason, therefore, Indian naval chief Admiral A. K. Chatterji suggested a
forward naval policy in the Indian Ocean, including the establishment of a fueling base in Mauritius.53
Indian decision makers, however, were not in favor of extending India’s
sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, as far as deterring China was
concerned, the presence of great powers in the Indian Ocean remained highly
reassuring. As a top secret assessment emanating from Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi’s office in April 1970 stated, “[J]ust as nobody in India can be certain that
the United States would use its nuclear weapons against China in the event of a
Chinese threat to India, nobody in China can be certain that the United States, in
fact, will not use its nuclear weapons against her.”54 U.S. naval operations in the
Indian Ocean buttressed India’s perceptual deterrence vis-à-vis China. Therefore,
Indian decision makers ignored the Indian navy’s call to fill the power vacuum
the British left in the Indian Ocean; the quest to balance China’s conventional and
nuclear threat dominated India’s approach to the Indian Ocean, and the presence
of great powers provided a cheaper policy alternative.
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As the historical narrative offered above shows, India’s first encounters with
the Seventh Fleet, or more broadly with great powers such as the United States in
the Indian Ocean, hardly can be characterized uniformly by feelings of anxiety,
insecurity, humiliation, and distrust; rather, it reveals how New Delhi early on
actually came to love the Seventh Fleet and the U.S. naval presence. Post-1971
sentimentalities notwithstanding, the relationship between India and the U.S.
Navy (and Britain’s Royal Navy before that) was one of “friends with benefits,”
so to speak. The American presence in the Indian Ocean and in the larger IndoPacific region serves a similar purpose today.
THE LAW OF THE SEA AND THE FREEDOM OF
POLITICAL NAVIGATION
India’s strategy in the Indian Ocean during the 1960s suffered from the basic
weakness of any bandwagoning approach: What should the bandwagoner do if
the great power turns hostile? President Nixon’s embrace of China to outflank
the Soviet Union in the bipolar contest of the Cold War created a dilemma for
India. As a top secret MEA report in February 1970 stated, “[E]stablishment of a
working relationship between USA and China is likely to work to our detriment,
politically and economically.”55 Whereas India had banked on an implicit U.S., or
at least U.S.-sponsored, deterrent vis-à-vis China, by early 1971 Washington had
conveyed to New Delhi that “if the Chinese were to come to Pakistan’s assistance
in an attack on India, the U.S. would not find it possible to help us.” With one
superpower turning hostile (or at least less supportive), India’s cryptic bandwagoning strategy had to give way; New Delhi instead signed an Indo-Soviet treaty
in August 1971. As India’s ambassador to the United States told U.S. Secretary of
State William P. Rogers, nonalignment does not mean that “in facing aggression
and/or threats of aggression, we will be alone and single-handed.”56
The 1971 war with Pakistan over the creation of Bangladesh resulted in contradictory impulses, of both exultation and anxiety. First, it entrenched a belief
of regional supremacy, or at least an aspiration toward it, in New Delhi. The war
laid the ideological, if not the material, edifice of India’s equivalent of the Monroe Doctrine.57 However, the previously discussed actions of the Seventh Fleet
toward the end of the war left a distinct impression of vulnerability on the Indian
psyche. Henceforth, the aspiration to establish the country’s supremacy within
the region and reduce its vulnerability against extraregional powers drove India’s
approach to the Indian Ocean. Given the country’s lack of material resources,
the tools of diplomacy, law, and morality became India’s primary instruments to
achieve its interests in the region.
The impact of this policy imperative first became evident in India’s approach
to the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace.58 If India earlier had conspired against its
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fellow nonaligned states silently, now it led that opposition from the front. As new
archival research shows, “[h]olding the Great Powers responsible solely for IOR’s
[Indian Ocean region’s] militarization and restricting the IOZP from addressing
any local imbalances of power assured that India’s regional primacy, achieved in
the aftermath of the 1971 war, would remain intact.”59 The same was true for India’s
position on Diego Garcia. In the 1960s, Indian diplomats had promised their British counterparts that the “Indian government did not propose to push their protest
[regarding the Anglo-American understanding on Diego Garcia] beyond a formal
objection. British base in the Indian Ocean might well in the long term be of advantage to India.”60 However, the change in India’s political circumstances transformed
what once may have been perceived as a security asset into a manifest threat.
Therefore, India’s approach to the evolving legal regime on the law of the
sea in the 1970s cannot be divorced from India’s political-strategic imperatives.
And, as in the cases of both the IOZP and Diego Garcia, India’s position on freedom of navigation in the EEZ was driven by two competing logics: power and
vulnerability.
In South Asia, India was one of the first states to endorse openly the EEZ
provision in the draft UNCLOS. With a total of 587,600 square nautical miles
in its nascent EEZ, India would be one of the top beneficiaries of the emerging
resource jurisdiction in the high seas. The discovery in the early 1970s of oil resources off the coast of Bombay and technological breakthroughs in seabed mining only heightened India’s interest in the concept. As was the case everywhere
else in the developing world, the fundamental impulse to claim an Indian EEZ
was “resource-oriented.”61
However, the motivation to claim EEZs was not purely economic. Like the rest
of the Third World, India was equally enthused by the prospect that the global
political-legal trend on EEZs might help extend the territorial sovereignty of
coastal states into the high seas. For India, such an extension of territorial jurisdiction could engender new “psycho-legal boundaries” against the military presence of hostile great powers in the Indian Ocean.62 As Elizabeth Young argued in
a 1974 article, “The great navies will find their traditional roaming of the open
seas, ‘showing the flag’ in their nation’s interest, constrained, psychologically
where not physically, by the multitude of new jurisdictional boundaries.”63 In the
face of material constraints on India’s naval power, the law of the sea provided a
perfect combination of diplomacy, legality, and morality for New Delhi to use to
achieve its immediate objectives in the region.
A concrete example of such thinking within the Indian establishment is available in a top secret note made by the Legal Treaties Division of the MEA in July
1976.64 Between 1974 and 1976, several incidents occurred in which Indian navy
ships were buzzed and harassed by USN aircraft on what were then the high seas
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of the Indian Ocean, but which prospectively would fall within the Indian EEZ
under UNCLOS.65 The MoD requested that the MEA take up the matter with the
American embassy in New Delhi, but it also sought a legal opinion on “whether
such acts of snooping and buzzing by the US Aircraft amount to a violation of
rights of the Indian Navy to conduct its operations on the high seas or any right
it may have in this regard.”
In the event, although India communicated its concerns to the U.S. embassy,
the foreign secretary cautioned the MoD that “New Delhi should not make much
of an issue.”66 The MEA believed that unnecessary publicity of these events could
create a political crisis for the government and “put a strain” on bilateral IndoU.S. relations.67
Second—and more interestingly—the MEA believed that U.S. actions did not
violate any international law. As the Legal Treaties Division explained, the 1958
Geneva Convention on the High Seas “allows such action under the freedom of
the high seas.” Furthermore, the note accepted that “even in the context of current negotiations on the law of the sea, the freedom of navigation and freedom to
fly over the oceans beyond the limits of the territorial sea are unchallenged.” The
issue, therefore, was not a matter of legal rights—which were nonexistent—but
of avoiding serious accidents on the high seas. Therefore, the practical solution
was to subject the interactions between the two navies to standards similar to
those the Soviet Union and United States had negotiated in their agreement on
the prevention of incidents on the high seas.68 Looking to the future, however, the
division pointed out that the ongoing negotiations in the United Nations could
create new legal boundaries to the U.S. presence in India’s adjacent high seas:
“[I]f these incidents occur in the maritime areas over which” India could gain
“sovereignty or sovereign rights or special rights, they may be regarded as interference with or violation of our rights thereunder.”69
India’s interests and expectations concerning the ongoing negotiations on the law
of the sea were principally responsible for the enactment—even before UNCLOS
was negotiated fully—of its domestic law on the subject, the previously mentioned
Maritime Zones Act of 1976. As one of the Indian negotiators of UNCLOS has argued, the act was “umbrella legislation” that asserted India’s claims in anticipation of
their acceptance at the third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III).70
Thus, the domestic law prefigured, rather than followed, the international treaty on
the law of the sea. The law laid out the maximum extent of India’s interests—not its
obligations—projected to flow from the conclusion of the 1982 treaty, UNCLOS.
When the domestic law came into effect in 1977, India also created a police force—
the Indian Coast Guard—to implement its domestic laws in its EEZ.
The terms of the Maritime Zones Act not only required any foreign warships
to provide prior notification of movement in India’s EEZ; it also declared that the
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government of India could restrict or regulate freedom of navigation in “designated areas” of its EEZ if deemed necessary in the “interests of the peace, good
order, or security of India.”71 Prima facie, both of these provisions in domestic law
were in contravention of the customary law of freedom of navigation on the high
seas. During the negotiation of UNCLOS India’s appeal to have these provisions
accepted was rejected, and the final version of UNCLOS upheld the freedom of
navigation of foreign warships.
Considering the final treaty terms, O. P. Sharma argues that “India had an obligation to modify [its relevant domestic legislation] after India formally ratified
the treaty.”72 However, once India had codified its maximalist position in domestic law it could not revise it without entailing high political costs for the government. Thus, democratic politics ensured that India would remain in violation
of its treaty commitments. The legal incompatibility between India’s domestic
law and its international treaty commitments can be traced easily to resource
nationalism, ideological adherence to Third World solidarity, and a belief that the
momentum of global politics was shifting in favor of the nonaligned.
However, India’s policy position was driven equally by the imperative to reduce
the country’s vulnerability to political intimidation by hostile great powers and
the aspiration to establish its regional supremacy. The overall strategic context
within which India conducted, and continues to conduct, its legal maneuverings
is vital to understanding why the Indian government has remained relatively silent on the presence of foreign navies in the Indian Ocean in general and the issue
of FONOPs in particular. While reducing the country’s vulnerability to political
intimidation by hostile great powers may have been India’s immediate interest,
its own longtime goal of establishing regional supremacy would necessitate its
rise as a naval power. These contradictory interests played out both in the debate
surrounding the enactment of the Maritime Zones Act of 1976 and in the act’s
subsequent implementation. India may have been materially weak, but it aspired
to be a great power, so insofar as today’s legal commitments could become tomorrow’s constraints, India had to tread carefully; the possibility that it someday
might become a significant naval power could shift the balance of India’s interests
closer to those of the established maritime powers. Such a possibility was given
due recognition within both the MEA and the MoD. The top secret assessment
made by the Legal Treaties Division in 1976 mentioned the Indian navy’s “right to
navigation” and the right to “exercise of freedom of navigation” on the high seas.73
However, the emergence of the EEZ regime created complications for the Indian navy vis-à-vis its smaller littoral neighbors in the Indian Ocean. If India used
the logic of the law to restrict great-power presence in its surrounding waters,
the smaller states could request that New Delhi extend them the same courtesy.
Moreover, while a state with a mediocre navy could ignore these restrictions, the
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situation could become a headache once that state achieved maritime greatness,
as India aimed to accomplish eventually. The MoD’s view soon was validated;
during the mid-1970s, Bangladesh, Myanmar (Burma), Pakistan, and Sri Lanka
enacted maritime laws requiring prior consent, resulting in restrictions on India’s
maneuverability within the region.74 For example, even though India offered a
reciprocal requirement of notification for the movement of both Indian and Sri
Lankan warships in the Palk Strait, Sri Lanka continuously has demanded that
India acquire consent for the movement of its warships.75 Moreover, Malaysia
and Indonesia could use the new construct of international law, in the form of
UNCLOS, to claim sovereignty over major navigational choke points such as the
Malacca Strait.
These concerns were incorporated into India’s domestic law, its negotiating
strategy in the UNCLOS conference, and the implementation of its domestic
maritime law regarding the presence of foreign navies in its EEZ. First, as was
discussed earlier, during the first law-of-the-sea conference, held in Geneva in
1958, India had gone along with the rest of the Third World, insisting on both
notification and authorization for the passage of foreign warships through a
state’s territorial waters.76 However, the provision was defeated at the insistence
of the major maritime powers. As New Delhi prepared to participate in negotiations for UNCLOS III, it confronted a dilemma regarding the passage of foreign
warships through its EEZ. Given the growth of Indian naval power during the
interim, the country’s material situation had changed significantly since 1958.
Therefore, unlike in 1958, on the advice of the MoD, New Delhi dropped its
support for requiring consent. This change in India’s position was motivated
primarily by the prospect of the country’s maritime rise and its possible future
naval operations in other countries’ EEZs. As O. P. Sharma explains, “On the eve
of the convening of the UNCLOS III, an in-depth examination of this issue [i.e.,
authorization and notification] was carried out by the Ministry of Defence and
it was concluded that India, being herself a growing maritime power, should not
insist on the requirement of prior authorization but should support only the less
restrictive requirement of prior notification.”77 Thus, India’s approach was driven
neither by legalism nor by notions of right and wrong; New Delhi was trying to
juggle its immediate against its prospective political interests. India’s immediate
interests supported the notion of mare clausum; its prospective rise required
mare liberum. The thinking within the establishment was relatively straightforward: because India’s interests and power might shift, today’s legal commitments
should not become tomorrow’s constraints.
Therefore, as Indian naval capabilities grew, the MoD’s insistence on demanding a “less restrictive requirement” from foreign navies also gained greater currency in India’s approach.78 If the 1976 act requires consent by all foreign warships
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to “enter and pass through” India’s EEZ, India’s 1995 declaration on the subject
simply states an “understanding” that the “provisions of the Convention do not
authorize other States to carry out in the exclusive economic zone and on the
continental shelf military exercises or manoeuvres, in particular those involving the use of weapons or explosives, without the consent of the coastal state.”79
The 1995 declaration is less restrictive than the 1976 act in two ways. First, as
Commodore Lalit Kapur points out, India’s interpretation of UNCLOS does
not result in a legal obligation: “An understanding is not a requirement. . . .
India has never sought to enforce this understanding against any USN ships.”80
Second, from the “all foreign warships” addressed under the 1976 act, the 1995
declaration pulls back to target only those involved in “military exercises or
manoeuvres.” The shift creates a higher bar before Indian law can be applied to
the presence of foreign warships, and it creates a distinction between navies that
India may perceive to be friendly and those it deems hostile to its interests.81 The
declaration concerning India’s position on foreign warships in EEZs represents
an evolution toward greater support for, rather than restrictions on, freedom of
navigation on the high seas. Just as politics rather than law guided India’s behavior on the law of the sea in the 1970s, it has continued to do so since then.
Second, similar reasoning applied to India’s position on major navigational
pathways or choke points, such as the Malacca Strait. Given the general trend in
the UNCLOS progression toward extending the limits of territorial sovereignty
into what had been the high seas, “creeping territorial sea[s]” threatened to restrict the “access of warships through straits used for international navigation
where passage had previously been free.”82 The extension of territorial seas to
twelve nautical miles may have allowed countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia
to challenge the status of the Malacca Strait as a high-seas corridor and thereby
claim sovereignty over it. This was one of the principal worries of the Indian establishment even during the 1958 Geneva conference. Among India’s fundamental interests in Southeast Asia, as a secret report prepared by the MEA argued in
February 1976, was that the “Malacca straits remain free and open to the Indian
Navy.”83 India, therefore, agreed with the major maritime powers over the incorporation into UNCLOS of a new regime of “unimpeded transit passage,” which
was an improvement over the earlier right of “innocent passage” in the territorial
seas. It is enshrined in article 38(2) of the 1982 UNCLOS treaty.
Third, India’s realpolitik also was visible in its implementation of its domestic laws in its EEZ. Even though the Maritime Zones Act of 1976 claimed for
India the right to close parts of its EEZs to foreign warships, New Delhi never
has implemented the law in practice. It hardly ever has declared any special
or designated areas as being out of bounds to navigation by foreign warships.
Instead, to protect its offshore oil installations, it has declared “cautionary
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zones” in which foreign navies could submit voluntarily to regulation of their
movements.84 As one official from India’s National Security Council argued
in an interview, “[T]he Navy has seldom employed coercive measures against
foreign navies transiting or operating through India’s EEZs.”85 The only public
account of the Indian navy physically challenging a foreign navy ship relates
to an incident of November 2019, when the People’s Liberation Army Navy
(PLAN) oceanic research vessel Shi Yan–1 was forced to leave the Andaman
Sea. The Indian navy justified its actions by declaring that the activities of Shi
Yan–1 violated India’s 1995 declaration. “EEZs are international waters, but if
we find Chinese ships engaging in what we perceive to be military manoeuvres,
we chase them away.”86 Perception, not the letter of the law, is the most critical
element of India’s practice.
Some Indian analysts have called out India for its legal hypocrisy in differentiating between USN ships and PLAN ships operating in India’s EEZ.87 This
criticism is mistaken, for two reasons. First, accepting either the letter of India’s
domestic law or its declaration of reservations on the eve of its ratification of
UNCLOS in 1995 as being the “gospel truth” of India’s position would be highly
erroneous. As the discussion above underlines, the question of foreign warships
in India’s EEZ was never about legalities but about political interests. Today,
India’s political interests align with those of the United States and clash with
China’s. U.S. naval movement in the Indian Ocean does not threaten India’s interests, whereas the PLAN constitutes the Indian navy’s primary challenge. Second,
India’s domestic law leaves enough space for Indian decision makers to make a
judgment on the intent of foreign warships transiting through or operating in
the Indian Ocean. The law allows for the benign passage of ships not involved in
hostile military exercises or maneuvers—and the distinction between benign and
hostile intentions is the result of a political, not a legal, determination.
In the end, how India implements its laws depends primarily on two factors:
whether it is interested in physically challenging those who technically may be
in violation of its domestic laws, and whether it has the power to do so. As to the
first, India has no interest in stopping the Americans, and it has every reason to
challenge the PLAN in its back yard.
However, as to the second: If a state lacks the capacity to surveil the high seas
and physically to escort violators out of its EEZ, regurgitating legalities is futile.
For India to take such action, it first must develop the requisite capability to
establish maritime domain awareness so it can identify violations, and it must
build enough naval muscle to be able to challenge the perpetrators thereafter.
Until India has both capabilities, the law is meaningless. This was evident in
2014 when a Chinese nuclear submarine transited through the Indian Ocean on
its way to the Pakistani port of Gwadar. Chinese authorities did notify the Indian
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defense attaché in Beijing, but only after the passage had been completed.88 In any
case, India would be foolish to believe that China will be deterred from conducting naval movements in the Indian Ocean simply because India holds a certain
interpretation of its own law. China will do what is in its best interests, and it will
be deterred only by India’s military capacity to safeguard its interests and enforce
its version of the law. The capability to perform the latter is augmented greatly by
India’s close military cooperation with the United States. India’s balance of interests dictates that the passage of USS John Paul Jones be seen merely as a tempest
in a teapot rather than a major crisis in Indo-U.S. relations.
The history of India’s legal positioning during the UNCLOS negotiations, the
process of enacting its domestic laws, and the way it implements those laws all
attest to the fact that Indian decision makers never have allowed the legal tail to
wag the political dog. Notwithstanding anyone’s idealistic perceptions of Indian
foreign policy, the country has a tradition of safeguarding its interests in the Indian Ocean through the practice of realpolitik. Because India is lacking in material power, New Delhi at different times has employed diplomacy, law, and norms
to attempt to secure its interests; however, the Indian government seldom could
be accused of remaining blind to the fundamental forces of international politics:
power and interests. The same logic drives India’s contemporary approach to the
Indian Ocean and the Indo-U.S. strategic partnership.
EYE ON THE DRAGON AND THE LARGER DYNAMICS OF
INDO-U.S. RELATIONS
By the mid-1980s, New Delhi had become convinced that the side India had
chosen in the Cold War superpower rivalry between the United States and the
Soviet Union (i.e., the latter) was “declining.”89 There also was a realization that
even though “India’s relations with the US have fluctuated from time to time” and
“US foreign and strategic objectives have often militated against India’s security
concerns in South Asia and the Indian Ocean,” the two countries’ interests were
complementary enough to achieve a “mutually beneficial relationship.”90 The rise
of the Indian navy as the region’s preeminent naval force also enticed the Americans to work with the Indians once again. Not without reason, therefore, naval
cooperation in the Indian Ocean was deemed to be one of the most promising
avenues for productive Indo-U.S. bilateral relations. As the report of an Indo-U.S.
task force on the Indian Ocean argued, “A more mature relationship is developing as India becomes increasingly strong and self-confident in its role as a major
self-reliant power with acknowledged maritime capabilities in the Indian Ocean
region.”91 India long had desired to gain recognition of its primacy in the region,
and U.S. support for a few interventions India conducted in the Seychelles and
Maldives in the late 1980s fulfilled this long-held desire of New Delhi.92
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The formal end of the Cold War greatly facilitated this dynamic. An editorial
in India’s leading English-language daily, the Indian Express, stated in 1992 that
“whether one likes it or not, there is no other country with which India has so
much in common as far as naval perceptions are concerned.”93 Given the absence
of a fundamental conflict of interest between the two countries, New Delhi had
no qualms about once again pursuing a bandwagoning strategy.94 U.S. unipolarity also left no other recourse available to Indian decision makers. India required American support for its economic growth and to realize its fundamental
foreign-policy goals, particularly gaining acceptance as a rising major power in
the international system. The most precise summary describing U.S. unipolarity
and India’s consequent strategy appeared in the report submitted by the highlevel Group of Ministers (GoM) that the Vajpayee government set up in 2000
to review national security. The report, titled “Reforming National Security,”
observed that the “pre-eminence of the USA in political, economic, military and
technological fields is more in evidence today than ever before. Its capabilities to
forge coalitions and alliances and have its way on any issue is [sic] unmatched.
. . . US pre-eminence in the global strategic architecture is unlikely to diminish
in the foreseeable future.”
Therefore, the GoM report, in its recommendations, argued that India should
embrace wholeheartedly a bandwagoning strategy: “Meaningful, broad-based engagement with the United States spanning political, economic and technological
interests and commonalities will impact beneficially on our external security concerns with a resultant albeit less visible impact on our internal security environment. Conversely, an adversarial relationship with that State can have significant
negative repercussions across the same broad range of issues and concerns.”95 If
the issue of India’s nuclear status can be taken as reflective of New Delhi’s ability
to accomplish foreign-policy priorities overall during the first two decades after
the Cold War ended, India still would be an outcast among the world’s global
nuclear powers—if it had not received support from the United States. The inertia
of India’s foreign-policy idealism may have forced it to propagate a vision of a
multipolar world order, but the country’s rise occurred within a unipolar system.
Yet India’s “bandwagoning for gain” strategy was premised on three major
assumptions: the absence of a serious security threat in its neighborhood, the
continuity of an American-centered unipolar world order, and the expectation
of India’s economic rise. In the last decade, all these assumptions have “come a
cropper.”
First, China’s rise as a significant economic and military power located in
India’s immediate neighborhood has created a unique political challenge for
India. For the first time since independence, India has witnessed the rise of a
great power not only located in its immediate vicinity but with which it has
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fundamental conflicts of interest—in particular, the two countries’ unresolved
border disputes.96 The bipolar order of the Cold War was comparatively benign,
not only because India was distant in the maritime realm from both the Soviet
Union and the United States, but also because it had no major disputes with either
of those great powers. The resulting bipolar world order was not a liability but an
asset, insofar as India could rely on one or the other or both of these powers to
protect its interests in the region. Therefore, India desired détente between the
United States and the Soviet Union and strove to support it when possible, as in
the 1960s.97 India’s fallback option was to gain the support of either great power if
the other turned hostile, as when it sided with the Soviet Union in the 1970s.98 Yet
given the distance factor and the lack of physical hostility, India could embrace
unipolarity with equal ease. However, the new bipolar order with China as one of
the two major poles threatens India’s fundamental interests, reduces its strategic
maneuverability, and limits the prospects for its global rise.
Second, a necessary corollary of China’s rise is the relative decline of the United States in global affairs. As China rises, U.S. influence on international politics
wanes correspondingly. As long as the United States was willing to accommodate
India as a rising power, the liberal world order—an anodyne representation of
global rules serving American interests and supported by American power—was
in India’s interests as well.99 China has shown no such regard for India’s place in
the sun, an attitude manifested in Beijing’s reactions to Indian exercise of influence in South Asia and to its membership on the United Nations Security Council or the Nuclear Suppliers Group.100 India remains deeply ambivalent toward
a China-centric Asian or global order. It is becoming highly doubtful that New
Delhi will be able to reach any respectful accommodation with Beijing, whether
on the border issues or on India’s status in the world.
Lastly, the bandwagoning-for-gain strategy assumed that as long as India generated enough economic and military power from within, New Delhi would not
require external support to fulfill its immediate security requirements. Moreover,
if India’s material power increased, other states by necessity could be expected to
accommodate its interests both in the region and across the world. However, the
impressive economic performance that India achieved late in the first decade of
the twenty-first century has been replaced by a mediocre one. India currently is
growing economically, but not at a rate that will enable it to stand up to China on
its own while also impressing the world with its arrival as a power with which to
be reckoned.101
It is these circumstances that have altered India’s approach to the United States.
Previously, gain was the motive; today, the logic for India to increase its strategic
closeness with the United States is the country’s survival, security, and future
position within the Asian and global orders. Balancing China’s rise has become
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India’s foremost foreign-policy priority. And, given the realization that such
balancing may not be achievable through the country’s internal resources alone,
the importance of the United States in India’s strategic calculus has increased
significantly.
This external balancing strategy is evident, first and foremost, in the growth
of Indo-U.S. military relations. In the last decade of the twentieth century and
the first of the twenty-first, the defense aspect of the relationship with the United
States helped deepen the two countries’ bilateral ties overall and build India’s trust
therein. Still, India’s primary motivation was to gain U.S. support for its foreignpolicy goals in general rather than to respond to a specific threat. However, in the
last decade the tone and tenor of the Indo-U.S. military relationship have been
driven by India’s insecurity vis-à-vis China. Not only is the bulk of the defense
equipment India has purchased from the United States being employed in deterring India’s northern neighbor, but the enthusiasm with which India has signed
the foundational defense agreements with the United States over the last five
years is evidence enough that it seeks greater assistance in upgrading its military
capabilities.102 These foundational agreements have helped India fill some major
gaps in its military preparedness, particularly its surveillance of, as well as its acquisition of other intelligence concerning, Chinese military capabilities along the
Himalayan frontier and throughout the Indian Ocean region.103 Although these
developments escape the classic definition of external balancing, which may be
considered to require explicit military commitments between allies, the objective
of India’s interest in pursuing a robust military relationship with the United States
has changed fundamentally, from being merely an instrument to achieve a greater
bilateral partnership to becoming an essential component of India’s deterrent
strategy vis-à-vis China. Skepticism regarding the Indo-U.S. military relationship
often touches on the remote possibility of India ever signing a security treaty with
the United States and of American soldiers ever fighting on Indian soil. However,
a more formal security partnership cannot be dismissed a priori. Given the nature of India’s security requirements, New Delhi’s foreign-policy practice suggests
that it has used formal security pacts—for example, the 1971 Treaty of Friendship
with the Soviet Union—to signal deterrence to its adversaries.104 The process of
moving toward a formalization of the Indo-U.S. strategic partnership continues
to unfold, adding to India’s internal capabilities to deter China and producing a
“force in being” that could be employed in the service of India’s interests in the
future. Much of the course of this continuing dynamic will depend on China’s
assertiveness and how ably India could cope with any Chinese military pressure
on its own.
The second evidence of India’s shift away from a bandwagoning-for-gain strategy to an external-balancing-for-security strategy is the increasing intensity of its
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support for the Quad. India’s approach to the Quad again can be classified into
two distinct periods: the pre-2007 and the post-2017 phases. In the face of China’s
discomfort and ire in response to Exercise MALABAR-2007, India readily folded
the tents of its support for the Quad, because it viewed the grouping primarily as
an instrument of gain rather than of survival. The Quad offered an opportunity
to extend Indo-U.S. relations; build relations with otherwise estranged maritime
democracies, such as Japan and Australia; and increase India’s status and raise its
profile in the region. However, the balance of India’s interests dictated that if the
Quad became an obstacle in the country’s quest to reach an accommodation with
China, New Delhi should abandon the concept with no qualms.105
But over the course of the Quad’s dormant decade, the manifest changes in
Beijing’s power, interests, and conduct were sufficient for New Delhi to revise its
approach to operationalizing a local balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. India’s
halting economic progress during that period only underlined the country’s need
for external assistance in countering China’s diplomatic, economic, and military
assertiveness in India’s back yard. China’s conduct in Galwan was the last straw.
At present, in light of the June 2020 Sino-Indian border crisis, any hope of reaching a separate peace or accommodation with China appears forlorn.106
The resurgence of the Quad in India’s strategy therefore is linked to its balancing requirements. Technological and resource cooperation with Quad countries
may assist India in challenging China’s monopoly on global supply chains, 5G
infrastructure, and rare earths.107 Militarily, the Quad not only helps to augment
India’s military capabilities and efficiency but—like bilateral Indo-U.S. military
cooperation—also signals the formation of a force in being that may prove useful
at a later date. If the Quad navies have achieved the capability “to plug and play”
in the Indo-Pacific, as the Indian navy chief argued in July 2020, the Indo-Pacific
naval entente surely is going to make heads turn in Beijing.108
The third indicator of India’s embrace of external balancing is its shifting policy
regarding the role of the United States and its allies in South Asian and Indian
Ocean region affairs.109 For the first time in its history, India is welcoming enthusiastically a greater American presence in the subcontinent and the northern Indian
Ocean region.110 Perhaps no other state in the region was hurt more by the U.S.
military withdrawal from Afghanistan than India.111 India also was instrumental
in brokering a defense pact between the United States and the Maldives. Signed
in September 2020, the Framework for U.S. Department of Defense–Maldives
Ministry of Defence Defense and Security Relationship would not have come
about without New Delhi’s active encouragement, given the close strategic ties
between New Delhi and Male.112 In contrast, back in 2013 India was instrumental
in scuttling a “status of forces” agreement between the Maldives and the United
States.113 During the recent negotiating process, both Male and Washington kept
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New Delhi constantly engaged, to the extent that the draft agreement was shown
to Indian leadership before it was signed. Similarly, India has encouraged greater
military cooperation between the United States and its allies, such as Japan and
Australia, and other South Asian states.114 American allies, particularly Japan and
Australia, also have become central to India’s anti-China diplomacy in the South
Asian region. Japan and India have collaborated to compete with China for major
infrastructure projects, such as the West Container Terminal project in Colombo,
Sri Lanka, and the Dhaka Metro Rail project in Bangladesh.115 Australia also
launched the South Asia Regional Infrastructure Connectivity Project (known as
SARIC) in 2019, with India as a critical partner.116 India’s volte-face on a greater
U.S. role in what it previously had considered to be its traditional sphere of influence is driven directly by, as one senior Indian official stated, the “imperative not
to provide space to China here.”117
The reality of Indo-U.S. relations is simple. In the current geopolitical environment, India needs the United States much more than the reverse.118 Given
India’s strategic vulnerabilities, New Delhi needs to focus its attention firmly on
Beijing. If that requires ignoring a few American inanities, it is definitely worth
the benefits. P. N. Haksar, Indira Gandhi’s principal secretary, once advised her
that foreign relations are a “balance sheet of credits and debits.”119 Even with the
Seventh Fleet’s April 2021 FONOP falling on the debit side, overall Indo-U.S.
relations remain hugely beneficial to India.
This article has explicated the discrepancy between the expectations of India’s
strategic community and the country’s foreign and national-security policies in
practice, concerning the Indian Ocean, the presence of great powers in the region, and the role of Indo-U.S. relations in India’s geopolitical strategy. It argues
that many students of Indian foreign policy have been overly idealistic, legalistic,
and principled when it comes to understanding India’s strategic behavior. In
practice, India’s foreign-policy mandarins seldom have been impelled by public
pronouncements, legal obligations, or rhetorical principles. The article’s analysis
underlines the strength of the realpolitik tradition in Indian foreign policy and
the capacity of successive Indian governments to pursue their interests even under severe material constraints by deploying tools of diplomacy and international
law. Marshaling recently declassified documents from Indian archives, it reveals
how Indian decision makers used the presence of great powers in the Indian
Ocean to fulfill their country’s security requirements, adroitly shifting from one
balancing coalition to another according to the geopolitical situation. It also lays
bare the political underpinnings of India’s engagement with international law,
particularly the law of the sea, and the enactment and implementation of domestic law concerning the country’s maritime responsibilities. India seldom has
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allowed the law to determine its political behavior; instead, its national interests
define its negotiating behavior in legal forums, the scope of the laws it pursues
or enacts, and the laws’ application within India’s maritime sphere of influence.
Lastly, the article highlights the logic of India’s stronger emphasis on its strategic
partnership with the United States as it confronts the peril of China’s ascendance
as a great power in Asia.
Without an appreciation of the history of India’s strategic behavior and the
pressing reality of India’s strategic requirements in the contemporary age of greatpower politics, students of Indian foreign policy always will remain a couple of
steps behind the curve in understanding the substantive reality of the Indo-U.S.
relationship.
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RUSSIA’S T WENT Y-FIRST- CENTURY
NAVAL STR ATEGY
Combining Admiral Gorshkov with the Jeune École
Johannes Riber

A

fter the Cold War, the Russian navy quickly disintegrated; new-construction
programs were postponed or canceled, while many existing units were
abandoned or provided only limited maintenance.1 However, over the course of
Vladimir V. Putin’s political ascendancy since 1999, the Russian navy slowly has
been resurrected. This development escaped much international notice—until
September 2015, when Russia intervened in the Syrian civil war. As part of that
intervention, Russia’s Caspian Flotilla launched its first-ever cruise-missile attack, firing twenty-six missiles at targets over 750 miles away.2 Two months later,
a Russian submarine similarly fired missiles into Syria from the Mediterranean,
and other Russian submarines repeated those attacks in 2017.3 Most recently, the
Black Sea Fleet has fired cruise missiles into Ukraine.4
The development of cruise missiles, together with other naval improvements
and innovations, has raised concerns in the West about the resurrection of
Russian sea power. Both the reestablishment of the U.S. Navy’s Second Fleet—
responsible for the North Atlantic—and the reopening of the military part of
Keflavík Airport in Iceland are clear reactions to Russia’s naval developments and
its worrying political posturing.5
Commander Johannes Riber is a career officer in the
While the Russo-Ukrainian war since FebruRoyal Danish Navy. He holds an MA in international security studies from the University of Leicester, ary 2022 has called into question Russian military
United Kingdom, and is a PhD fellow at the Uniabilities in general, including at sea, it would be
versity of Copenhagen, Denmark. He most recently
published a chapter on Danish naval strategy as a careless to assume—regardless of the future course
part of the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Stud- of that conflict—that Russia will not continue to
ies Series, King’s College London.
be a significant security factor in the future. Yes,
Naval War College Review, Summer 2022, Vol. 75, No. 3
Russia runs the risk of total defeat in Ukraine,
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yet that only underlines this article’s main observation: the similarities between
France after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71 and the Russia of today, each
squeezed in a multipolar world, with a poor economy and a diminishment of its
industrial power.
To make this comparison, the article will analyze the contemporary Russian
navy to offer a better understanding of the service’s thinking and strategy—a
strategy whose execution the Ukraine war only will speed up. On paper, Russia
harbors the ambition to become the world’s second-largest sea power—the position the Soviet Union held during the Cold War. However, both Russia’s economy
and its political geography have changed since that era, and Russia is dividing
its naval development along two separate lines of effort. The first is influenced
by Russian strategic culture and ideas about nuclear deterrence inherited from
Admiral Sergey G. Gorshkov (1910–88), the longtime head of the Soviet navy
(1956–85); this line of effort centers on bastion defense and submarine warfare in
the North Atlantic area. The second line is a Russian version of the French Jeune
École, sometimes referred to as a naval strategy of the weak; it centers on building smaller units with offensive weapon capabilities, with the aim of deterring
adversaries—in Russia’s case, to enable it to establish sea control in the Baltic and
Black Seas and sea denial in parts of the Mediterranean Sea. This second line of
development will be increasingly important in a context that includes the war in
Ukraine and Russia’s resultant naval losses.
The biggest evolution in Russian naval thinking has been toward this second
emphasis, on smaller surface units armed with advanced capabilities such as
cruise missiles. Such an approach contrasts with that characteristic of the Soviet
era, when the Soviet navy would have been capable of fighting larger sea battles
in the North Atlantic.6 To force an adversary to divide its fleet as it attempts to
overbalance the new Russian navy locally, today’s service likely will focus on
conducting multiple smaller, geographically dispersed engagements in the North
Atlantic while exercising sea control in the Baltic and Black Seas.
This article first will analyze Soviet and Russian naval histories, to establish
Russia’s strategic culture and Admiral Gorshkov’s continuing influence on modern Russian naval thinking. Next will come a discussion of the French Jeune
École and its development at the end of the nineteenth century, highlighting the
similarities between France’s strategic position then and Russia’s today. That will
be followed by an analysis of the two parts of current Russian naval strategy: first,
the implications of Russia’s traditional strategic culture; second, how Russia’s
naval strategic ambitions, combined with the country’s financial constraints and
its current and projected diplomatic and economic isolation, have and will put
its conventional surface navy on a course similar to that suggested by the Jeune
École concept. The last-mentioned analysis examines the naval development of
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss3/1
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the Caspian Flotilla and Black Sea Fleet since 2008. The article concludes with a
discussion of the implications of these developments for the Baltic Sea and how
Western naval and defense planning should address Russia’s naval development.
RUSSIA AS A SEA POWER—A “STRATEGIC CULTURE” PERSPECTIVE
In his 1976 book The Sea Power of the State, Admiral Gorshkov argues that
Russia’s historical successes and failures in war were linked to the successes and
failures of the Russian navy, either directly or indirectly.7 The validity of his argument can be questioned, but his overall message is clear: Russia has an important
sea-power history. Other prominent sea-power scholars echo this point.8 Russian
naval officers often remind audiences that Peter the Great (1672–1725) founded
both the Russian navy and its naval academy, making the latter one of the oldest
in the world, and that sea power subsequently had profound impacts on Russian
history, especially with victories in the battles of Gangut (1714), Chesma (1770),
and Sinop (1853).9
However, despite this early imperial history, Russia’s contemporary strategic
and sea-power culture is influenced more directly by the later tsarist navy and
subsequently by the Soviet one. Thus, the historical sketch that follows will concentrate on Russia’s naval history in the twentieth century and the navy’s development—driven by Admiral Gorshkov’s vision—from a coastal-defense fleet into a
great sea power, then the Russian fleet’s disintegration after the Cold War.
The Russian navy suffered two significant setbacks in the twentieth century:
its devastating defeat by Japan at the Battle of Tsushima in 1905 and the Russian
Revolution in 1917.10 Emerging from these disasters in the 1920s, the Soviet navy
developed the “Russian New School.”11 This school of thought held that the navy
should play a principally defensive role, protecting the Soviet coast and supporting Soviet land operations. This meant that the Soviet fleet would focus on
submarines, sea mines, coastal batteries, and similar near-seas capabilities. With
no large surface combatants, the Soviet navy made the submarine its principal
offensive platform. The L-class submarines of the early 1930s were part of the service’s first large submarine-construction program after the revolution. The first
two submarines of the class were Leninets and Stalinets (meaning the followers of
Lenin and Stalin, respectively)—heavily politically freighted names that suggest
the program’s political and institutional importance at the time.12
Several attempts were made to move away from the Russian New School.
Joseph Stalin (1878–1953), for one, supported a more traditional view on naval
development that emphasized large warships, but new-construction programs
were postponed by more-pressing military needs at the outset of the Second
World War and by subsequent economic restraints.13 The Russian New School regained political prominence under Nikita S. Khrushchev’s leadership (1953–64).
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Khrushchev (1894–1971) opposed the idea of large surface combatants, viewing
them as dinosaurs in a world dominated by nuclear conflict; he called them nothing more than “big metal eaters.”14
While Stalin may have understood the need for large warships and Khrushchev
did not, neither of them fully understood the navy’s potential role in diplomacy.
The whole idea of maritime or “gunboat” diplomacy was absent from Soviet naval
thinking up to the 1960s—a deficit put on stark display during the Cuban missile
crisis of October 1962. It has been argued that Russia did not have enough large,
modern warships to escort the merchant vessels bound for Cuba, which forced
those ships to attempt individual clandestine transits.15 This is not entirely true;
Russia did have cruisers, and, while they were not as modern as the U.S. Navy’s,
they were sufficient to make a clear statement of Soviet strategic will.16 Instead,
the Soviet navy’s biggest shortcoming was in auxiliary vessels, especially oceangoing oilers, to support such a deployment.17 The Soviet navy therefore could not
replenish its warships at sea during long transits. In the case of Cuba, the Soviet
navy planned to use shore-based logistical support, but for this to work the initial
phase of the missile transportation had to remain secret; the Soviet navy would
not begin operating overtly from Cuba before a deterrence capability had been
installed on the island.18 In this crisis, the Soviet navy demonstrated that it had
neither the ability nor the experience to deploy naval task groups in the absence
of logistical support from shore—a clear indication that Russian naval strategic
thinking at the time largely was limited to coastal-defense and nuclear-secondstrike capabilities.
In the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, this orientation changed completely, as the Soviet navy realized it needed large surface combatants. Admiral
Gorshkov started an ambitious shipbuilding program. However, he argued that
the most important function of a modern navy was not to engage in decisive sea
battles against enemy fleets but to maintain the capability to strike an adversary’s
homeland with nuclear missiles; the mission of the rest of the navy was to protect Russia’s submarine-based second-strike deterrent.19 In the 1970s, this idea
gave birth to the strategic concept of bastion defense: creating protected enclaves
where the Soviet Union’s nuclear-missile-armed submarines could operate safe
from American attack submarines.20 Gorshkov also saw the Soviet navy’s ability
to threaten the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) from North America as an
important support operation during any war in Europe. Finally, Gorshkov understood a navy’s potential diplomatic importance.21 Gorshkov was particularly
inspired by British naval strategist Sir Julian S. Corbett (1854–1922). This was
especially so with respect to the importance of avoiding needless decisive battles,
using blockades, and understanding the role of navies during crises or proxy
wars.22
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Five years after the Cuban missile crisis, during the Six-Day War of June 1967
between Israel and its Arab adversaries, the Soviet navy deployed significant
forces to the Mediterranean, and it did so again during the Yom Kippur War in
1973, both times to balance U.S. involvement and show political support for the
USSR’s Egyptian and Syrian allies.23 Similarly, beginning in 1964 the Black Sea
Fleet conducted regular deployments into the Mediterranean; ten years on, the
fleet averaged forty warships. The Soviet navy also maintained a permanent presence in the Indian Ocean and made regular visits to client states such as Angola.24
Thus, the Soviet Union had learned its lessons during the Cuban missile crisis,
including the value of navies as diplomatic tools.
Even though by the 1970s the Soviet navy surpassed the U.S. Navy in number
of ships, it was not designed to fight large, decisive sea battles far from Russia’s
shores. The Soviet navy could not wage such a battle in the middle of the North
Atlantic without organic tactical air support. Yet while it remained a continuing
Soviet ambition to build aircraft carriers similar to those of the U.S. Navy, the
costs were too high.25 Therefore, the Soviet Union developed long-range bombers that it could send to the Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom (GIUK) gap,
as an integrated part of its sea-denial strategy—a strategy so important that its
naval air force became one of the largest air forces in the world.26 This focus on
accomplishing sea denial in the North Atlantic was intended partly to prevent
reinforcements from reaching Europe from North America and partly to protect the Soviet submarine-based nuclear-second-strike capability residing in the
North Sea and Arctic Ocean.27 Beyond exercising a degree of sea denial in the
North Atlantic, the Soviet naval strategy aimed to establish local sea control in
the Baltic and Black Seas. It sought to accomplish all this with a combination of
submarines, large surface combatants, and long-range bombers.
But with the end of the Cold War the Soviet navy went from zenith to nadir.
The Russian navy quickly disintegrated and returned to being a coastal-defense
navy, although it retained a capability for nuclear deterrence.28 The service was
forced to readopt the strategy of the New Russian School, from which it had
escaped in the 1960s. It was not until the presidency of Vladimir Putin (1952–)
that the Russian navy, together with the other military services, experienced
significant rearmament.29 This rearmament was influenced heavily by Russian
strategic culture—not least the lessons of the Cold War—but also by the necessity to accept heavy compromises that can be explained best by reference to the
Jeune École.
THE JEUNE ÉCOLE AND RUSSIA
The Jeune École is an alternative approach to naval strategy, in that it offers
a different path for states that cannot establish themselves as dominant sea
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powers but nonetheless have global political ambitions. Reference to the Jeune
École therefore can contribute to an understanding of Russia’s present naval
strategy.
As a naval strategic theory, the Jeune École originated from a French debate on
how to balance a superior British Royal Navy in the 1880s and 1890s. The theory
therefore was labeled a strategy of the weak, suggesting an intent to avoid decisive
(Mahanian) sea battles against a superior force.30
While the ideas of Corbett and Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914) were presented in one or more of their respective books and spread from there, the Jeune
École originated in a variety of writings by multiple authors and debates among
many on the future of the French navy, spearheaded by Admiral H. L. Théophile
Aube (1826–90) and journalist Gabriel Charmes (1850–86).31 The Jeune École
therefore is not a strategic theory originated by a single intellect and propounded
by a single author but rather the result of a dynamic debate at the end of the
nineteenth century in France.
The debate was motivated partly by the costly naval competition with Great
Britain, and partly by geostrategic changes in continental Europe. The France of
the 1890s inhabited a multipolar world presenting various strategic challenges.
In 1871, the country had been defeated in the Franco-Prussian War, resulting in
enormous financial losses. France also suffered an 8 percent loss of industrial
capacity because it had to cede Alsace-Lorraine to Germany.32 Furthermore, the
Triple Alliance, created in 1882 among the German Empire, Austria-Hungary,
and Italy, was aimed primarily at France.33 And while France did not see Britain
as having any territorial ambitions in continental Europe, it did view it as the
single largest threat to French colonies.34 Thus, at the end of the nineteenth century France was squeezed in a geostrategically multipolar world with Britain on
one side and its rival continental powers on the opposite side, while it lacked the
economic strength to balance them all.
It was out of these conditions and constraints that the Jeune École developed.
Admiral Aube argued that the only way the French navy could afford to fight
both in the Mediterranean and against Britain was by taking advantage of technical innovations (steam, steel, submarines, torpedoes, communications, etc.) that
the Industrial Revolution had brought to navies. Technology would be a force
multiplier in that it could make even large battleships vulnerable. Naval blockades would be a thing of the past because large warships no longer could defend
themselves against submarines and high-speed torpedo boats. Technology would
substitute for the battleships that France could not afford.35
Aube was aware that change in technological means could not do the job
alone; to make the change work, new strategic and tactical ways were required
as well. The French navy still should be able to face and defeat, say, the Italian
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss3/1
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navy, but it also still should avoid facing the British in any decisive naval battle.
The French focus on the Italian navy arose from the strategic need to deny Italy
sea control of the Mediterranean. Therefore, a part of the Jeune École argued in
favor of a naval strategy of defeating the Italian fleet before it could leave its harbors, by taking offensive action that combined harbor bombardment with naval
maneuvers by small units such as torpedo boats.36
However, the strategic approach to the Royal Navy needed to be completely
different. Here, France would focus on attacking British merchant ships with
high-speed cruisers in an unlimited guerre de course.37 The aim of the guerre de
course was to raise the costs of sea transportation so high that the British public
would consider the price of continuing the war too great.38 At the same time,
French colonies should be protected by modern coastal batteries and small, fast
units such as torpedo boats.39
Thus, the ideas of the Jeune École were distilled into a two-pronged strategy.
An inferior enemy navy should be attacked preemptively, while a superior fleet
should be addressed with an effect-based, asymmetric approach.
The Jeune École faced some obvious challenges. Range was an issue with regard to commerce raiding; while cruisers could travel a fair distance, they needed
coal, just like any other ship. The French answer to this problem was to operate
a dispersed fleet from multiple bases that were placed such that the navy could
concentrate its power at a given time, then disperse its units again.40
The Jeune École constituted a completely new way of naval strategic thinking. While the ends (winning the war) were the same, the means and ways
were completely different. Abandoning the concept of the decisive sea battle
meant that the means could be in the form of smaller but highly technical
units; the ways were either preemptive or asymmetric attacks, depending on
the opponent.
For the concepts of the Jeune École to work today, a number of strategic preconditions would need to be present.
• A state would need to have the ambition of maintaining a position as a dominant sea power. It was France’s relative loss of power, including sea power,
that changed its mode of thinking, in hopes of regaining its position.
• There must be a geostrategic need to divide military forces. France saw itself
surrounded by enemies and felt it had to divide its forces.
• There must be economic constraints, a geographical loss, or both. France had
lost the Franco-Prussian War, resulting in enormous financial and territorial
losses, which put financial restraints on its naval-construction programs.
• The technological revolution has to be so significant that a state can seek to
incorporate alternative ways and means into its naval strategy.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2022

79

74

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 75 [2022], No. 3, Art. 1

Combined, these strategic preconditions would result in a navy consisting mainly
of smaller but heavily armed and technologically advanced units operating from
multiple harbors, in combination with robust coastal defenses.
Russia’s present strategic environment is similar in many ways to that of France
during the era of Admiral Aube. Russia clearly is ambitious to return to a greatpower position similar to the Soviet Union’s during the Cold War; its invasions
of Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014), together with its intervention in Syria
(2015), make this clear. Furthermore, Russia sees a world that is multipolar, and
thus perceives a need to divide its navy among the various relevant seas. While
this also was the case during the Cold War, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact,
combined with enlargements of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), has underlined Russia’s need to maintain a
credible naval presence in both the Black and Baltic Seas.41 A more independent
Turkey and a rising China only add to the multipolarity and therefore to the naval
complexity.
On top of these geostrategic challenges, the Russian economy went into a big
decline in the first decade after the Cold War, and the country still struggles to
compete with the United States, China, and the EU; while Russian gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita had been increasing prior to the Ukraine war, Russia’s
share of the global GDP has been decreasing since 2008.42 While the full, longterm impacts on the Russian economy of the sanctions the West has imposed in
response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine remain to be seen, there is little doubt
they will be severe.
Finally, in recent decades the world has seen a digital and technological
revolution in military affairs, similar to the industrial development experienced
a century ago.43 Since Russian defense spending began to increase in 2008,
the Russian armed forces have benefited significantly from this technological
revolution.44
Thus, Russia’s present strategic ambitions and environment, combined with
the economic restraints to which it is and will continue to be subject, offer clear
similarities to France’s challenging situation a century ago. But the global digital
revolution makes it possible for Russia to investigate new strategic naval ways
and means, providing alternatives to building a traditional, conventional, greatpower, blue-water navy—which it remains incapable of doing.
THE CONTINUING INFLUENCE OF STRATEGIC CULTURE ON
CURRENT RUSSIAN NAVAL STRATEGY
Russian strategic culture is influenced heavily by mistrust of the West and a feeling of humiliation since the end of the Cold War, when the country lost its status
as one of the world’s two superpowers.45 Russian security and global influence
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were never better than during the Cold War, and Russia looks back to what made
it a great power following the Second World War.
Therefore, from a naval perspective it was no coincidence that President Putin approved the country’s most recently issued maritime doctrine on board the
frigate Admiral Gorshkov, named after the founder of the modern Soviet navy.46
The doctrine leaves little doubt regarding Russian naval ambitions and lays the
groundwork for a revised naval policy paper issued two years later. The latter
document includes verbiage such as the following:
The Russian Federation still maintains the status of a great maritime power, possessing maritime potential that supports the implementation and defense of its national
interests in any area of the World Ocean. . . . The Russian Federation will not allow
significant superiority of naval forces of other states over its Navy and will strive
to secure its position as the second most combat capable Navy in the world. . . . [It
would possess] powerful balanced fleets in all strategic areas consisting of ships
intended to carry out missions in near and far sea zones and ocean areas, as well as
naval aviation and coastal forces equipped with effective high-precision strike weapons, and [an] advanced basing and supply system.47

Plans included replacement of the majority of Russian naval units by 2030.
Both the maritime and naval doctrines aim to develop the Russian navy, if not
into a Mahanian navy, then at least into a tool of sea power equal to that of the
United States. Admiral Gorshkov would have no objections to these ambitions.
Thus, Russia’s heritage as a naval great power sets the frame for the country’s
naval strategic goals: nuclear deterrence, bastion defense, credible blue-water
war-fighting capabilities, and global reach in maritime diplomacy.
However, today’s economic challenges remain, and Russia’s ambition to build
a navy in the image of the former Soviet fleet poses an extremely difficult challenge. According to a RAND analysis from 2019, the Russian navy can perform
three overall functions: strategic deterrence, coastal defense, and short-term
ocean-presence operations.48 But another study emphasizes that Russian financing
and shipbuilding capacities are incapable of rebuilding a blue-water navy while
simultaneously maintaining Russian strategic nuclear deterrence.49 As an example,
the Crimea conflict caused a significant setback in the Admiral Grigorovich–class
frigate program—the necessary gas turbines were produced in Ukraine.50
Since Russia seems unwilling to compromise on its strategic ambitions, it must
find a path forward that will align those ambitions with the existing economic
constraints. Submarines, both nuclear and conventional, always have had a
prominent position in the Russian navy. While large-scale construction of large,
modern surface warships started only in the 1960s, submarines have had a presence in the Russian naval inventory since imperial times, and they were an important naval asset during the eras of both the Russian New School and Admiral
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Gorshkov. As an example, the fraction of total Russian naval tonnage consisting
of submarines increased from one-fifth at the beginning of the 1960s to nearly
half in the 1980s.51 Importantly, submarines long have provided and continue to
form an integral part of Russia’s naval culture, not simply a component of its fleet.
They are connected closely to Soviet-era nuclear deterrence and bastion defense,
and thus form a link back to the country’s history as a great power. Therefore,
Russia’s focus today on submarines comes as no surprise. As discussed below, the
commissioning of new and the updating of existing submarines constitute the
highest priorities for the Russian navy.
Russia plans to replace its present second-strike capability with ten Boreyclass, nuclear-powered, ballistic-missile-carrying submarines (i.e., SSBNs) by
2027.52 While the Russian shipbuilding industry is renowned for its delays, four
Borey boats have been commissioned, with an additional four under construction.53 Similarly, Russia is planning a significant upgrade of its Akula-class attack
submarines.54 The Russian navy also is expecting nine Yasen-class guided-missile
submarines by 2027, with six commissioned by the end of 2022.55 These heavy
Russian investments in submarines, nuclear as well as conventional, seem to
be an echo from the Gorshkov era four-plus decades ago, partly because they
modernize Russia’s nuclear-second-strike capability and partly because of the
similarities to the naval leg of the Soviet bastion defense of the 1970s.
However, these submarines come at a steep financial cost, and the scale of
these investments will limit the Russian navy’s ability to fulfill its other ambitions,
including building large surface combatants. Pre-Russo-Ukrainian war estimates
indicated that it would take decades for Russia to commission ships above frigate size (seven-thousand-plus tons); the various costs of the war in Ukraine have
moved attainment of such an ambition even further away.56
Russia therefore must find new ways either to increase its available resources
or to mitigate its shortcomings when it comes to blue-water operations and maritime diplomacy. Russia will have to rethink its naval strategy because its navy,
including both its fleet and its naval air force, will not have the power to threaten
North Atlantic SLOCs as it could during Soviet times. Russia also is well aware
that great-power status requires maintaining the capability both to establish sea
control in adjacent waters and to conduct maritime diplomacy.
This combination of requirements dictates a strategy similar to that of the
Jeune École for the Russian fleet, its naval air force, and the country’s coastal batteries. It is an incremental strategy, with naval power increasing in steps, enabling
the gradual establishment of a broader naval presence without compromising a
continuing strong defensive role. The Black Sea Fleet and the Caspian Flotilla are
prominent examples of Russia’s pursuit of this strategy and of how the country
intends to use its conventional fleet abroad.
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The Caspian Flotilla and Gunboat Diplomacy
The Caspian Flotilla normally lives a quiet life on its own, attracting little international notice. However, in 2015 the flotilla for the first time engaged targets in
Syria, employing cruise missiles from a range of at least 1,200 kilometers.57 From
a military, tactical perspective, attacking rebel groups in Syria with cruise missiles did not make much sense; the Syrian rebel groups had no effective antiair
systems, so Russia just as well could have continued using aircraft and bombs—a
far cheaper solution.
But the attack had an important strategic purpose. By firing missiles from
the Caspian Sea, Russia demonstrated its new capability to exercise gunboat
diplomacy toward the coastal states in the Caspian region. In 2014, Russia had
signed a political declaration with the Caspian coastal states of Azerbaijan, Iran,
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan to keep the Caspian Sea NATO-free.58 Four years
later—after the Syria strikes—the same coastal states signed the Convention on
the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, which, among other things, allows military
presence in the Caspian Sea only by Caspian coastal states.59
Given Russia’s perpetual concern over NATO enlargement, these agreements
can be interpreted only as an attempt to vitiate NATO’s individual partnership
agreements, such as the Partnership for Peace programs it has with Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan.60 Since the Caspian Sea is a lake and can be
reached only through Russian rivers, future access for NATO forces would have
to be provided through membership in the organization by or partnership with
one or more Caspian states. Installation by Russia of modern cruise missiles on
its modern (albeit small—just under one-thousand-tons-displacement) corvettes
hardly would be necessary, given that the area in question is reachable by the
Russian air force; however, the action sends a clear message about Russia’s strategic will and its capability to practice gunboat diplomacy. The Caspian Flotilla’s
engagement in Syria sent exactly this type of message, providing a reminder of
what might happen if any Caspian state should question Russian hegemony in
the region.
The Black Sea Fleet: From the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and Beyond
The first indication since the Cold War of the increased importance of Russia’s
Black Sea Fleet was seen during the Russo-Georgian conflict in 2008, during
which a naval task group conducted amphibious landings in Abkhazia.61 These
landings in themselves had little if any significant effect on the opponent; plus,
given that Georgia’s navy was almost nonexistent and Russia’s Black Sea Fleet was
then in a poor state overall, the naval aspect as a whole had little influence on
the outcome of the larger conflict. Yet the landing served as an important signal
to other Black Sea coastal states, such as Ukraine, that Russia still could conduct
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offensive naval, including amphibious, operations. Russia used the intervention
in Georgia to reestablish itself as a naval power in the Black Sea. More importantly, it was the first clear example since the Cold War of Russia using coercive
maritime, or “gunboat,” diplomacy.62
Russia’s position as a naval power in the Black Sea was strengthened further
during the annexation of Crimea in 2014. While Russia, in the Kharkiv Accords,
had rented the naval facilities in Crimea from Ukraine until 2042, its annexation
of the peninsula allowed it to establish a larger military presence and eradicate
any uncertainty regarding Russian access to those naval facilities in the future.63
With the annexation, Russia could strengthen its naval-deterrence profile, in
combination with all its military assets, including air and land forces. It better
could support its ambitions of establishing sea control in the Black Sea and a
jumping-off place for operations in southern Ukraine.
Similarly, it better could support its ambitions of developing a permanent
naval presence in the Mediterranean. Since the annexation of Crimea, the Black
Sea Fleet has played an increasingly important role in Russia’s larger military
strategy. In the Russian intervention in Syria in 2015, the Black Sea Fleet’s main
task was to provide supplies to Syria and protect those shipments, which included
significant amounts of military equipment. This function became known as the
“Syrian Express.”64 Beyond that, however, also in 2015, the Russian submarine
Rostov-on-Don fired a number of cruise missiles from the Mediterranean before
it joined the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol.65 Two years later, an additional four
Russian submarines (Krasnodar, Velikiy, Novgorod, and Kolpino) did the same.66
All the submarines were newly built, modernized, Kilo-class boats. Six of these
have been delivered to the Black Sea Fleet, accomplishing a complete refit of its
submarine forces.67
The Black Sea Fleet also is undergoing a large renovation of its surface units.
Apart from its older units, some of which will be decommissioned before 2023, it
is projected to have three new frigates and approximately twenty corvettes (displacement 800–1,800 tons) by 2030. All these units are capable of firing Kalibr
cruise missiles, and some can switch roles, owing to their modular design and
systems. A common denominator is the vessels’ relatively small size, measured
by displacement and complement, but they are heavily armed and capable of
conducting offensive naval operations. Finally, on the land and air sides, Russia
has developed mobile antiship and surface-to-surface systems for coastal defense,
and it has modernized its naval airframes to carry and deliver different types of
new air-to-surface missiles, including the Kalibr.68
Russian naval strategy in the Black Sea aims to use the Black Sea Fleet to establish sea control by combining submarines, smaller units, aircraft, and coastal
defenses, all armed with modern weapon systems such as long-range cruise
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missiles. Beyond the Black Sea, Russia aims to establish a level of sea denial in
the Mediterranean, using mainly the Black Sea Fleet but supported by units
from other parts of the Russian navy; the latter aspect is exemplified best by
the deployment in recent years of submarines and the aircraft carrier Admiral
Kuznetsov from the Northern Fleet. However, an important limitation on the
Black Sea Fleet is its (in)ability to sustain operations. First, the Montreux Convention (1936) puts restrictions on Russian submarines’ transits through the
Bosporus Strait.69 Second, sustained operations outside the Black Sea require
some sort of logistical setup, with resupply and the like provided either afloat or
from Russian bases abroad.
Russia has plans to establish the latter, and in January 2018 it signed a fortynine-year rental agreement with Syria regarding the naval base in Tartus and a
similar agreement on a military airport.70 In December 2020, Russia also signed a
twenty-five-year agreement with Sudan to build a base at Port Sudan on the Red
Sea.71 The symbolism of a frigate from the Black Sea Fleet conducting a port call
in Port Sudan two months later cannot be mistaken.72 The base in Tartus will ease
Russian naval operations in the Mediterranean, especially submarine operations,
given the limitations imposed by the Montreux Convention. The importance of
this has been underlined during the present war in Ukraine, in response to which
Turkey has prohibited Russian naval units from transiting the Bosporus.73 Without the naval base in Tartus, Russian units in the Mediterranean would have been
forced to return either to the Northern Fleet or to the Baltic Sea.
While the availability of the Tartus base may not enable Russia to exercise sea
control over the eastern Mediterranean for any prolonged period, it will make sea
denial possible by facilitating the combination of contributions from submarines,
aircraft, smaller combat units, and coastal-defense systems. Similarly, the naval
base in Port Sudan will make it possible for Russia to deploy and sustain its most
modern surface units—its corvettes—to the Red Sea, as well as its submarines. A
corvette berthed in Port Sudan will enable Russia to engage any target in the Red
Sea with Kalibr missiles without the ship even leaving harbor, and while there it
can serve as a coastal battery system.
RUSSIAN NAVAL STRATEGY: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Even as Russia modernizes its surface fleet with a large number of smaller, technologically capable units, it will maintain a limited number of older, larger units
such as those of the Kirov, Slava, and Udaloy classes. Being a global sea power—as
called for in Russia’s published maritime strategy—requires having large warships that can deploy on a global scale. It was the large warships—in addition to
the powerful submarines—that Admiral Gorshkov saw as crucial to the Soviet
Union becoming a major sea power. For Russia now to abandon large surface
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combatants would be the same as rejecting Gorshkov’s ideas and the legacy of the
Soviet navy. Therefore, Ukraine’s sinking of the Russian cruiser Moskva in April
2022 was not just a matter of depriving the Russian navy of lives and capability
but equally an attack on Russia’s perception of itself as a sea power.74
Yet Russia cannot afford to build new, large, warships of greater than seven
thousand tons displacement. Therefore the only option is to maintain and
modernize its current units. For example, Russia’s sole aircraft carrier, Admiral
Kuznetsov, seems to be “kept alive” despite years of challenges to keep it operational and a number of severe setbacks during its recent refit in Murmansk.75 As
noted, scrapping Kuznetsov would be the same as scrapping the idea of Russia
being a great sea power. Therefore the Russian navy will go far to retain its only
aircraft carrier, even if only on paper. If nothing else, Kuznetsov is a clear symbol
of the continuing influence of Soviet strategic culture on current Russian naval
strategy.
Russia will continue to prioritize its nuclear-second-strike capability and
bastion defense. As discussed previously, submarines have played and continue
to play a crucial role in Russian strategy; however, the Russian navy, in contrast
to the Soviet service, is not designed to threaten NATO’s SLOCs in the North
Atlantic by marshaling those submarines with large surface combatants and
long-range bombers, because the modern service has fewer boats.76 Therefore,
while the Russian navy’s bastion defense will continue to focus on protecting the
service’s nuclear submarines, it will do so from a more drawn-in position.
This change will allow far-more-unhindered transit by American, other
NATO, and other allied shipping across the North Atlantic SLOCs than was true
during Soviet times. Russia instead has focused on developing and deploying
long-range air-to-surface and surface-to-surface missiles, and it intends to replace the old Soviet strategy of high-seas naval attacks with one aimed at threatening harbor approaches in the northeastern Atlantic—a strategy more similar
to the ideas of the Jeune École than to those of Admiral Gorshkov. Such missiles
could be fired from ground batteries, submarines, and air and surface units in
the Norwegian and Barents Seas. A Tsirkon missile fired from the Norwegian
Sea would take around seven minutes to travel a thousand kilometers to a target located near the Faeroe Islands.77 Western naval strategists should be more
concerned with air and submarine threats in the eastern North Atlantic and with
protecting SLOCs near the European approaches than with a Russian submarine
threat to the GIUK gap; therefore, NATO’s capability to conduct antisubmarine
warfare must be shifted from the GIUK gap to the Norwegian Sea and the United
Kingdom–Faeroes–Norway gap. This will be necessary to suppress Russian
submarines that can threaten high-value targets, while remaining prepared to
conduct multidomain defense.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss3/1

86

Naval War College: Summer 2022 Full Issue

RIBER

81

Russia’s other strategic focus—on smaller naval combat units and foreign
naval bases—is linked closely with the country’s broader global naval ambitions.
While the Ukraine war will result in a setback for these ambitions, the future
economic constraints on Russia’s economy will mean that the combination of
smaller naval units with foreign bases will constitute the country’s primary naval
option for years to come.
Once the Russian armed forces have established (or reestablished) the capability to exercise sea control in the Black Sea, the next step will be the Mediterranean, then beyond. The naval bases in Tartus and Port Sudan are the first
examples of this incremental effort. Strategists should ask themselves where else
Russia might extend its network of naval bases. An obvious candidate is Libya,
where Russia first supported Khalifa Haftar, leader of the Libyan National Army,
then contributed to the negotiation of a cease-fire.78 While Russia’s present role
and influence in Libya are unclear, access to a naval base there would give the
Russian navy a strategic presence in the center of the Mediterranean that it lacks
today. Preventing Russia from establishing new naval bases abroad would be one
of the most effective ways to restrain Russian sea power, because Russia’s most
capable but smaller units must depend entirely on their support.
In the Baltic, Russia cannot establish bases similar to those in the Mediterranean or Red Sea. Just as important, however, there is not the same necessity
for them, since Russia’s Northern Fleet can provide the navy’s main access to the
North Sea and North Atlantic. Therefore Russia can establish sea control in the
Baltic using long-range shore batteries and aircraft, in combination with minor
surface units. Russia already has brought about this situation.79
Finally, Russia’s ability to establish sea control in coastal regions using a combination of shore batteries, aircraft, and smaller units—all armed with long-range
missiles—will require NATO naval strategists to rely on strike warfare using
cruise missiles as the most effective way to reduce Russian sea control there. The
idea of “classic sea battles” in confined waters between opposing naval units is
gone, and—with the exception of submarine warfare—sea control will determine
how power is projected to and from the shore.
Western naval strategists looking into the future should focus on three overall
areas: first, how to restrain Russia’s establishment of foreign bases; second, how
to establish sea control, when needed, in the Baltic, Black, and Mediterranean
Seas; and third, how to deter and counter Russian submarine and missile threats
in the North Atlantic. While the first task resides at the political-strategic level,
the other two tasks are naval-strategic considerations. Achieving those objectives
will require navies able to fight in a multidomain environment, mainly against
submarines, smaller surface units, and aircraft, while protecting high-value units
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from long-range missile engagements. Allied navies also should be capable of
conducting long-range strike warfare with cruise missiles to engage land-based
missile batteries and naval and air force bases as an integrated part of establishing
sea control in confined waters such as the Baltic, Black, and Mediterranean Seas.
In the future, the responsibility to meet such demands should fall not only on
large, global or regional sea powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and France but also on any navy that considers the Baltic, Black, or Mediterranean Sea its home waters. Such naval services must maintain the capabilities
and readiness necessary to balance and deter Russia’s sea-power ambitions.
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HOW THE WEAK C AN BEAT THE STRONG IN
WAR AT SEA
Dustin J. Nicholson

T

hroughout history, weaker naval powers have sought to overcome their relative weakness to contest command of the sea. This inclination represents a
clear continuity in naval warfare that remains ever present today.
CONTESTING COMMAND OF THE SEA
Weaker naval powers can contest command of the sea either through alliances
with third-party naval powers or through asymmetric naval strategies. In the
first case, weaker powers form alliances with third parties to mount a combined
capability to contest command of the sea; in the second, weaker naval powers
employ asymmetric strategies that leverage fortress fleets and commerce raiding
to their advantage.

Rent a Navy
History shows that weaker naval powers can contest command of the sea by
forming alliances with other sea powers. This “rent a navy” strategy enabled
Sparta, a classic land power, to go to sea in the
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Lastly, Japan pursued this strategy with a twist in
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the Russo-Japanese War when it formed an alliance with Britain to “rent” sufficient naval deterrence to keep Japan’s war with Russia geopolitically isolated.
Sparta in the Peloponnesian War. The Peloponnesian War, which spanned nearly three decades, reached a decisive outcome only when Sparta acquired a fleet
through its long-sought alliance with Persia.
From the start of the war, the “elephant” knew that it would have to put to
sea to beat the “whale.” Archidamus, one of Sparta’s kings at the war’s opening,
recognized in his prewar net assessment that Sparta needed to ally with a whale;
“Hellenic or barbarian it matters not.”1 While Sparta made initial attempts to beat
Athens on land, “it was only when Sparta embraced sea power that it defeated
Athens—not in the fields of Attica, but on the seas from which Athens derived
its power.”2 Once Sparta had access to a Persian fleet to take its hoplites to sea,
it could project its power across the Aegean to seize territory in the Hellespont,
the narrow straits through which Athens imported grain from distant markets.3
Sparta’s strategy threatened the commercial access on which Athens relied—a
move that would have resonated with Alfred Thayer Mahan—thereby forcing
Athens to give battle in faraway waters. And this is where fighting with a rented
navy offers its greatest advantage; a loss at sea would amount to a setback for
Sparta but would spell defeat for Athens.4 The elephant won because it grew disposable fins before the whale could grow disposable legs.
The United States in the Revolutionary War. Some twenty-two centuries later, a
new nation would win its independence from the world’s reigning maritime hegemon by allying with a third party that could compete for command of the sea.
Much as Sparta eagerly allied with a “barbarian” sea power, the nascent American
republic warmly embraced the naval might of a French despot.
General George Washington wrote a letter to the Marquis de Lafayette in November 1781 in which he echoed what Archidamus long before had told his Spartan audience: “No land force can act decisively unless accompanied by a maritime
superiority.”5 By securing an alliance with Britain’s leading naval rival, the Americans
transformed London’s domestic affair into a global contest. “By its presence alone,”
France’s navy “had reduced British counterinsurgency to a secondary priority.”6
Strategically unhinged, the Royal Navy now sought to defend all the British
Empire’s interests with inferior forces at every location—creating opportunities
for Franco-American exploitation, and later providing Mahan the impetus for
much of his naval theory.7 Although the United States was the far weaker naval
power, it leveraged third-party alliances to leave Britain “more isolated than at
any other time in its history, even more than in 1940.”8
Japan in the Russo-Japanese War. More than a century later, Japan deftly leveraged its alliance with Britain to keep Russia’s fleet isolated, both diplomatically
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and logistically. The Russo-Japanese War illustrated how a weaker naval power, in
this case Japan, could overcome its relative weakness by shaping the strategic and
operational environment in its favor. Rather than renting Britain’s Royal Navy to
fight tsarist Russia, Japan instead sought to “rent” the Royal Navy’s deterrent effect to keep France (Russia’s ally) out of the war.
Absent aid from France and the use of the numerous ports that country could
have made available along the route to the Far East, Russia’s Baltic Fleet sailed
more than eighteen thousand miles in isolation. Japan’s strategy combined distance with diplomacy to erode Russia’s prewar naval superiority, to the point that
the Baltic Fleet’s admiral messaged home: “I have not the slightest prospect of
recovering command of the sea.”9
Although separated by thousands of years and thousands of miles, Aegospotami, Yorktown, and Tsushima all intersect in an important way. Each was the
final naval battle of a war wherein the weaker sea power leveraged its naval allies
to win.
Impose Asymmetric Costs
Absent the intervention of third-party navies, weaker naval powers still can seek
to contest command of the sea directly through asymmetric strategies that leverage fortress fleets and commerce raiding. For these strategies to work, the costs
imposed on the stronger adversary must be higher than those incurred by the
weaker naval power.
World War I illustrated both the strengths and weaknesses of fortress fleets,
while World War II demonstrated the extreme costs that a weaker naval power
could impose through asymmetric commerce raiding. Lastly, case studies from
the post–World War II era prove that these strategies remain a fixture of naval
warfare.
Germany in World War I. When facing a superior naval opponent during World
War I, Germany and the Ottoman Empire each employed fortress-fleet strategies.
They experienced divergent operational outcomes.
Frequently asserted to constitute the beginning of a classic Thucydides trap,
the unification of the German states in 1871 “brought about a structural change”
in Europe that placed Germany on a collision course with Britain.10 Although
Kaiser Wilhelm II endeavored to come out ahead in a prewar naval arms race, war
intervened in 1914 with Germany’s High Seas Fleet still weaker by any measure
compared with Britain’s Grand Fleet. Therefore, Germany pursued a fortressfleet strategy as propounded by the French Jeune École, which emphasized the
cost-imposition advantages that emerging technologies afforded to weaker naval
powers—namely, small mines and little torpedo boats now could sink big battleships.11 With the High Seas Fleet as a fortressed fleet in being, German strategy
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aligned with the adage attributed to Britain’s most famous admiral: “A ship’s a
fool to fight a fort.”12
The logic of this strategy, however, required the Royal Navy to be “foolish
enough to rush into the Heligoland Bight.”13 Yet with the stalemate in the North
Sea playing to Britain’s favor, the Grand Fleet had no need to rush in, and this in
turn eventually forced Germany’s High Seas Fleet to sally forth to Jutland.
Turkey in World War I. The key difference with the Ottoman Empire’s employment of a fortress-fleet strategy in the Dardanelles campaign of 1915 was that
the British did not have time on their side; in short, rushing in was thought the
least-foolish option. And in reality, had an ill-fated series of mine explosions not
occurred, the outcome for Britain might have proved very different.14
Yet history records how the Ottomans successfully wielded a force that was far
more fortress than fleet to impose greater naval costs on their mightier adversary,
pushing the Allied powers back out to sea after suffering a quarter-million casualties. The Turkish fortress fleet had been underestimated beforehand, and subsequently it denied the world’s most capable naval power access to the straits.15
Germany in World War II. The Second World War surpassed in destructiveness
the First World War by most measures, and this held true for the destructive
capacities of weaker naval powers as they implemented asymmetric strategies to
contest command of the sea. Nazi Germany waged a commerce-raiding campaign in the Battle of the Atlantic that nearly succeeded in preventing Allied industrial power from being projected onto the European continent.16
Although Germany was the “weaker” naval power, its level of effort was staggering, from several perspectives. In terms of time, “the Battle of the Atlantic
lasted from 3 September 1939 through the end of the war in Europe.”17 In terms
of scale, “the Allies lost three million tons of shipping in American waters” in
just the first six months of 1942 alone.18 Having “woefully underestimated the
U-boat menace” during the interwar period, the Anglo-American navies entered
another world war lacking adequate countermeasures to unrestricted submarine
warfare.19 Only significant wartime adaptation got the Allied navies back on the
winning side of a grim cost-imposition contest.
Other Case Studies. From the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War to
America’s ongoing strategic rivalry with the People’s Republic of China, weaker
naval powers of the post–World War II era have continued to embrace asymmetric strategies to contest command of the sea. In October 1950, North Korean mines in Wonsan harbor delayed the U.S. X Corps’s amphibious assault long
enough “that even Bob Hope’s USO show had beaten them to Wonsan, much to
MacArthur’s embarrassment and chagrin.”20 As a prelude to the opening of America’s next war, North Vietnamese patrol craft launched torpedoes at an American
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destroyer in the Tonkin Gulf on 2 August 1965. A second attack was thought to
have occurred two days later, leading Congress to pass, “with near-unanimity, the
Tonkin Gulf Resolution.”21 In the next major war the United States fought, Iraq’s
coastal defenses posed enough of an asymmetric threat to make gaining approval
for Operation TIGER—the proposed amphibious assault from the waters of the
Persian Gulf—“an all-but-impossible task.”22
Although each of these post–World War II case studies offers a glimpse of a
weaker naval power’s attempt to contest America’s command of the sea, those
efforts pale in comparison with the unprecedented fortress fleet that China is
building today within its ever-expanding antiaccess/area-denial zone. China’s
rapid naval expansion and maturing precision-strike regime have renewed vigorous interest in the very question this article aims to answer.
COUNTERARGUMENT: GEOGRAPHY TENDS TO PREVAIL
Some may argue that asymmetric naval strategies are inherently futile, since the
side employing them seldom wins the war. In short, the only consistent way for
a weaker naval power to overcome its relative weakness and win is by allying
with a third-party sea power. Such critics would be correct to point out that each
of the weaker naval powers mentioned in the first section of this article—that
is, those that allied with other sea powers—were victorious. Conversely, all the
weaker sea powers in the second section of this article—those that built coastal
defenses or fortress fleets or depended principally on guerre de course—were
vanquished.23 One might conclude that the distinction lies in the reality that the
weaker naval power in any given war is most likely at a geographic disadvantage.
In other words, the only way for a weaker naval power to overcome its deficit in
the geographic elements of sea power is to ally with a third power that maintains
a relative surplus in such elements.
Although Themistocles was able to set ancient Athens onto a trajectory toward
maritime hegemony by building walls that “fastened [his] city to the Piraeus and
the land to the sea,” this degree of geographic conversion remains historically
anomalous.24 Germany discovered—and then rediscovered—through each world
war just how difficult it is to convert inherent land power into unnatural sea
power. Simply put, Germany wasted much of its finite resources in attempting to
overcome the limitations of its geography. “Germany suffered a severe handicap”
in geographic terms, as “all its sea-borne commerce had to pass through either
the North Sea or the English Channel, almost literally under the guns of the British navy.”25 In fact, few even in Britain realized “how great a role geography played
in the checking of the German challenge.”26 Sharing land borders with powerful
and hostile neighbors on the continent only made it more “improbable, as Mahan
pointed out,” for Germany to “ever divert from its army enough of its human and
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material resources to win primacy at sea.”27 In stark contrast, Britain maintained
a clear sea-power advantage—one that was elemental—in times of peace and war
through the natural insularity its geographic disposition provided.
Those who emphasize the geographic elements of sea power above the asymmetric tendencies of weaker naval powers likely would draw many parallels
between the Anglo-German imbalance of the early twentieth century and the
Sino-American imbalance taking shape today. “Before you decide for war, look
at geography”—sound advice in any situation, and it ought to ring loudly in Chinese ears.28 A chain of island nation-states, all of which are either allies or defense
partners of the United States, encloses China’s coastline, from end to end.29 Provided that the United States can maintain access to and basing rights on the first
island chain, when China looks seaward it will continue to see the equivalent of
thousands of unsinkable aircraft carriers that could impose high costs on its new
navy. Until China achieves its aim of “breaking the island chain so it can prosper,”
it remains more a contested near-sea power than an uncontested oceanic power.30
More to the point, whereas Britain could leverage its insularity as a small island
power over Germany to great effect, the United States can do so on a continental
scale. It is arguably America’s greatest geostrategic advantage that it remains the
world’s only great power not found within the densely packed Eurasian mass.
Much as Wilhelmine Germany had to contend with maritime geography that
handicapped its otherwise grand maritime aspirations, so too must Xi’s China.
REBUTTAL: A LOT CAN HAPPEN IN ONE AFTERNOON
Consideration of the geographic elements of sea power, viewed from America’s
perspective, can be encouraging, given that the United States of today meets
Mahan’s criteria on a scale that even he could not have anticipated fully in 1890.
Yet if geography were a panacea, war would be predictable and strategy would be
irrelevant. When imagining a high-end war between China and the United States,
one ugly truth comes to light as a succinct rebuttal to the counterargument: only
an American admiral could lose that war in an afternoon.
Just as Britain’s decades of sea-power advantages over Germany came with an
added burden for the Royal Navy in the First World War, so too will America’s
navy carry such a burden in any future contest for command of the sea, especially
one with China. And, just as Britain had to adapt its maritime strategy toward
Germany by shifting from a close blockade to a distant blockade, so too must
the United States pursue a naval strategy that manages risk through appropriate
standoff.31 To be clear: Modern asymmetric naval technologies have not erased
the effects of geography; if anything, geography holds an even more prominent
position in maritime strategy today. As fortress fleets evolved from dominating harbors to dominating territorial waters to dominating near-sea expanses,
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weaker naval powers continued to blend the land with the sea to overcome their
relative weakness. In response, the stronger naval power must stand ready to win
a contest for command of the sea through an equally blended strategy.
Therefore, geography must be at the center of American naval strategy. The
first island chain holds Sino-American attention, and for good reason. As Sir
Julian Corbett professed to his seagoing countrymen more than a century ago,
wars are “settled on dry land.”32 Any future Sino-American contest for command
of the sea will be settled on dry land by troops with wet boots. When Sparta and
Athens clashed as two titans long ago, it was the littoral bits of land throughout
the ancient Greek world that bore the brunt of the fighting.33 From that viewpoint, there is perhaps much that remains unchanged.
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MISSION COMMAND IN THE AGE OF SAIL
Josh Weiss

M

ission command is a command-and-control philosophy characterized
by trust between senior and junior leaders and independent execution
of orders on the basis of a common understanding of purpose and intent.
While the concept has been part of the U.S. military’s joint doctrine since the
1980s, recently it has received more attention from senior leaders.1 In 2012,
General Martin E. Dempsey, USA, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
argued that the rapidly changing and increasingly complex security environment, especially when paired with an enduring period of constrained fiscal
resources, requires the joint force to be able to leverage any and all advantages
presented by “smaller units enabled to conduct decentralized operations at
the tactical level with operational/strategic implications.”2 In January 2021,
Admiral Michael M. Gilday’s Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Navigation
Plan (NAVPLAN) also called for the Navy to orient around commander’s
intent and to learn to “foster initiative, flexibility, and trust” throughout the
force.3 Notably, however—and appropriately, given the CNO’s central theme of
providing commander’s intent without specific
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in theory and study.4 Fortunately, there exists an
extensively studied area of history that possesses
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still-untapped potential to aid in building a mission-command-education program: the age of sail.
This is not a new idea. Even though the term mission command is an anachronism relative to that era, several historians already have used the concept to
examine the age of sail. However, most of them, as well as practitioners seeking
to apply the mission-command framework better, have done so primarily by
examining Vice Admiral Lord Nelson’s tactical brilliance, as well as the idea
of the so-called Nelson Touch.5 That is a productive approach, and the Nelson
Touch does anticipate many of the core aspects of contemporary mission command. But we should not limit ourselves to Nelson’s tactics; the age of sail offers
many other useful examples of mission command, and it does so at all levels
of warfare.6 An analytical framework based on mission command can help
discover, develop, and present effectively these lessons for the many modern
practitioners seeking to apply mission command in the context of ongoing
great-power competition.
This article answers General Dempsey’s and Admiral Gilday’s calls by developing an analytical framework for mission command and proposing the full age of
sail as an area for current military officers to mine for case studies and lessons
to learn. It further demonstrates the value of this novel approach by examining
a case study from the age of sail through the lens of mission command. The
resulting analysis not only exemplifies the value to practitioners of studying the
age of sail; it also suggests some ways in which the current discourse on mission
command could be extended productively.
A MISSION-COMMAND FRAMEWORK
At its heart, mission command is about the relationship between commander
and subordinate.
The Relationship
The commander has a particular end state or specific goal in mind and must rely
on the subordinate to achieve that objective. Ideally, the commander also can
count on the subordinate to exercise discretion on the scene to take advantage
of local conditions or react to unforeseen changes in the operating environment.
This is the primary benefit of mission command. The commander also has an
idea of the boundaries or limits within which the subordinate should operate
when executing orders. Another way to say this is that the commander has an
idea of an appropriate decision space within which a subordinate can create and
choose a particular course of action.
The subordinate relies on the commander to provide the overall goal, as well as
the intent behind the objective and any limits on or boundaries to the courses of
action the subordinate may choose to achieve the desired ends. The commander
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may provide the mission orders in written or oral form, depending on the situation. The subordinate then leverages the advantage of being on the scene, as
well as an understanding of the implicit and explicit limits conveyed by the commander’s intent and orders, to develop his or her own perception of the decision
space from which to choose a particular course of action. The desired end state
of correctly executed mission command is a subordinate who, even in an environment of imperfect or incomplete information, is able confidently to leverage
any advantage deriving from proximity to the task or issue by independently
interpreting and executing orders without further guidance.7 Of course, this is
incredibly difficult to execute in the real world and requires significant effort on
the part of both commander and subordinate.
Understandably, the commander has the more difficult job with respect to
mission command. He or she must convey the objective or desired end state
clearly while also conveying sufficiently understandable and workable boundaries within which the subordinate may operate. If these boundaries overly
constrict the subordinate, the commander risks negating the ability of the subordinate to take advantage of local conditions or changes in the battle space. Put
another way, simply conveying a directive or objective—for example, “Avoid hostilities with another nation’s naval forces”—is insufficient, because it can overly
constrain a subordinate and negate any advantage provided by that subordinate’s
ability to react to local conditions. On one hand, a subordinate may interpret such
direction so strictly that it precludes protecting allies from attack; on the other
hand, it could prevent the subordinate from taking advantage of a rapidly developing or unforeseen situation. Therefore, to leverage mission command fully, a
commander must create and communicate clearly an acceptable and appropriate
decision space within which the subordinate can act.
When creating the limits of such a decision space, the commander must consider three interrelated areas:
1.	 First and most importantly, the commander must explain to the
subordinate the intent behind the orders. A shared understanding of
why the commander wants something done, and any other reasoning
behind the orders, will help align the commander’s and the subordinate’s
decision spaces, minimizing the potential that the subordinate will select
a course of action that is unacceptable to the commander. It also will
provide maximum opportunity for a subordinate to take advantage of
opportunities on scene.
2.	 Second, the commander must understand and incorporate the
subordinate’s personal history, personality, and other factors contributing
to his or her mind-set when both explaining intent and issuing orders.
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This will help the commander shape the orders to the particular strengths
and weaknesses of the subordinate.
3.	 Finally, the commander must consider the specific language of the orders.
Informed by an understanding of the subordinate to whom the orders will
be issued, the commander must take care to use language that provides
the subordinate sufficient maneuvering room while not allowing too free
a hand.
Careful analysis and consideration of these three areas will help a commander
issue effective mission-style orders and shape an appropriate decision space for
the subordinate.
The subordinate’s job is less complicated but still difficult. On receipt of orders, the subordinate must filter the language of those orders through his or her
understanding of the commander’s intent and the desired end state to create a
perceived decision space from which to choose a particular course of action.
Appropriately executed mission command ensures that the two decision spaces
overlap to a significant degree, even if not completely. If needed, and if time and
communications permit, the subordinate should seek clarification or further
guidance. The subordinate should take advantage of any information or circumstances available on scene and select a course of action that stays within the
bounds of the intended decision space.
Trust is the most significant prerequisite for successful execution of mission
command. Both the commander issuing the orders and the subordinate executing
FIGURE 1
THE MISSION-COMMAND RELATIONSHIP
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them must accept the risk of all possible outcomes.8 In other words, mission command is not a panacea; it does not guarantee success. Even a subordinate with a
perfect understanding of commander’s intent and executing beautifully written
orders still may choose an improper or ineffective course of action. The subordinate may fail to achieve an objective or may do so in a manner contradictory to
what the commander intended. So, both commander and subordinate must trust
each other. In mission command, the commander’s trust of the subordinate should
be considered part of his or her knowledge of the subordinate, as previously discussed. An extra dimension exists for the subordinate, however. Subordinates
must trust that commanders will understand their actions and protect them from
irrational or excessive punishment resulting from the subordinates exercising
discretion or interpreting commanders’ orders. If subordinates do not have this
trust in their commanders, they naturally will be unwilling to take risks or exercise
initiative—effectively negating the prime benefit that mission command provides.
The Possibilities
A matrix of four mission-command possibilities can be developed for application
to events, including during the age of sail, by laying out the roles of and requirements for both the commander and the subordinate. Each of the four elements in
the matrix represents a possible combination of circumstances in the application
of mission command, and therefore a unique framework by which to question,
understand, and teach. None of the questions offered below should be taken to
apply only to the possibility alongside which it is presented; in many cases, the
questions will apply to multiple possibilities. Nor should the questions presented
below be considered exhaustive; they are presented merely to show the outline of
a possible framework for historical analysis.
The first possibility represents the best execution of mission command. In
such scenarios, the subordinate’s derived decision space overlaps significantly
with the intended decision space the commander provided through mission orders and explanation of intent. The subordinate then chooses a course of action
from this shared decision space that leads to the commander’s desired outcome.
Historians and practitioners should apply several questions to scenarios that fall
into this category. What factors led to the two decision spaces overlapping so
well? Was it in the way the commander understood the subordinate’s limitations?
Was it because the subordinate trusted the commander to provide protection
from unintended consequences? Did the overlap of the decision spaces lead to
the successful outcome, or was it some other factor?
The second possibility is best described as an adequate exercise of mission command. In such scenarios, the subordinate chooses a course of action from his or
her decision space that leads to the commander’s desired outcome. However, the
chosen course of action lies outside the decision space from which the commander
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intended the subordinate to
choose. In other words, the
subordinate got the job done,
but did so in a manner that
the commander did not intend. This possibility should
not be confused with the best
execution of mission command simply because the subordinate achieved the desired
outcome. Because mission
command involves a relationship, it is at its best when the
chosen course of action comes
from a shared decision space.
Historians and practitioners
should ask why the two decision spaces did not overlap to
include the successful course
of action ultimately chosen.
Did the commander convey
intent poorly, or did the words
Subordinate’s Course of Action Falls:
of the orders overly constrain
Within Commander’s
Outside Commander’s
Desired Decision Space
Desired Decision Space
the subordinate from exercisPossibility no. 1:
Possibility no. 2:
ing initiative? Was there a
best execution of
adequate execution of
viable course of action that
mission command
mission command
Possibility no. 4:
Possibility no. 3:
lay within the shared decision
likely not mission
failure of mission
space? Why did the subordicommand related
command
nate choose a course of action
that lay outside the decision space the commander had provided?
The third possibility is similar to the second in that the subordinate chooses
a course of action inside his or her own decision space but outside that intended
by the commander. However, in this case, the subordinate fails to achieve the
commander’s desired outcome. This is best described as a failure of mission
command. In addition to the questions presented for the second possibility, here
practitioners and historians should focus on whether mission-command-related
issues contributed to the failure to achieve the desired outcome. Would the desired outcome have been achieved if the subordinate had chosen a particular
course of action within the commander’s intended decision space? Or was the
failure unrelated to a mission-command issue?

FIGURE 2
FOUR MISSION-COMMAND POSSIBILITIES

Mission
succeeds
Mission
fails
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The fourth possibility likely does not relate to mission command at all. Here,
the subordinate chooses a course of action from a decision space that overlaps
with the commander’s intended decision space yet fails to achieve the desired
outcome. In other words, these scenarios may involve issues that even mission
command could not have solved, such as those caused by chance or the fog of
war. Here practitioners and historians should attempt to identify the factors that
caused the chosen course of action to fail. Was it simply that, in war, bad things
sometimes happen? Did the shared decision space contain a course of action that
might have led to the desired outcome? If so, why was it not chosen?
Taken together, these four possibilities create a useful framework by which to
analyze events from the age of sail.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT: THE AGE OF SAIL
The age of sail is a particularly useful era to mine for mission-command-related
lessons, because of the challenges inherent in the age. The communications and
strictly military-related challenges at the tactical level are well known and have
been explored.9 However, the same challenges existed at the operational and strategic levels of war as well, and those are particularly relevant to the political and
diplomatic challenges facing today’s military leaders in a renewed great-power
competition. Because of slow communication during the age of sail and the
global nature of many of the wars fought, officers on station—that is, the subordinates—frequently were required to use their initiative and to make decisions
at the operational and strategic levels of war in an environment characterized
by incomplete or imperfect information. Likewise, ministers at home—that is,
the commanders—had to try to shape those officers’ behavior through orders
that could take months to arrive, if they did at all, and which could have become
irrelevant by the time they did. There are clear parallels from this information
environment to modern militaries’ concerns with disruption of today’s communication and coordination capabilities at all levels of war.10 The case study examined here demonstrates those parallels and provides both a particularly rigorous
test of the developed mission-command framework and an excellent example of
the valuable lessons that such complicated events can yield.
Less clear but no less important are the parallels from the age of sail to today’s
information-rich environment. The same constant-communication capabilities
that militaries worry about losing in the opening days of modern combat likely
are acting to degrade subordinates’ abilities to exercise initiative. John Nelsen
neatly demonstrated this in his 1987 article “Auftragstaktik: A Case for Decentralized Battle.” The situation he anticipated then—which has come to pass
today—was that newly developed communications technology both allows and
incentivizes commanders to micromanage subordinates, to the detriment of
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the subordinates’ abilities and willingness to practice initiative to advantage.11
Because commanders in the age of sail did not have the option of constant communications, they naturally developed methods to communicate within, and to
develop subordinates’ abilities to deal with, a sparse information environment.
Modern commanders seeking to prepare their subordinates for a severely
degraded communications and information environment in a future conflict can
learn from their predecessors in the age of sail. It is time, then, to apply the analytical framework to a specific case study and demonstrate the value of this approach.
THE CASE STUDY
Between 30 June and 11 July 1815, Rear Admiral Sir Philip Durham and Lieutenant General Sir James Leith, respectively the British naval and land-force
commanders in chief of the Leeward Islands in the Caribbean Sea, engaged in a
remarkable dispute regarding the island of Guadeloupe, whose governor had declared allegiance to the recently returned Napoléon Bonaparte. The dispute was
carried out via a series of lengthy and legalistic letters between the two officers.
The missives centered on whether the British forces should, or even were permitted to, intervene militarily to retake Guadeloupe in the name of the restored
Bourbon king, Louis XVIII.12
The correspondence between the commanders makes clear that each was
attempting to interpret imprecisely worded orders to fit a novel situation, and
that this effort was complicated significantly by their inability to communicate
quickly with ministers back in Britain. The fundamental problem was that the
two commanders reported to different ministers in London, and the two ministers had issued them different orders. Leith’s orders came from the Secretary of
State for War and the Colonies, Henry, Earl Bathurst, while Durham reported
to the First Lord of the Admiralty, Robert Dundas, Viscount Melville. Bathurst
communicated effectively to Leith the end state he envisioned—provision of
support to the Bourbon forces in the West Indies—while Melville constrained
Durham, forcing him to wait for a positive order to engage in any hostilities. In
other words, the two commanders on the scene were operating in two different
mission-command scenarios.
As will become clear, though, the episode is not as simple as a case of two commanders with two different sets of orders. A close reading of the correspondence
between Durham and Leith demonstrates that Durham did not understand Melville’s desired end state and Melville did not understand the pressures that were
weighing on Durham. Herein lies the value of mission command as an analytical
tool; it encourages historians to delve into the mind-sets of the commanders on
the spot, as well as those higher in the chain of command, and it does so in a
language familiar to modern-day practitioners. When we do so here, not only do
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we plumb useful depths for mission-command-related lessons, but we also revise
our historical understanding of the particulars of this case.
Events in the West Indies during and after Napoléon’s escape from Elba in
February 1815 have received very little attention. Recent accounts of the naval
history in the West Indies during this period either focus on American commerce
raiding toward the end of the War of 1812 or do not touch on events in the West
Indies at all.13 Nor is the nineteenth-century historiography much better.14 In
both cases, the lack of interest in the region is understandable, given the enormity
of the shadow cast by Napoléon’s return to France, his defeat at Waterloo, and his
exile to Saint Helena.
The Commanders
The few accounts we have of the dispute between Durham and Leith flow entirely
from Durham’s version of the events. James Ralfe’s 1828 biography of Durham—
very likely sourced from the admiral himself—blames the dispute on Leith and
concludes that the root cause was “an excess of zeal on one part [Leith’s], and
the exercise of sound discretion on the other.”15 Durham’s memoirs, published
posthumously in 1846, come to a similar conclusion, although they do not attack
Leith directly.16 The only modern analysis of the dispute relies heavily on both
these sources, as well as three letters from Durham to Leith. It concludes that it
was “Leith’s belief that his letter from Bathurst clearly obligated him to restore
by force of arms the usurped royal authority on [Guadeloupe], and Durham’s insistence that his instructions dated 26 March prevented him from co-operating”
that caused the dispute.17 In fact, a closer examination of the events in question
suggests a different conclusion, as this article will demonstrate. In addition to
applying a mission-command framework, the analysis relies on additional correspondence from Durham and other previously unconsidered perspectives of the
events on Guadeloupe and Martinique during Napoléon’s return.18
One new perspective on the dispute between Durham and Leith is that of
the French general Eugène Édouard Boyer de Peyreleau, who was the principal
deputy to the governor of Guadeloupe, Charles Alexandre Léon Durand, comte
de Linois. In a pamphlet published in 1849, General Boyer provided commentary
on the internal deliberations and a detailed view of the events leading up to the
government of Guadeloupe declaring allegiance to the restored Bonapartist government on 18 June—the event that was the chief cause of the Durham-Leith dispute (occurring, coincidentally, on the same day as the Battle of Waterloo). When
considering Boyer’s account, however, it is important to consider that, while both
he and Linois were sent home to face trial after Napoléon’s final defeat, he was
the only one to face any blame. He was sentenced to death for his role, although
this quickly was commuted to a lifetime prison sentence, of which he actually
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served only three years. As Boyer indirectly makes clear in his introduction, he
published his pamphlet primarily to reclaim his reputation and to set the “public
record” straight after Linois’s death.19 Therefore, aside from particulars such as
dates, places, and names of participants, his account should be treated skeptically.
Nevertheless, it provides a helpful French perspective on the dispute—which,
after all, hinged on the behavior of the French in the West Indies.
In addition to ignoring the French perspective, the existing studies of the dispute also have failed to examine how the backgrounds of the British and French
commanders in chief shaped their actions in the summer of 1815. When he
was appointed to command Royal Navy (RN) forces in the Leeward Islands in
November 1813, Rear Admiral Durham’s career was approaching its apex. In the
thirty-seven years since he joined the Royal Navy, he had survived the disastrous
sinking of Royal George, successfully commanded several ships and a squadron,
fought and been wounded at Trafalgar in 1805, and amassed considerable fame
and fortune.20 He had made an excellent first impression in the Leeward Islands
by capturing two French frigates while en route to his new command. American
privateers were preying on shipping throughout the station, so Durham immediately set about employing his squadron to capture them, and his efforts earned
lavish praise from the British merchants in the Caribbean.21
But Durham was eager to return to England to commence his postwar career,
so shortly after the Treaty of Paris was signed in 1814 he applied for relief. While
waiting for the identified officer to arrive and relieve him, including through the
winter and early spring of 1814–15, Durham occupied his time and his squadron
with several tasks. These included continuing protection of merchant ships while
the Treaty of Ghent awaited ratification and implementation, removing British
troops and colonists from the West Indian islands being returned to Denmark
and France, and sending several ships of his squadron home to England as part
of the general drawdown of the Royal Navy.22
As governor in chief and commander of the British land forces in the Leeward
Islands, Leith found himself in a position similar to Durham’s. Having served
with distinction in the Peninsular War at Bussaco, Badajoz, and Salamanca, he
received his appointment to the Leeward Islands on 15 February 1814. Arriving
in the islands later that spring, Leith’s primary concern was handing over the
administration and control of the captured islands to the newly arriving Danish
and French authorities—not a simple task. The handover of Guadeloupe, which
was completed in early December 1814, proved particularly challenging for all
involved; apparently Leith’s personal intervention was required to overcome
disagreements between the outgoing British governor and the incoming French
administration. Adding to Leith’s difficulties in carrying out his duties was the
fact that he had no legal authority over his naval counterpart or the troopships
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in the region, and therefore he could not move troops around the station unless
Durham agreed to supply the means to do so.23
On the French side, the governors of Martinique and Guadeloupe appointed
by Louis XVIII’s newly restored Bourbon government were reliant on a prerevolutionary ordinance for the organization of the colonies. The two governors were
in charge of military matters, while administration and finances were left to an
intendant and a superior counsel. The first French ships of the expedition to
reclaim the West Indies for the Bourbons left France on 1 September 1814, while
the governors set sail in late October.24
The new governor of Guadeloupe, the comte de Linois, had served in the
Bourbon, revolutionary, and Imperial French navies, seeing notable service in the
Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean as part of the last two. Linois’s active service
ended when he was injured in a battle with Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren, RN,
during his return to France in March 1806 and taken prisoner to England. Linois
spent the remainder of the war there, until Napoléon’s abdication in 1814. While
captive in England he was created Baron of the Empire and awarded a pension
of four thousand livres per year. Linois arrived on Guadeloupe and assumed his
post as governor on 14 December 1814.25
Unlike Linois, Pierre René Charles Marie, comte de Vaugiraud, was a staunch
royalist. He was made a vice admiral and appointed governor of Martinique in
June 1814 after having spent the previous twenty-four years in exile in London. It
also is worth noting that in 1795 Vaugiraud was serving as the pilot on Durham’s
Anson off Noirmoutier when the ship ran aground—resulting in a threat from
Durham to hang him. Vaugiraud arrived on the island in early December. His
first several months there appear to have been fairly routine, concerned mostly
with the mechanics of the restoration of Bourbon rule and the reestablishment
of commerce to and from the island. However, Vaugiraud’s knowledge of Linois’s
background likely played a part in his decision to order the captain of the royalist
ship L’Hermione on 15 December 1814 to bring him an account of the situation
on Guadeloupe, Linois’s attitude, and any Bonapartist activities there.26 Clearly,
during the winter and early spring of 1815 some tension existed between the two
French governors.
The Islands
It is important next to understand the relative economic and strategic unimportance of the islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique compared with other islands
in the West Indies. It is true that sugar, and the ability to produce it inexpensively using enslaved labor, made West Indian colonies very valuable possessions
throughout the eighteenth century. Furthermore, strategically, the West Indies
provided a convenient peripheral theater in which a nation could distract its
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opponent or force a diversion of forces away from another theater. In fact, in
every war between 1748 and 1815 the British conducted major operations there
to disrupt French and Spanish trade. From Britain’s wartime perspective, the
importance of Guadeloupe and Martinique was not in bringing their cane land
under British rule but in bolstering Britain’s domestic sugar market by destroying the islands’ capacity to produce sugar, and thereby denying the French the
ability to profit from them. Later, the possessions could be used as diplomatic
bargaining chips in peace negotiations. So, for instance, at the end of the Seven
Years’ War in 1763, Britain effectively traded both islands, along with a number
of other West Indian possessions, back to France in exchange for Canada, and
in the 1802 Treaty of Amiens it gave back Martinique for no directly related
concessions.27
A similar line of thinking seems to have influenced the decision by Robert
Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh, Britain’s foreign secretary, to return the islands
to Louis XVIII in the 1814 Treaty of Paris. Castlereagh appears to have returned
Martinique and Guadeloupe solely as a salve for France’s national pride, as that
country’s borders on the continent were being driven back to the status quo ante
bellum, and British sugar production on Jamaica, Trinidad, and Saint Lucia and at
Demerara was not threatened by the resumption of French production on Guadeloupe and Martinique.28 As a result of the treaty, during the winter and spring
of 1815 Leith and Durham busied themselves redistributing colonists and naval
and land forces to restore French control over the islands.29
The French merchant interest, on the other hand, assigned more economic and
strategic importance to returning the islands to their control, maintaining peace,
and restarting trade. The 1814 Treaty of Paris also gave the French government
the right to attempt to reconquer Saint-Domingue (Haiti) from the regime that
had held control of the island since a successful slave revolt during the early days
of the French Revolution. This possibility gave the traders and merchants who
had suffered since the onset of the French Revolution, both in France and in the
colonies, hope of restoring their former glory and prosperity.30 They were eager
to be rid of their overbearing former British overlords; they hoped to resume a
more profitable life under the rule of Louis XVIII’s newly installed government.31
Napoléon’s Return
Napoléon’s unanticipated return from Elba, and the response of the French armed
forces to that return, had global implications. While the allies meeting in Vienna
were quick to declare Napoléon an outlaw and to ratify the seventh coalition
on 13 March, a week after learning of his escape, Napoléon’s return nonetheless
caused significant angst and debate within the British government.32 The debate
did not center on whether Britain should oppose Napoléon’s resumption of his
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throne; in fact, on 18 March, even before Napoléon arrived in Paris, the Duke
of Wellington was able to inform Castlereagh of the allies’ decision to renew the
Treaty of Chaumont, which bound each signatory to supply 150,000 troops for
a common defense against Napoléon’s expected aggression. The military provisions of the treaty were “instantly accepted” by the British government after it was
signed on 25 March, with an immediate commitment of £2 million in subsidies
to be paid to continental powers for the raising of one hundred thousand troops
to help Britain meet its quota.33
Instead, the debate focused on what ends the British government publicly
could commit itself to attempting to achieve through the use of military force
against Bonaparte. The government was particularly concerned with whether the
Bourbon monarchy was worth restoring. Louis XVIII’s abrupt flight from Paris to
Lille and then to Belgium within a span of nineteen days did not help his supporters in Britain.34 Neither, however, did his flight soften the British government’s
intent to fight Napoléon. After hearing the news of Louis’s departure, Castlereagh
wrote to Wellington that Britain’s involvement must be of “the largest scale. . . .
[Y]ou must inundate France with force in all directions.”35
The final results of this debate, and the fate of Napoléon himself, have been
studied extensively and need not be addressed further here. However, the fact
that this debate occurred from the moment the British government and its ministers learned of Napoléon’s return on 10 March until the end of May serves as an
important backdrop to the orders those ministers sent to their respective commanders in the West Indies during this period.36
The Orders
The first letter that Melville wrote to Durham after Napoléon’s escape was a cancelation of his relief as naval commander in chief of the Leeward Islands station.
Writing shortly after news of Napoléon’s return reached London on 10 March,
Melville told him about Napoléon’s escape, praised Durham’s conduct, and specifically mentioned that the admiral had given “such great satisfaction” to the
merchants on his station. Melville concluded, “Should, however, peace not be
disturbed, I will take care to send out an officer to relieve you.”37
Having disappointed Durham’s hopes of a return to England, Melville then
wrote the order that would drive and guide Durham’s conduct for the next four
months. Because a subordinate’s understanding of the intent behind a commander’s orders and how the commander conveys that intent are so important,
Melville’s orders of 26 March are worth quoting in their entirety here.
The vessel that conveys this letter and other despatches for you, carries out orders
from Louis XVIII to the Governments of Martinique and Guadaloupe [sic], to hold
those islands in his name.
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I hope they will obey the requisition, but if they should not, and if on the contrary
they declare for Bonaparte, it will nevertheless be your duty (indeed it is scarcely
necessary for me to remind you of it) to abstain from any hostile acts against his flag,
unless the vessels which carry it should commit any act of aggression against British
ships, or until you learn hostilities between France and this country have actually
commenced. If Martinique and Guadaloupe continue faithful to Louis XVIII, and
their vessels carry his flag, they must of course be treated as friends.38

On the face of it, Melville’s orders seem to differ significantly from the
attitude of the rest of the British government. He wrote them two weeks
after the allies in Vienna had declared Napoléon an outlaw and a week after
Wellington had informed Castlereagh of the allies’ intent to renew the Treaty
of Chaumont and commit 150,000 troops to Napoléon’s defeat. However,
Melville’s orders still fit within the overall response of the government. During this period, even as the navy continued to deal with the ongoing postwar
reduction in the strength of its squadrons around the world, including in
the Leeward Islands, the service, like the rest of the British government, was
dealing with the shock of Napoléon’s return, and Melville faced the growing potential of a renewal of a worldwide war in which the Royal Navy was
likely again to play a major part in protecting the British homeland and its
possessions overseas.
Looked at this way—with the benefit of hindsight and the knowledge of
how the greater conflict concluded—Melville’s desired end state seems clear;
he did not want to provoke unnecessary conflict in the West Indies.39 However, his guidelines for acceptable action by Durham are less clear, serving to
obscure his true intent. Durham was neither to act aggressively nor to allow
his actions to start an unprovoked conflict with any French ship, regardless
of whether it flew the white Bourbon flag or the imperial tricolor. Crucially,
what was less clear was what Durham should do, or even was permitted to
do, if events in the West Indies exceeded the scope of Melville’s orders before
new ones could be sent across the Atlantic. In the end, Melville’s language is
extremely rigid; it is that of a commander restricting too severely the options
available to a subordinate in the field. “[T]o abstain from any hostile acts” gave
Durham very little room to maneuver as circumstances changed, and the focus
on “hostilities between France and this country” only confused matters. After
all, the allies claimed to be taking up arms against French forces as allies of
France—they merely were seeking to capture the outlaw Napoléon Bonaparte.
Whether France and Britain actually were at war seems a simple question
on its face, but in the context of Napoléon’s return Melville severely limited
Durham’s available courses of action and confused his understanding of the
evolving events in Europe.
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On 10 April, amid efforts to supply and prepare the Duke of Wellington’s army
on the Continent after Britain’s official commitment to the renewed Treaty of
Chaumont on 25 March, Bathurst wrote his orders to Leith. As with Melville’s
orders to Durham, they are worth quoting in their entirety here.
The events which have recently taken place in France give too much reason to believe
that some endeavours may be made by the party attached to Bonaparte to gain
possession of the islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique and there is ground for apprehension that the governors of those islands may not be able without assistance to
maintain the authority of His Most Christian Majesty.
Under these circumstances I am commanded to signify to you the pleasure of His
Royal Highness the Prince Regent that in the event of any requisition being made to
you for assistance for such a purpose from the officers in command in those islands
you should without delay afford from the force under your command such assistance
as the means placed at your disposal may be able to furnish.40

Unlike Melville’s orders, these clearly communicate Bathurst’s desired end
state to Leith: retention of the islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique under the
control of Louis XVIII. In further contrast to Melville’s orders, Bathurst’s are
those of a commander setting a goal for the on-scene subordinate while leaving
significant room for that subordinate to choose how best to accomplish that goal.
His full intention is clear: the islands must be retained for the king of France without removing Leith’s ability to do his job, which included protecting the British
colonies under his charge. By using open and permissive language, Bathurst gave
Leith significant room to maneuver and to match his actions to the situation. This
will become important later.
As evidenced by the first sentence of Melville’s orders of 26 March to Durham, the French ministers also felt the need to send prescriptive orders to Vaugiraud and Linois in the immediate aftermath of Napoléon’s return. The Bourbon
minister of the navy and the colonies wrote to Vaugiraud on 12 March, sending
him copies of newspapers announcing the return of “l’usurpateur.” Louis’s ambassador in London wrote to both governors on 24 March urging them to hold
their islands in the name of Louis XVIII. However—likely understanding the
different backgrounds of the two governors—the ambassador gave additional
instructions that neither of them should permit any new forces to enter Guadeloupe, nor should they hand over the administration of the colony without a
personal order from the king countersigned by Blacas d’Aulps, the minister of
the king’s household. Another potential reason for the firm tone of the ambassador’s order is that the king apparently was considering permanent retirement
to Guadeloupe and Martinique if Bonaparte was ultimately successful in his
return.41 Much like Melville’s, these orders served to box in the French commanders on station rigidly.
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As the Bourbons’ situation in France worsened, however, even those prescriptive orders did not provide sufficient confidence to Louis’s government. On 18
April, Blacas wrote to Vaugiraud and Linois, as well as to the intendant of Guadeloupe, to inform them that the king had appointed Vaugiraud governor general of
both Martinique and Guadeloupe. He gave Louis’s reasoning for this change to be
the events that had come to pass in France. Implicit, however, is Louis’s ministers’
concern that military and government leaders continued to declare for Napoléon,
leaving the royal court anxious to consolidate power in the West Indies in the
French commander that it trusted.42
The Orders Delivered
By the third week of April, then, both the British and French ministers in Europe
had cast their dice, from a mission-command perspective. On both sides, intent
was imbued, intentionally or otherwise, into orders. On the French side, Louis
XVIII’s government decided it did not have the right military commander on
Guadeloupe for the unfolding situation. All the orders and commands then were
sent on the long journey to the West Indies, to be interpreted and carried out by
the disparate group of commanders.
In this period, instructions from ministers in Europe took between one and
two months to reach their intended recipients in the West Indies. For the British,
the primary mail route to the West Indies originated, like all other wartime mail
service to overseas destinations, from Falmouth in the southwest of England. The
service followed a relatively consistent path from Britain to the West Indies that
was designed to take advantage of prevailing winds and geography. Occasionally,
the first stop for the ships after their departure from Britain was Lisbon—three of
the twelve packets called there in 1815. Next, the ships would sail to the northeast
coast of South America before proceeding into the Leeward Islands, where typically they would stop at the various colonies in the region. Barbados, followed by
Dominica and Antigua, were the colonies visited most often in 1815. Finally, from
the West Indies the packets would take about a month to return by a more northerly route to Falmouth, where they would start the cycle again.43
Between the fall of 1814 and the end of 1815, the route to the West Indies was
serviced by approximately a dozen packets that departed on a roughly monthly
schedule. On all the routes that the packet service maintained, the primary determinant of the scheduling seems to have been the availability of the packet ships
themselves; however, if important mail needed to be sent and no packets were
available, mail also could be consigned to any available RN vessels.44
On the French side, Louis XVIII’s flight to Ghent meant that his government
would not be able to rely on the French postal service to relay instructions to his
commanders in the West Indies; instead, his ministers would have to rely on the
British postal system for assistance. As the opening line of Melville’s 26 March
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orders to Durham points out, the packet carrying his orders also carried orders
to the governors of Guadeloupe and Martinique. This also is likely why Blacas,
when notifying Vaugiraud of his appointment as governor general in the West
Indies, directed him to relay all reports on the colonies through Louis XVIII’s
ambassador in London. Constrained by similar difficulties, Bonaparte’s newly
restored imperial minister of the navy and the colonies sent his first letter to
Vaugiraud and Linois via a French armed schooner.45
Also inherent in this timeline is the assumption that the packet ship, warship,
or merchant vessel entrusted with the mail makes it to its destination safely. However, packets faced many risks in the early nineteenth century, including falling
victim to a competing nation’s warships or privateers, or simply to the elements.
This was true especially for transatlantic packets during the War of 1812, which
saw the average loss of mail-carrying ships at sea jump from two a year to seven
after June 1812. Luckily for Leith and Durham, however, the last loss of packets
to any source in the West Indies in 1815 occurred in February, when an American privateer took Lady Mary Pelham on the latter’s return trip to Falmouth, and
in April, when Duke of Montrose foundered on rocks off Barbados, managing
nonetheless to save the mailbags. Correspondence successfully and regularly
arrived in the West Indies throughout the entirety of the Hundred Days.46 Of
course, neither Bathurst nor Melville, nor Leith nor Durham, could have known
this during the spring and summer of 1815; instead, they would have been used
to the opposite, with the timely arrival of guidance being something on which
they could not depend.
From a mission-command perspective, the slow and semireliable system
responsible for conveying orders and guidance from ministers and commanders at home to subordinates in the West Indies created a dangerous information
environment in the spring and summer of 1815. Despite the generally reliable,
stable, and periodic arrival of mail from Britain, the potential for the loss of
orders, combined with the significant travel time, meant that the British and
French commanders in chief were operating in an environment characterized
by incomplete and imperfect information—or at least the fear of flawed and late
information. This, in turn, placed even greater emphasis on the latitude provided
to those commanders in the orders that were about to begin arriving.
The Course of Events in the Islands
The orders and other communications arrived in quick succession. Newspapers
carrying the first reports of Napoléon’s escape from Elba and the upheaval in
France reached Barbados on 28 April in the mailbags saved by the crew of the
sinking packet Duke of Montrose.47 The news reached Guadeloupe on 29 April.
A few days later, on 2 May, after having stopped at Martinique, HMS Badger arrived at Guadeloupe with the 24 March orders from Louis XVIII’s ambassador in
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London, before the ship proceeded on to Barbados. Melville’s orders to Durham
of 26 March also arrived in Badger, reaching Barbados on 8 May, but Durham
actually did not receive them until a few days later, as he was off on an initial
reconnoiter of the situation on Guadeloupe. It is not known exactly when Leith
received his 10 April orders from Bathurst or by what means he received them.
However, Durham, in a letter to the Admiralty dated 28 May, stated that Leith
had received instructions to help Linois and Vaugiraud maintain their islands
loyal to Louis XVIII. On the basis of recorded packet sailing and arrival dates
during this period, these instructions could have been delivered only by warship or private vessel, and they likely arrived shortly after Durham’s orders from
Melville.48
On Martinique and Guadeloupe, as in France, news of Napoléon’s return created immediate difficulties for the Bourbon governments. In early May, both
governors, fearful of their respective populations’ increasingly pro-Napoléon
sentiments, reached out to Leith to ask for assistance. Vaugiraud, facing imminent mutiny from two-thirds of the 1,300-man garrison on Martinique, swiftly
communicated with Leith and concluded a signed agreement with the British
governor on 20 May to allow British troops to garrison forts on Martinique as
auxiliary forces for the preservation of Louis XVIII’s authority.49
On Guadeloupe, Linois, concerned with rumors spreading across the island
of the return of the hated “Anglais” and with his government’s inability to keep
news from the inhabitants about Napoléon’s increasing success in France, wrote
to Leith on 3 May asking for a British man-of-war to patrol off both Martinique
and Guadeloupe.50 He requested that this patrol “intercept any vessels with the
tri-coloured flag,” and Durham, not yet having received the 26 March orders
from Melville, complied with the request immediately.51 Durham and Leith then
both sailed at once for Guadeloupe, arriving 13 May, to inform Linois that the
requested patrol would be established, to offer him assistance, and to request an
in-person interview. Likely fearing the effect of his being seen conferring with
British commanders in chief, subsequent to rumors among the general population of an imminent reinvasion of the island by the hated British, Linois refused
an in-person interview. However, he and Leith continued to communicate by
letter for the remainder of May, culminating with Leith’s offer on 26 May to send
an auxiliary force to garrison the forts of Guadeloupe. Linois declined the offer, citing his orders from Louis XVIII’s ambassador in London to allow no new
forces to enter the colony without express permission. On hearing of his refusal,
Vaugiraud wrote to Linois on 6 June counseling him that the ambassador’s orders
were intended solely to exclude any new French troops from Europe, and that he
should allow British help in maintaining the colony’s loyalty to the French king.
Linois refused again.52
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Durham and Leith, both newly in receipt of guidance from their respective
ministers in England, swiftly made preparations to assist Vaugiraud. By 27 May,
Leith had assembled two thousand soldiers, along with artillery, provisions, and
other stores, at Saint Lucia. Having no authority over the troopships or Durham
himself, Leith requested the admiral’s assistance to ferry the British troops from
Saint Lucia to Martinique as soon as Vaugiraud was ready to receive them.53 Durham readily, and without any apparent argument, agreed, arriving at Saint Lucia
with the required transports on 31 May.54
While making preparations to deliver the British troops to Vaugiraud on
31 May, Durham reported to the Admiralty Linois’s refusal of Leith’s similar
offer of an auxiliary force. In his missive, Durham described the deteriorating
situation on Guadeloupe yet defended Linois’s loyalty. He believed that Linois
was basing his refusal on his inability “to permit an English Soldier to land[,]
as almost every Man on that Island ‘is attached to Buonaparte,’ to ‘Privateering,’ and ‘Plunder’ and are the most disorderly set in the West Indies.” He also
noted—with the concern of a man whose reputation in the West Indies to this
point had been built on his success in defending the merchant trade from attack—that he had received reports of a force of up to twenty privateers waiting in the harbor at Pointe-à-Pitre (the main anchorage of Guadeloupe). He
believed they were waiting only for the “moment the tri-colored flag is hoisted
or that they hear of Hostilities having commenced” to begin wreaking havoc
on British trade. Durham then went on to assure the Admiralty that he would
do everything in his power to avoid being the first aggressor in the region.
He also reported to the Admiralty that he had asked for and received Linois’s
promise that the governor would not endorse any expedition to occupy two
valuable islands to the south of Guadeloupe, the Saintes. Finally, in a postscript
Durham warned that Duchesse d’Angoulême, a French frigate, had departed
for France, leaving only one French warship in the area. It is clear that at this
point Durham understood the fragile situation on and around Guadeloupe,
especially the weakness of its government, and the potential consequences of
that island declaring for Napoléon. Despite having received Melville’s direction
to engage in no hostile act against a ship carrying the tricolor flag, Durham left
four brigs—the maximum amount of force he could spare—to watch both for
any indication that privateers had begun to attack shipping and for the arrival
of any ships from the French mainland.55
Both Durham and Leith expected Vaugiraud to take immediate advantage
of the agreement but were surprised when, after being notified of Durham’s
readiness to land troops, the governor balked. Durham’s report to the Admiralty
describes the governor’s hesitation as resulting from fear of the reaction of the
inhabitants to the arrival of the British. However, in two letters to Durham, on
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29 May and 1 June, Vaugiraud asks Durham to postpone the arrival of the troops
until he can make proper arrangements to receive them, mentioning concerns
that some of the more recalcitrant Bonapartist soldiers should be sent back to
France first. Durham and Leith, both of them concerned about the health of the
British troops packed together in ships, were understandably upset, and they
leaned heavily on Vaugiraud to accept the troops.56
It also is worth noting that while Durham and Leith were exchanging letters
with Vaugiraud, Durham began to dictate a summary of his career-long exploits
and the several plaudits he had received for his service to king and country. As
Hilary Rubinstein observes in her book Trafalgar Captain, it appears that amid
preparations for an occupation of French territory and the potential onset of another world war, Durham was focused on memorializing himself.57
Ultimately, on 5 June the British auxiliary force landed safely on Martinique;
the forts were garrisoned in the name of Louis XVIII, with appropriate pomp and
circumstance; and the colony remained loyal to the French king. Recognizing that
the inhabitants of Martinique might be wary of the return of British troops to their
island, Leith and Vaugiraud took care to publish widely the terms of their agreement. They also tried to assuage the fears of the French colonists by incorporating
two conditions regarding the retention of Bourbon authority over the colony. Specifically, Leith guaranteed that the sovereign administration of Martinique would
remain under Vaugiraud’s control entirely, and that the British troops, as auxiliaries, would report to Vaugiraud for use as he saw fit to maintain Louis’s authority.58
The news of the British troops’ arrival on Martinique reached Guadeloupe
the next day, on 6 June, and the terms of the agreement between Leith and Vaugiraud were published there on 10 June. According to Linois’s deputy, Boyer,
news of the troops caused a significant uproar, while word of the agreement did
nothing to calm the population; in fact, according to Boyer, it was only his own
heroic efforts that prevented the island’s inhabitants from immediately declaring for Bonaparte.59 Writing to the Admiralty on the same day on which the
terms of the agreement were published, Durham offered a different perspective.
Because of Melville’s orders of 26 March, Durham had found it necessary to resist requests from Leith, Vaugiraud, and Linois to “act in any way hostile to the
tri-colored flag.” Clearly, Leith, Linois, and Vaugiraud had grown uncomfortable with the situation on Guadeloupe, realized that the arrival of orders from
Napoléon’s government would set the island on fire, and understood that the
Royal Navy was the only means of preventing this from happening. Durham
did not disagree with this conclusion, expressing his relief later in the same
letter that he was “happy to say [that no ship carrying Napoléon’s flag] had
. . . appeared yet in these seas.” He, however, appeared concerned that soon he
might be forced to act outside the restrictive bounds of Melville’s orders.60 So,
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by the second week of June the situation on Guadeloupe had reached a tipping
point—as had Admiral Durham.
Dispatched by Napoléon’s government from France on 9 May with a mission
to “rallier la Martinique et la Guadeloupe à la métropole,” the French schooner
L’Agile made its first landfall at Saint-François on the eastern side of Guadeloupe
on 12 June, carrying two letters for the governor.61 HMS Barrosa, one of the brigs
cruising around Guadeloupe at Linois’s request—to prevent exactly this type of
thing from happening—came upon L’Agile shortly after it left Saint-François.
Barrosa, ignorant of L’Agile’s success in already landing letters, determined the
schooner to be acting suspiciously and brought it to Durham, whose flagship
was anchored at the Saintes. Durham’s interrogation of L’Agile’s commander
revealed that the ship carried both the tricolor and the Bourbon flag, and that
the captain had instructions to fly the Bourbon flag when away from the coast to
fool any patrolling British ships. Most importantly, Durham learned that L’Agile
carried instructions and exhortations from Napoléon’s newly installed minister
of the navy and the colonies for the governors of Martinique and Guadeloupe,
as well as for all French warships still in the West Indies, to return themselves to
imperial rule. Likely remembering the rigid words of Melville’s orders, Durham
forwarded the dispatches to Linois on Guadeloupe and asked what he would like
done with them. Linois’s reply, revealing the increasing stress he felt in his position, was unambiguous. He asked Durham to send the dispatches to Vaugiraud,
who recently had learned of his appointment by Louis XVIII’s government in
exile as governor general of all the French West Indian colonies, to ask for his
advice and instruction. Tellingly, Linois also implored Durham—taking care to
refer to him as a friend—to have L’Agile forcibly escorted out of the West Indies
to ensure continued tranquility.62
At this point, Durham faced what seemed to be an easy choice: either confiscate the dispatches carried aboard L’Agile, and possibly the ship itself, or release
it to deliver the instructions. No act of aggression actually had occurred yet.
Barrosa had encountered L’Agile while the latter was flying the Bourbon flag, and
the French ship appears to have come peacefully to the Saintes, where, again, the
captain had surrendered the dispatches without any recorded violence. In other
words, Durham had stayed within the letter of his instructions and easily could
justify confiscating the imperial dispatches, if not L’Agile also. This is especially
true given the explicit request from the Bourbon governor of Guadeloupe to
do exactly that, which was in line with Bathurst’s orders to Leith. Even if the
confiscation of the imperial dispatches generated a protest from a yet-to-beestablished Napoleonic government in the distant future, it was extremely
unlikely that Durham would face censure from a government that had joined
in declaring Napoléon an outlaw and that had directed another commander
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in chief on the same station to give the royalist governors any assistance they
requested.
It is also possible to argue that it was in Durham’s best interest as the naval
commander in chief to confiscate the dispatches. Left unchecked, L’Agile had
instructions to provide the incendiary dispatches to any French warship it could
contact. While Durham knew that only one such warship remained, even that
single ship would have presented a significant threat to his diminished squadron
and the merchant shipping in the area. Additionally, as he had reported to the
Admiralty previously, Durham was concerned that the twenty or so privateers
in harbor at Pointe-à-Pitre in Guadeloupe were waiting only for a return of
Napoléon’s government to begin ravaging trade in the region. Finally, regardless
of what happened to Napoléon in Europe, in no way would Britain’s interests in
the West Indies be bettered by having a Bourbon government secured by British
power on Martinique and a Bonapartist government on Guadeloupe. Again, it is
extremely unlikely that a British commander in chief would face any discipline
or displeasure for taking measures to prevent depredation of British trade in the
West Indies. Nonetheless, Durham wrote to the Admiralty on 13 June that he did
not believe the “nature of his instructions” permitted him to do anything other
than return the dispatches and allow L’Agile to go wherever it chose.63
Unsurprisingly, the captain of L’Agile chose to proceed directly back to Guadeloupe, arriving at Basse-Terre on 15 June. Immediately on landing, the crew
distributed copies of the Moniteur and other newspapers, then gave dispatches
to the commander of the harbor. The ship’s captain, proudly displaying a tricolored cockade on his hat, proceeded through town to meet with the governor,
drawing an increasingly large and boisterous crowd as he went. Over the next
three days events proceeded exactly as Linois had feared when he asked Durham
to send the dispatches to Vaugiraud and to banish L’Agile from the West Indies.
The enthusiasm of the general population for Napoléon’s return followed a
path identical to that of the people in France. The arc of events culminated in
Linois—likely out of a sense of self-preservation rather than any overwhelming attachment to Napoléon’s cause—allowing the tricolor to be raised over the
island on 18 June and issuing his formal declaration of loyalty to Napoléon’s
government on 19 June.64
This proved too much for the island’s intendant, Jean François César de Guilhermy, a staunch royalist. He fled Guadeloupe for the Saintes on the night of 20
June, along with several other leading citizens of the colony. Two days later, Linois
sent an armed detachment to the island to deliver a letter to Guilhermy. In accordance with Durham’s orders, HMS Barbadoes, stationed at the Saintes to monitor
Guadeloupe, did not interfere with the armed party’s landing or its stay on the
island. In his letter to Guilhermy, Linois asserted that he had no other choice but to
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attach his own destiny to that of Bonaparte. He also requested that Guilhermy return to Guadeloupe to resume his post. At the same time, according to Guilhermy’s
personal papers, published in 1886, Linois threatened Guilhermy’s wife, who was
still in her house on Guadeloupe; the governor warned that he would keep her and
her children hostage until Guilhermy agreed to return. The threat did not persuade
Guilhermy or the others on the Saintes, who escaped aboard Barbadoes, leaving the
Saintes in the possession of the armed party from Guadeloupe. Guilhermy arrived
on Martinique on 26 June—one day after his family members did, who apparently
had not been held captive. Three days later, after receiving a report of events on
Guadeloupe, Vaugiraud, in his capacity as governor general of the French West
Indies, issued a proclamation dismissing Linois as governor of Guadeloupe.65
Meanwhile, Durham had returned to Guadeloupe on the morning of 18 June
and discovered the tricolor flying above all the fortifications. He apparently had
“long been in expectation of [it] taking place.” In his report of this news to the
Admiralty, Durham did not give an explicit reason for his return to Guadeloupe,
but his concern that he might be found at fault for releasing L’Agile and its dispatches was implied heavily by a postscript to the report. In it, Durham informed
the Admiralty that he had just learned that L’Agile had delivered dispatches at the
eastern side of Guadeloupe before Barrosa came into contact with it. He clearly
was trying to demonstrate that his release of L’Agile was not the sole cause of the
island declaring for Napoléon. Durham then informed his superiors in London
that he had sent an officer ashore to confer with Linois, whose reply convinced
him that the colony’s leadership now was dedicated fully to Napoléon’s cause.
Finally, wholly in line with Melville’s orders of 26 March, Durham informed the
Admiralty that once he heard of hostilities actually beginning he immediately
would place the island in a state of blockade.66
Having completed his report on the revolt of Guadeloupe, Durham next took
an action that baffled Leith. Shortly after 18 June, Durham wrote to Linois, informing him that, having received no orders to commence hostilities, he would
not interfere with any ship flying Napoléon’s flag, regardless of the mission on
which it was engaged. It did not matter whether the ship was engaged actively in
hostility toward Louis XVIII’s authority or bringing troops, weapons, and supplies to fortify Guadeloupe against a Bourbon reinvasion; Durham would not
permit his squadron to intervene unless his ships were attacked or he learned that
war had commenced between Britain and Napoléon’s France.67
This news circulated rapidly throughout British, Bourbon, and Bonapartist
circles, appropriately encouraging or enraging each audience as late as 22 July. At
the time, Leith could not comprehend why Durham’s ship had allowed the rebels
to seize the Saintes without opposition. Leith was troubled especially by Durham’s
decision to tell Linois that he effectively had a free hand to undermine Bourbon
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authority in the West Indies, and as a direct consequence put Leith’s troops on Martinique, and anywhere else they were assisting Bourbon forces, in danger.68
But the rationale behind Durham’s decision becomes clearer when viewed
through the lens of mission command. As previously discussed, Melville’s orders of
26 March overly constrained Durham’s available options. They limited too severely
the decision space available to Durham to deal with a unique and rapidly evolving
environment in which he could not hope to get clarification on a useful timescale.
Undiscussed to this point, however, is that Melville’s orders also failed to account for the personality and mind-set of the person receiving them. It is clear
that by the end of June 1815 Durham wanted to go home to England. He had
applied for a relief and been granted one, only to find that hope snatched away
at the last moment by Napoléon’s escape from Elba.69 Sensing the possibility of
another destructive world war, Durham was acutely aware of the degraded material state and decreasing numbers of the squadron he had available to protect
the vital commerce in his theater. This, in turn, could threaten the reputation he
had built throughout his entire career and affect his prospects at home; in fact,
he was concerned enough about this reputation to begin memorializing it while
busy preparing to land troops on Martinique. As with the L’Agile incident, Durham could have stayed well within the bounds of his orders simply by ordering
his ships not to interfere with French ships flying the tricolor; he did not need to
tell Napoléon’s sympathizers on Guadeloupe explicitly that they had a free hand
to do as they pleased. Durham’s broadcasting of his intention neither to interfere
with nor to intercept any of Napoléon’s ships likely only served to ensure that
none of those ships would act aggressively in the first place, which would have
forced Durham to start a conflict he did not want. When looked at in light of all
these stresses, it is clear that the restrictive nature of Melville’s orders, as well as
his explicit tying of Durham’s prospects of relief to the maintenance of peace,
provided Durham an excuse to do nothing and hope for the best. Put another
way, Melville’s orders did not take into account the mind-set of the commander
for whom they were intended; instead, they took away any incentive for boldness
or initiative and provided room for the admiral to equivocate.
The Back-and-Forth
Leith, of course, did not know any of this when he wrote his first contribution to
what turned out to be a seven-letter exchange. He simply was trying to accomplish his mission as he understood it, and Durham was doing things that both
did not make sense to him and could hinder significantly Leith’s ability to carry
out his own orders.
On 30 June, Leith wrote two letters to Durham. The first expressed Leith’s
general frustration at Durham’s decision to allow L’Agile to put into Guadeloupe, at Durham’s public insistence that he would not interfere even with ships
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bringing reinforcements to Guadeloupe that Leith’s troops eventually might have
to fight, and with Durham’s complete unwillingness to take a risk for the greater
good. Leith concluded the first letter by informing Durham that he had ordered
a body of soldiers to retake the Saintes, by force if necessary. Likely anticipating significant pushback from Durham, Leith asked only for Durham’s ships to
provide protection from aggression and to prevent the garrison on the Saintes
from communicating with Guadeloupe. The second letter was an extension of the
first. Leith informed Durham that, because of a communication from Vaugiraud
concerning events on Guadeloupe, Leith felt compelled to accelerate greatly his
preparations to make his army ready for offensive operations against any French
island that might declare for Napoléon. He again implored Durham to change his
policy of allowing French reinforcements to enter Guadeloupe, seeking to prevent
the island’s inevitable recapture from Bonapartist forces from being prohibitively
costly in blood and treasure.70
Durham’s reply on 1 July was extremely narrow in its scope and almost as acerbic in its tone, going well beyond the intent behind Melville’s orders. Durham, in
an overtly defensive and offended manner, stated plainly that he could not and
would not permit any ship under his command to be the first aggressor against
any force coming from Guadeloupe. Most surprisingly, Durham informed Leith
that only because the forces occupying the Saintes had withdrawn to Guadeloupe
would he permit his ships to intervene and protect Leith’s troops from attack. He
then went further, limiting that protection to “warn[ing] off any force that may
be sent from Guadeloupe.” In other words, Durham implied that if a French force
still had occupied the Saintes he would have required his ships to stand off and
watch an attack on British troops, and even if he did allow his ships to intervene
he would have permitted the French to attack first.71 His narrow interpretation of
Melville’s orders was clearly excessive. In no way did Melville intend for his commander in chief in the West Indies to stand by and watch British soldiers die, but
that is how Durham, intentionally or not, had construed his orders.
As it happened, the British successfully landed a force on the evacuated Saintes
on 4 and 5 July. However, Leith and Durham continued to exchange letters, as
Vaugiraud and Leith had decided to repossess Guadeloupe’s main islands forcibly.72
The two British commanders exchanged another four letters over the next
six days; the missives contained arguments and reasoning similar to those in
the previous three. On 2 July, Leith attempted to reason with Durham; most importantly, he sought to demonstrate that the two commanders should be able to
find a path to cooperation that would satisfy Durham’s narrow interpretation of
his orders. Leith’s line of argument laid out that he was acting in accordance with
the spirit and intent of the orders of the prince regent, not just his department
head, Bathurst, to support Louis XVIII’s government by employing force short of
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declaring war. Leith also argued that he considered anyone attempting armed rebellion against Louis’s authority, regardless of the flag under which it was done,
to have committed the first act of aggression against British and French troops.
Leith ended by asking Durham pointedly whether he would permit his ships
to protect the British troops on the Saintes from being attacked by troops and
weapons that Durham’s ships had allowed the French to deliver to Guadeloupe.73
Leith’s arguments convinced Durham only partly. On 4 July, the admiral
hastened to inform the general that he already had sent orders to his ships to
“prevent [any] renewed attempt at the repossession of that post, and when the
British have garrisoned it to keep all French ships of war under whatever flag
at a respectful distance.” However, that is as conciliatory as Durham got. The
rest of his letter was dedicated to legalistic arguments about how he could not
possibly allow his forces to become the aggressors. First, he argued that only if
the governor of Guadeloupe had requested assistance, as Vaugiraud had done at
Martinique, would he feel satisfied that the British were acting defensively. Then
he concluded that, because he had received “several communications from the
Admiralty subsequent [to Leith’s receipt of his 10 April orders from Bathurst],
all of which recommend to [him] a cautious line of conduct with respect to any
act of aggression against the French nation under whatever flag,” his naval forces
could not participate in an operation against Guadeloupe until he received orders
from Britain, which he expected to arrive at any moment.74
In his reply on 6 July, Leith shifted tactics, primarily attacking Durham’s legalistic arguments. He reminded Durham that Vaugiraud had been appointed governor general of all the French West Indies, and that in fact he had requested British
assistance—making Linois a rebel instead of a governor refusing assistance. He
also informed Durham that he had received another dispatch from Bathurst, dated
two days later than the last instruction Durham had referenced previously, again
instructing him to support and maintain Louis’s authority. Yet, not willing to base
his argument entirely on technicalities, Leith concluded the letter with a remarkable paragraph, writing, “The responsibility of every commander ought naturally
to oblige him to regulate the extent of his cooperation, in absence of direct orders,
by his zeal for the public service, and by his professional judgment founded on all
the circumstances of the case, while the principle of action is established by facts,
and do not, for that purpose, require the exercise of discretion.”75
Unsurprisingly, Durham was not swayed by this, and in the final letter of their
exchange, dated 7 July, he simply responded by restating the same argument he
had made since 30 June: that he could not and would not act offensively until the
Admiralty gave him permission to do so.76 Clearly, nothing Leith could say was
going to change Durham’s mind—he would do nothing differently until directly
ordered to do so.
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The Deadlock Broken
That order came quickly. On 10 July, having had enough of Leith questioning his
decisions, Durham prepared to forward the correspondence between the commanders in chief and began a letter to the Admiralty complaining that Leith was
“insisting [he] commence offensive operations.” He also took special care to call
attention to “the many extraordinary Arguments and Accusations that [Leith]
has brought forward,” in an attempt to “goad me into compliance.”77
If Durham had more to say about the pressure to which Leith was subjecting him, he never got a chance to record it. On 11 July, when he was halfway
through drafting the letter, Durham received Admiralty orders directing him
to cooperate with Leith.78 To his credit, Durham quickly informed Leith that he
was ready to do so. Perhaps fearing criticism from the Admiralty, however, he
also was quick to inform the lords that he had been preparing for the expedition “without intermission.”79 Given his strident opposition to Leith’s entreaties,
this was likely at best a bending of the truth, but one that would not affect the
overall operation.
Finally released from his narrow interpretation of Melville’s 26 March orders,
Durham lost no time in cooperating fully with Leith to prepare to retake Guadeloupe. Compared with the effort to launch the expedition, and contrary to Leith’s
fears, the assault on Guadeloupe was relatively uneventful. It began on 8 August,
and, despite spirited resistance, Linois and Boyer surrendered the island on 10
August after little loss of life. However, according to Leith’s report to Bathurst,
the attack had come just in time to prevent the return of the terrors of the French
Revolution, as several royalists apparently were due to be executed only five days
later, to mark Napoléon’s birthday. Somewhat surprisingly, Leith included in his
report fulsome praise for Durham’s efforts. Likewise, Durham heaped nothing
but accolades on Leith in his dispatch to the Admiralty.80
In the end, the events in the West Indies caused by Napoléon’s escape from
Elba concluded with no major consequences. Napoléon was defeated and exiled
again. British trade to and from the West Indies was not interrupted. Leith was
able to execute his orders and shore up Louis XVIII’s authority in the West Indies. Melville kept his promise, with Rear Admiral John Harvey being named as
Durham’s relief; Durham finally could go home. He even was able to bolster his
reputation further when, in the closing hours of the assault on Guadeloupe, a fort
close to Basse-Terre hauled down its flag on 10 August in response to bombardment from Durham’s flagship, HMS Venerable. On this basis, Durham claimed
for the remainder of his life that he had been present at, and responsible for, the
surrender of the first and last tricolor flags of the war.81 Even Linois was acquitted
by a court-martial in France, promoted in retirement to vice admiral, and created
a grand officer of the Legion of Honor.82
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When we look at these events only against a backdrop of insignificant consequences for the people involved and the minimal effect on the larger war, it is easy
to see why they largely have evaded analysis. But when we look at them through
the lens of mission command, their importance stands out.
APPLICATION OF THE MISSION-COMMAND FRAMEWORK
Mission command is a powerful tool, one that can provide a nuanced and more
compelling explanation of events during the age of sail, considered at all levels
of warfare. In the case of the events during the spring and summer of 1815 in
the West Indies, and especially in the case of the conflict between Durham and
Leith, using mission command as an analytical framework provides a much better explanation than the previously accepted narrative. It also provides important
lessons for modern commanders at the strategic and operational levels of war.
This article’s mission-command framework demonstrates clearly that the
cause of the dispute between Leith and Durham went much deeper than a difference in interpretation of orders or Durham’s alleged desire to avoid plunging
his “nation into a rash, and perhaps unnecessary, war.”83 Clearly, Melville and
Durham’s relationship, as evidenced by Melville’s orders and the communications
between the two, fits into the failure-of-mission-command category (the third
of the possibilities presented in the introduction). Not only did Durham fail to
achieve the desired end state by allowing Guadeloupe to fall into Bonapartist
hands, when minimal and nonaggressive action could have prevented it from
doing so, but Durham’s and Melville’s respective decision spaces barely aligned,
if they did so at all. This failure was primarily Melville’s. His orders were overly
restrictive, preventing Durham from adapting to a fast-changing situation or
taking advantage of his position on scene. Melville also failed to take Durham’s
mind-set into account when writing his subordinate’s orders. He knew Durham
had requested relief and wanted to return home, but he does not appear to have
anticipated how this might affect Durham’s actions on station. Taken together,
these failures created such a narrow potential decision space for Durham that
the orders both forced and allowed him to take actions that made no strategic
sense and could have complicated Britain’s position in the West Indies greatly if
Napoléon had fared differently in Europe.
On the other hand, at the operational level of war, the interaction between
Leith and Bathurst exemplifies the best execution of mission command (the first
of the possibilities presented in the introduction). Leith, operating with orders
that specified an end state and that used permissive language, made the most of
his initiative by securing Martinique quickly, preventing an imminent uprising
there. Bathurst’s orders to Leith also clearly were well tailored to Leith’s mind-set
and the trust existing between the two. This is demonstrated by the fact that Leith
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did not feel the need to ask for clarification or further orders; he understood what
was required of him, and he trusted that his actions would receive Bathurst’s support, despite whatever consequences Durham’s actions might have brought about.
This is demonstrated even more powerfully by the extract from Leith’s last letter
to Durham, quoted above; while Leith obviously had no familiarity with the term
mission command, he clearly understood, and strove to apply, its core concepts.84
Modern commanders can draw two lessons from Melville’s failure of mission command and from Bathurst’s best application of the same. The first is the
difficulty in crafting adequate mission orders. Put simply, word choice matters.
As Melville found out, overly restrictive language can restrict the subordinate’s
perceived decision space to the point where it brings about unintended consequences, even at the strategic level of war. Permissive language, on the other
hand, allows a subordinate freedom to maneuver and adapt, as Leith did. A commander must consider whether the orders in question define an appropriate decision space for the subordinate or instead will remove potential courses of action
that should have been available.
Implicit in this is an understanding of the subordinate for whom the orders
are intended. A subordinate who is energetic and willing to take risks, whether
to his or her physical safety or personal reputation, might be trusted with more
latitude in orders. A subordinate who is too reckless or aggressive may need to be
restrained, whereas a subordinate who is too timid may need to be forced into action. So, when crafting mission orders, modern commanders should take care to
use language that shapes and appropriately constrains the subordinate’s decision
space. As demonstrated above, permissive language usually will provide better
results than constrictive wording.
The second lesson commanders can draw concerns the importance of intent.
Even precise wording of orders still can prove insufficient if a subordinate does
not understand why the commander wants an objective to be achieved. If Melville
had written even a few lines to Durham in the 26 March orders explaining why he
was to avoid hostilities, Durham likely would have been in a much better position
to adapt his restrictive orders to a changing situation. In contrast, Bathurst’s orders
to Leith demonstrate the power of intent. Simply by telling Leith that the prince
regent desired the French West Indian islands to remain faithful to Louis XVIII,
Bathurst gave Leith the confidence to adapt to the situation. This lesson is applicable to all three levels of war. Explanation of the intent behind orders, then, is the
most powerful tool a modern commander has when applying mission command.
Mission command never has been more important than in the current era of
great-power competition, because it is one of the strongest methods by which to
leverage the advantages inherent in decentralized command in today’s rapidly
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evolving battle space.85 This is especially true with the emergence of the cyber and
space domains of warfare. However, mission command is neither simple nor easy
to use effectively. To reap the full benefits made available by mission command,
practitioners must both practice it in day-to-day operations and study the past
for lessons learned previously.
The age of sail is a gold mine for those lessons at all levels of warfare and
complexity. As previously mentioned, historians already have succeeded in
drawing mission-command-related lessons from the age of sail at the tactical
and operational levels of war. However, this article’s framework provides a standardized and more rigorous analytical method for future study than that applied
previously. There are many other examples from the age of sail at all levels of
war—such as Graves at the Battle of the Capes, Calder in the Trafalgar campaign,
and Berkeley in the Peninsular War—that should be mined for military-related
mission-command lessons.
The case study presented in this article was particularly complicated. Politics
and diplomacy played an important role; events changed rapidly and unexpectedly when Napoléon returned; there was a long lead time in communications
between commanders and subordinates; and two separate British ministers with
different priorities issued orders to two different military commanders, with
no theater commander to provide a unified chain of command. Because of all
these elements and challenges, the case provides an extremely tough test of the
mission-command system—and equally valuable lessons.
This further demonstrates the utility of this framework and of the idea of
mission command at the strategic level of war, because it can be applied to situations involving all the instruments of national power, not just the military. For
example, applying this framework to Collingwood’s time in the Mediterranean
or Saumarez’s in the Baltic likely would provide senior admirals and generals
with invaluable lessons in the application of diplomacy, information, and economics—something they face on an increasingly frequent basis in today’s era of
great-power competition.
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STRATEGY IN MANY FORMS
Phase Line Attila: The Amphibious Campaign for Cyprus, 1974, by Edward J. Erickson and Mesut
Uyar. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Univ. Press, 2020. 235 pages. Free hardcover and e-book.

Although a wealth of scholarly literature
exists on various political, military,
intelligence, and intercultural aspects of
the 1974 Cyprus crisis, an authoritative
English-language history of the actual
Turkish campaign and Greek Cypriot
resistance was lacking heretofore. Now,
Phase Line Attila assesses Turkey’s July–
August 1974 invasion of Cyprus, an
operation officially dubbed YILDIZATMA 4 (STAR-DROP 4); this was the
fourth revision of an invasion plan drawn
up in 1970. The book is recommended
for anyone interested in either eastern
Mediterranean military history in
particular or the strategies and tactics of
modern amphibious assaults in general.

then narrate events chronologically, beginning with discussion of a simmering
crisis from the 1940s (when Cyprus was
still a British colony) through independence in 1960 and the gradual increase
in tensions between Greek and Turkish
Cypriots, as well as between Greece and
Turkey themselves, both of which were
under military governments during
parts of the 1960s and early 1970s. This
retelling is supported by eleven tables on
air, land, and naval deployments, plus
twelve maps of the operational zones of
the time. This cumulative presentation
will be very helpful for academics
desiring visual accompaniments for
teaching the military campaign.

The authors of Phase Line Attila are
eminently qualified for the project.
Dr. Edward J. Erickson is a retired U.S.
Army officer and noted historian of
the late Ottoman and early Turkish
militaries. His coauthor, Dr. Mesut Uyar,
is dean of the School of Business and
Social Sciences, Antalya Bilim University, and a retired Turkish army officer.

The book does come with certain
caveats—which are somewhat paradoxical. While the authors generally are
objective and remind readers that other
works also should be consulted for a
wider appreciation of the Cyprus crisis,
their attempt to limit their treatment
strictly to military history does not
succeed entirely. Where encountered,
this is more a sin of omission than
anything worse. This is because of the
still extremely controversial nature of
the military operation itself, which made

Structurally, the book begins with
introductory background material on
other examples of post–World War II
amphibious assaults. Its eight chapters
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Turkey an international pariah, including incurring a U.S. arms export ban that
lasted until 1978. In effect, the authors
have written an apologia for Turkey’s
intervention, emphasizing the elements
of strategic genius and battlefield
bravery necessary for them to make the
case for it as a model military operation.
While there certainly is some truth
to the depictions, the authors never
critically assess the likelihood of Cyprus
uniting with Greece, as no great powers
of the time would have allowed this,
and Greeks themselves were divided
on it. Nevertheless—as the authors
note—the Greek Cypriot military coup
that overthrew Archbishop Makarios
in 1974 provided Turkey with a useful
pretext for its long-planned invasion,
as it could point to the 1960 treaty
negotiated among itself, Greece, and
Britain, which stipulated that these
guarantor powers of Cypriot independence could prevent the island from
uniting with another country. So, if
the truism holds that every battle is
over before it has been fought, it can be
said that the British-led negotiations
created a military confrontation that
only required time to be fulfilled. A
similar omission is the lack of detailed
discussion of Turkish or Turkish
Cypriot leaders and their contributions.
Perhaps the most baffling omission is
the book’s lack of critical inquiry regarding what happened—and why. Many
historians, especially Greek ones, have
suspected tacit Anglo-American support
for the Turkish invasion as a way to solve
the island’s pesky interethnic issues—
even if it meant a potentially disastrous
rift within NATO. Of course, the British
military also retained two sovereign base
areas and an important signals facility,
so it would be laughable to presume that
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both it and the UN, which had had a
peacekeeping mission in place since the
early 1960s, could be caught off guard.
Nevertheless, this is what the authors
claim: that the Turkish military used the
element of surprise, along with overwhelming air superiority, to defeat the
well-entrenched Greek Cypriot resistance. Nowhere do they ask why Greece
reacted so weakly, or whether it was
possible that certain individuals (such
as the deposed Makarios) had sold out
the country. In any case, Greece already
had pulled out the bulk of its military in
the mid-1960s, whereas Turkey had not.
The major surprise of the campaign was
the choice of landing beaches. Whereas
the Greek Cypriots (and, according
to the authors, Henry Kissinger) had
believed the intelligence of a Turkish
defector that pointed to one location,
the actual Turkish landing took place
at another port, with only ghost vessels
sent toward the former. The authors
mention this as a point of fact, but
again they ask no further questions that
could lead to even more interesting
findings—for example, to confirm
whether the informant was indeed an
actual defector or just someone sent to
provide the enemy with disinformation.
However, this is the kind of conundrum
the reader is happy to encounter. The
presence of such conundrums in the
work speaks to the level of detail the
authors have presented—on strategy,
tactics, and the vital ground-level information on troop movements—that fuels
and inspires further research. While
Phase Line Attila sometimes is a onesided work, it is a necessary one for anyone interested in Cyprus or the history of
amphibious assaults in the modern age.
CHRIS DELISO
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Innovating Victory: Naval Technology in Three
Wars, by Vincent P. O’Hara and Leonard R.
Heinz. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
2022. 336 pages. $36.95.

Many aspects of warfare may remain
the same through the centuries, but the
weapons of war do not. Weapons developed, tested, and used in one conflict
become standard arms in subsequent
wars. Today’s experimental weapon may
become tomorrow’s weapon of choice.
For navies, new technologies become
part of doctrine, practices, and platforms.
The authors of Innovating Victory study
six emerging technologies in naval
conflict during three wars of the twentieth century: the Russo-Japanese War,
World War I, and World War II. They
provide a macroperspective on mines,
torpedoes, radio, radar, submarines, and
aircraft; after an introduction and an
opening chapter titled “Use, Doctrine,
Innovation,” one chapter is devoted to
each of these technologies. Each such
chapter is structured similarly, presenting
to readers information on and discussion
of the discovery, evolution, and exploitation of the technology. In the course of
doing so, the authors tell how these “six
technologies facilitated and frustrated
navies in their pursuit of victory” (p. 5).
In the introduction, readers are
reminded that in the twentieth century
there were four waves of technological change for navies, three of them
climaxing in one war—World War II.
The first wave began in the midnineteenth century with the shift from
sail to coal-fired steam engines, and
included the development of armor, the
improvement of guns and mines, the
rise of torpedoes, and the introduction
of radio. The second wave, from 1905
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to 1918, brought to naval warfare
submarines and aircraft. The third wave
was made up of radar and sonar, which
“revolutionized the collection and use of
information, and saw the introduction
of practical guided weapons” (p. 2). The
fourth and final wave is still ongoing. It
began with the splitting of the atom and
includes satellites, drones, computers
and data networks, artificial intelligence,
and weapons that employ magnetic
and directed energy. (This fourth wave
is worthy of its own volume.)
The first chapter reminds readers how
quickly naval technologies changed
during the twentieth century. Some of
the ships of the British and German
navies that fought at the Battle of
Jutland in 1916 were twice as large
as the battleships that had fought ten
years earlier at the Battle of Tsushima,
and they fired shells that were twice as
heavy at twice the range. Within three
decades, junior officers who had fought
at Jutland, now senior officers, might
have used radar and guided weapons in
World War II. Not only is technological
development fast moving, but it does
not follow a specific trajectory that
permits rapid establishment of doctrine
regarding its use. Further, technological
advantages in warfare rarely endure, and
not all naval technologies developed
are successful when employed.
Mines are the subject of the second
chapter. Mines as a naval weapon came
to maturity during the Russo-Japanese
War, and by the war’s end all major
navies had begun to study the conflict
for lessons about this and other new
technologies with an eye to future wars.
Properly used, mines can be highly
effective, yet the authors contend that
even though mine warfare is a core
naval capability, navies do not prioritize
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it, in part because it is not a compelling technology with an emotional
component that will “command the
imagination like aircraft carriers and
nuclear submarines do” (p. 50). This lack
hinders advocacy of the technology.
The third chapter’s study of torpedoes
shows that the maturation of torpedo
warfare was slow and sporadic. After the
Russo-Japanese War there was debate
regarding the future role of torpedoes,
because of their negligible effects in that
war, but by the eve of World War I the
range, speed, and warhead weight of
torpedoes had increased—with deadly
consequences. The British, Germans,
and Americans all faced difficulties
with sea-launched torpedoes, and early
in the war the Americans’ air-dropped
torpedoes had a staggering failure rate.
For U.S. torpedoes, a reliable magnetic
exploder did not appear until 1943, but
after that the results were impressive.
The authors contend that, more than for
any other technology, torpedo development “shows that the combination of
the right platform and the right target
transforms a technology of marginal
application into one with war-winning
potential” (pp. 77–78). They continue
this argument in the sixth and seventh
chapters, dealing respectively with the
development of submarines and aircraft.
Chapters 4 and 5 (radio and radar,
respectively) provide summaries that for
this reviewer were the most informative
and show the exponential effects of
combining technologies in warfare. Both
technologies are constructed to use the
electromagnetic spectrum, but with
different core purposes. For radio, it is
communication; for radar, detection. The
Italian navy began testing shore-to-ship
radio in 1897, and the British navy did
so in 1899. Radio systems that competed
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with Marconi’s invention soon arose,
with other navies favoring them. By the
time of the Russo-Japanese War, radio’s
naval utility had been proved, and the
technology continued to improve. The
interwar years saw the initial development of radar and its varied use by belligerent nations, and World War II saw its
maturation as an effective naval weapon.
The final two chapters, dealing with
submarines and airplanes, likely will
cover ground more familiar to most
readers, and the authors present very
good overviews of these technologies as
naval weapons. The concluding chapter
provides a synthesis of the lessons
learned from the six weapons studies.
The volume has numerous photographs
and charts that enhance the study, as
well as an extensive bibliography. Equally
weighted chapters provide balance to
the book and ensure it is readable to
generalists yet informative and thought
provoking for all; it is filled with historical examples, well written, and engaging.
TIMOTHY J. DEMY

Military Virtues, ed. Michael Skerker, David
Whetham, and Don Carrick. Havant, U.K.: Howgate, 2019. 410 pages. $39.99.

The opening line of Military Virtues captures the attention of the reader with the
provocative teaser: “What does Aristotle
have to teach a fighter pilot?” (p. xxv). In
response to the question, editors Michael
Skerker, David Whetham, and Don
Carrick integrate articles by thirty-eight
warfighters, professors, and chaplains
into one book, combining both theory
and practice into a cohesive exploration
of moral virtues for the profession of
arms. Each of the fourteen segments on
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the warrior virtues provides an overview
that surveys the philosophical dynamics
of the virtue in question, then follows it
with two case studies that consider the
practical implications of that specific
character trait in historical scenarios.
Military Virtues investigates the ideals of
classical philosophy without retreating
into the ivory tower of academia, while at
the same time it examines current practice from the ethical foxholes of modern
and ancient battle spaces without reducing morality to something responsive to
a simplistic manual on decision-making.
Aristotle’s system of virtue as the golden
mean between the vices of excess and
deficiency can shape the military
frontiers of just war theory and a whole
gamut of applied ethics, including the
use of drones, interrogation techniques,
professional military contractors, and
artificial intelligence. From Homer’s tales
of Odysseus in the Trojan War to the account of Chief Warrant Officer Thompson’s intervention at the My Lai massacre
in the Vietnam War, the reader journeys
with distinguished writers and warriors
who invite serious reflection on one of
the most compelling topics in military
ethics: the role and nature of virtue.
However, virtue ethics, whether defended
by Aristotle or contemporary proponents
in Military Virtues, draws a number of
criticisms. In particular, the emphasis on
character seems to dodge the quandaries
of right choices and plays into the
argument of moral relativists, who claim
that all norms are subjective preferences
or social conventions. In championing a
moderate moral objectivity and referring
to Aristotle’s formulation of aretē (virtue)
and eudaimonia (human flourishing),
Peter Olsthoorn maintains that most
philosophers reject moral relativism for
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various reasons. For example, Olsthoorn
points out that virtually all would agree
that it is intuitively self-evident that
“kicking babies for fun is morally wrong”
(p. 2), and this admission of a foundational moral value, along with others
(prohibition of rape, murder, genocide,
and so on), undermines the argument for
moral relativism. Thus, moral relativism
lacks credibility as a viable truth claim.
More germane to military operations,
Olsthoorn considers the Afghan practice
of bacha bazi (the sexual exploitation of
boys by adult male soldiers). According
to moral relativism, bacha bazi calls
for cultural tolerance, and yet this
practice repelled NATO servicemembers
deployed to Afghanistan. Rather than
accept bacha bazi as merely a difference
of cultural values, Olsthoorn conducted
empirical research and uncovered that
bacha bazi actually was outlawed by the
pre-2021 Afghanistan government and,
according to one study, 80 percent of
Afghans find the practice morally abhorrent. The external evidence of law and
public opinion on bacha bazi calls into
question the adequacy of moral relativism as a sweeping theory and undergirds
a more general premise of basic rights
common to all humanity. Skerker notes
that the latter part of the twentieth
century was marked by ongoing twin
reiterations of just war theory and
virtue ethics, but little was espoused in
terms of military virtues. Thus, Military
Virtues is an implicit attempt to bridge
that “curious” gap with virtues in the
armed services that support the enduring
precepts of the just war tradition.
By the time the reader has completed
this comprehensive study, he or she very
well may agree with Skerker’s conclusion:
“Aristotle has much to teach fighter pilots
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as well as SIGINT analysts, artillery
gunners, submariners, ordnancemen,
snipers, linguists, and logisticians”
(p. xxvi). Undeniably, Aristotle does
have much to teach both the military
practitioner and the philosopher of
political theory. But by the same token,
if Aristotle—a master of methodological
induction and a posteriori analysis—suddenly returned to life today, no doubt he
would learn much, just as the presentday military strategist and tactician
would, from the candid war experiences
and the well-reasoned arguments of
the astute thinkers in Military Virtues.
EDWARD ERWIN

Restoring Thucydides: Testing Familiar Lessons
and Deriving New Ones, by Andrew R. Novo and
Jay M. Parker. Amherst, NY: Cambria, 2020. 218
pages. $39.99.

When I was trying to drum up enrollment for an elective on Thucydides
at the Naval War College, one interested student told me that he was most
inspired by Thucydides’s famous quote
that “the nation that makes a distinction
between its scholars and its warriors will
have its thinking done by cowards and its
fighting done by fools.” I did not have the
heart to tell him that he had not only the
quote wrong but the author too. Sadly,
this is only one of many misconceptions
that national-security professionals
have about Thucydides and his work.
Andrew R. Novo and Jay M. Parker’s
Restoring Thucydides: Testing Familiar
Lessons and Deriving New Ones takes on
many of these misconceptions to “push
back against the oversimplification and
decontextualization of Thucydides” (p.
3). In doing so, Novo and Parker appear
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to be part of the response to Graham
Allison’s 2017 Destined for War: Can
America and China Escape Thucydides’s
Trap? and his use of Thucydides as a
crystal ball for future Sino-American
relations. While the authors acknowledge
their issues with Allison’s analysis,
they take pains to point out that they
are less interested in refuting Allison’s
thesis and more interested in providing a corrective to some of the worst
misunderstandings of Thucydides that
followed Allison’s best seller. To that
end, they draw on some of the major
scholarship on Thucydides over the past
twenty years from diverse perspectives
such as literary criticism, translation
mechanics, and international relations
theory. In addition, they rely on multiple
English translations of Thucydides and
even throw in a little ancient Greek.
The authors first identify five “common
threats” that lead readers to superficial
conclusions: that fifth-century Greece
was bipolar, that Thucydides blamed
the international system for the war,
that domestic politics are less important
than state-on-state interactions, that
Thucydides is the father of realism,
and that the Peloponnesian War was
a single unitary conflict between
Athens and Sparta. In each chapter, they
provide something like an annotated
bibliography of relevant books and
articles that support their reexamination
of these misconceptions. In addition,
they present accessible summaries of
some of the most important episodes
of the Peloponnesian War, such as the
political maneuvering during the Peace
of Nicias, the siege of Melos, the Sicilian
expedition, and the fates of Athens and
Sparta after the war ended in 404 BCE.
The book ends with seven lessons to take
the place of the five threats identified
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earlier. The fact that the former are not
as easily listed as the latter demonstrates
that Novo and Parker are offering morecomplex and -nuanced lessons than
those they replaced. Aside from these big
takeaways, the book has some smaller
but no less compelling ideas. Specifically,
Novo and Parker point out that, despite
what Archidamus, king of Sparta,
and Pericles, “first citizen” of Athens,
repeatedly say (and what the Naval War
College repeatedly teaches), navies were
far easier to replace than armies (p. 75).
They also quite persuasively dispute the
Sicilian expedition’s similarities to the
Vietnam War (pp. 37–38, 147), another
long-standing Naval War College truism.
Unfortunately, the authors sometimes
are guilty of the very sins they catalog.
First, some of their myth busting seems
more like hair splitting. For example,
they point out that Athens was not a
sea power because “strictly speaking,
as a metropolitan area” Athens lacked
access to the sea (p. 102)—but surely a
distance of six miles from acropolis to
port does not dictate disqualification as
a sea power. Second, they take several
incidents out of context, or they ascribe
links between events that just are not
present in Thucydides. For example,
they imply that Thucydides was shocked
that Sparta did not break the Peace of
Nicias after Melos was reduced, but
the quote they cite describes Spartan
reaction (or lack thereof) to Athenian
raids in the Peloponnesus (p. 115), not
the sack of Melos. Finally, on several
occasions they mischaracterize secondary sources as representing Thucydides,
or speeches from Thucydides as the
author’s own views (p. 83). The end
result is that rather than add nuance to
an oversimplified claim such as “fifthcentury Greece was bipolar,” they merely
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replace it with an equally oversimplified
claim such as “fifth-century Greece was
not bipolar,” despite having presented
many diverse and compelling points
of view that fifth-century Greece was a
more complicated state than a simple
label would suggest (pp. 50–53).
I recognize that I may not be the target
audience for this book. I am fluent in
ancient Greek; I have read Thucydides
multiple times, as literature, translation
material, history, and political science;
and I already am familiar with most of
the books and articles the authors cite.
In contrast, for a reader who knows
Thucydides only through Graham
Allison or from pithy misquotations and
misattributions, this book may provide
alternative perspectives. While I agree
with Novo and Parker’s exhortation to
use Thucydides “as a beginning not as an
end” (p. 171), readers who are unfamiliar
with Thucydides but wish to understand
this important work still should approach
Restoring Thucydides with caution.
JOSHUA HAMMOND

On Operations: Operational Art and Military Disciplines, by B. A. Friedman. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2021. 256 pages. $31.95.

On Operations is B. A. Friedman’s examination of the origins of the operational
level of war, operational art, and the
military general staff and of their impact
on U.S. military thinking, doctrine, and
way of war. His ambitious work has two
aims. First, he advocates strongly for the
removal of the concept of the operational
level of war from U.S. doctrine. Second,
he seeks to improve the value and use of
operational art by military staffs in organizing tactical actions to attain strategic
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results. Although the pieces as a whole
are thought provoking for practitioners
and planners, the book suffers from two
notable shortfalls. In his pursuit of the
first aim—removing the operational
level of war from military thinking—he
at times appears to paint theory and
doctrine as excessively dogmatic. In
addressing the second aim—enhancing
the use of operational art—his points,
while persuasive at times, would have
been stronger overall had they provided
further elaboration on the planning
efficacy that would be achieved by using
a paradigm with no operational level.
Friedman organizes his work into
seventeen chapters and provides five case
studies to help illustrate his own theory
of operational art. In his introductory
chapter he meticulously lays out the case
for bifurcating the operational level of
war from operational art, then removing
the operational-level concept from
U.S. military thinking altogether while
retaining operational art. He presents
his evidence against the operational
level first by outlining the arguments
opposing its abolishment. In the five
subsequent chapters he reinforces his
position by covering the historical
origins and application of the operational
level in German, Soviet, and U.S. military
thinking, and discusses the nature of
a healthy civil-military relationship.
Friedman shifts his focus in the
remaining chapters and proffers a set
of principles for operational art by
organizing war-fighting functions into
six disciplines. He dedicates a chapter to
each of the six: administration, information, operations, fire support, logistics,
and command and control. Finally, five
case studies covering Austerlitz, Königgrätz, the Atlantic campaign, the Battle
of Britain, and Operation WATCHTOWER
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(Guadalcanal) are offered to illustrate the
utility of these operational disciplines.
Friedman argues that the concept
of an operational level of war, and
consequently the levels themselves,
has no place in U.S. military thinking
and must be removed. He asserts that
the adoption of the operational level
as part of U.S. doctrine was the result
of a misinterpretation of German and
Soviet operational thought. Further, he
claims that there is an underlying lack
of supporting logic for the purpose of
the operational level as being the link
between tactics and strategy. According
to Friedman, the various definitions
of the operational level are contradictory and nebulous in the literature and
cannot be linked to the long-established
concepts of tactics and strategy. He warns
that the consequences of an operational
level interposed between tactics and
strategy will continue to be damaging
to contemporary military planning.
Friedman advocates strongly for the retention and application of operational art
and for a military general staff to serve
as its executor. According to Friedman,
flawed doctrine and military thinking
have resulted in an incorrect understanding of the operational level and a
resultant conflation of it with operational
art, causing the latter to be marginalized.
He firmly establishes that operational art
has merit once it is separated from the
operational level. He explores the rise of
the military staff in applying operational
art to manage the conduct of war, and
he suggests a modernized version of
the Scharnhorst model of a general
staff as an exemplar. This professional
staff, knowledgeable in the practice of
operational art, capably can support the
commander. It is the general staff and
its application of operational art, not the
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concept of an operational level of war,
that effectively support the tactics-andstrategy dialectic, in turn serving to manage the complexities of modern warfare.
Unfortunately, Friedman’s argument
paints a picture of the concepts underpinning military theory and doctrine as
being static and unchanging. Yet military
theory is not static, and doctrine changes
under the pressures of experience and
critical thinking to provide pragmatic
utility. No theory or doctrine should
be dogmatic, especially in the conduct
of war, and this truism applies to the
concept of the operational level of war
as well. Even though it was wrongly
adopted into doctrine, the concept of
an operational level of war has evolved
beyond its original formulation. In
the absence of addressing directly the
interrelationships among levels, related
objectives, and operational art itself, his
argument is left weaker than it could
have been. As long as there is utility to be
found in applying any concept to create
and execute military plans effectively,
that concept has a purpose in military
thinking and should be retained.
On Operations outlines a way to
understand and manage war. The work is
ambitious and covers significant territory
in roughly two hundred pages. This work
will generate controversy among practitioners of operational planning—who, in
fact, should be challenged to justify the
value and existence of the operationallevel-of-war concept. Friedman’s work
adds to the body of military thinking
about operational art and the operational
level of war. It should appeal to military
staffs, and planners in particular, who
desire to widen their professional
knowledge about operational art and
the theory and doctrine that support it.
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Imperial Twilight: The Opium War and the End of
China’s Last Golden Age, by Stephen R. Platt. New
York: Knopf, 2018. 592 pages. $17.

In modern Chinese history, few subjects
are discussed as widely and misunderstood as broadly as the so-called
Century of Humiliation, which ostensibly commenced with China’s defeat in
the First Opium War (1839–42). Most
academic analyses of the Century of Humiliation’s genesis emphasize economic
and technological disparities, inevitable
clashes of contrasting civilizations, or,
broadly, the tide of European imperialism. Historian Stephen Platt, however,
has sought to examine the prelude
to the Opium War comprehensively
through the eyes of the individuals who
drove early Anglo-Chinese relations.
Imperial Twilight is concerned not with
the Opium War itself but with how it
came to occur. Platt posits two essential
questions along which he aligns his
work. The first examines how Britain
came to fight a war with China for the
sake of merchants who were trafficking
illegal drugs, despite visceral domestic
opposition. The second seeks to
determine how China declined from its
peerless geopolitical position in the eighteenth century and, in turn, how Britain
came to take advantage of that decline.
Within this framework, Platt examines
the early history of Anglo-Chinese trade
and diplomatic relations, beginning with
the establishment of the canton system
in 1759 and ending in the aftermath
of the Opium War. At the same time,
Platt relates the various internal crises
faced by the Qing Empire, from the
White Lotus Rebellion to rampant
piracy in China’s southern littoral.

EDMUND B. HERNANDEZ
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Notably, however, Platt’s discussion
of the evolution of the relationship
between Britain and China is driven
by the actions of individuals of both
nations from 1759 to 1842. Platt asserts
that the Opium War in no way resulted
from an inevitable clash of cultures,
much less a premeditated imperialist
plot; rather, the war represents a tragic
culmination of mounting domestic
crises taxing the resources of the Qing
Empire coupled with the successful
lobbying of the British Parliament by
private merchants to protect their illicit
businesses, despite many Westerners’
genuinely felt, albeit misinformed,
admiration of Chinese civilization.
Platt’s work is eminently readable, using
concise language and driven by the
engaging individual personalities of
those involved in Britain’s burgeoning
trade with China. His inclusion of both
British and Chinese perspectives, in
relatively equal allotments, grounds the
work’s approach to understanding how
a mutual relationship between the states
was established and evolved. The author
relies extensively on both English- and
Chinese-language primary sources,
lending credibility to his accounts
and interpretations. At the same
time, Platt’s emphasis on the role that
individuals played in the Anglo-Chinese
relationship reminds readers that the
greatest events in history often are
triggered by happenstance and subject
to unintended consequences rather
than resulting from methodical plans.
Perhaps the most notable contribution
of Platt’s work is the comprehensive
debunking of any association between
premeditated grand imperialist plans
for China and the Opium War. Early
in Imperial Twilight, Platt presents the
reader with a discussion of the amazing admiration that the West felt for
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China prior to the war. In recounting
many writings from major Western
Enlightenment figures, such as Adam
Smith, George Washington, and Voltaire,
Platt demonstrates to readers that
China—rightfully so—was revered as
the world’s largest, most prosperous,
and best-governed state during the
eighteenth century. This fact was the
foundation for Britain’s efforts to engage
China diplomatically and economically.
Nonetheless, many of the key individuals
driving closer relations between Britain
and China, such as George T. Staunton,
did so primarily out of their own
personal interests, not at the behest of
London. Regarding the eventual war
itself, Platt relates the intense opposition
from members of the British public
and Parliament, firmly rooted on moral
grounds, that persisted throughout the
short conflict. Ultimately, Platt argues
convincingly that the decision to go to
war, which succeeded by only five votes
in the House of Commons, was rooted in
the moneyed interests of private opium
merchants responding to a renewed
clampdown on their trade. In doing
so, Platt undercuts proponents of the
narrative portraying the Opium War as
a plot to initiate China’s subjugation and,
in turn, the Century of Humiliation.
The primary shortcoming of Imperial
Twilight is its apparent lack of a distinct
conclusion. The work begins by posing
its two questions, and centers on them;
however, after the historical narrative
culminates in the final chapter, the work
fails to revisit these ordering questions
explicitly. While Platt’s emphasis
on the role of individuals and their
intergenerational relations is refreshing
among modern histories that tend to
overemphasize trends and forces, the
book’s limited consideration of structural
factors undermines its ability to marshal
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the panoply of evidence provided to
establish definitive answers to the
original questions. Furthermore, Platt’s
brief treatment of the consequences
of the war itself may not convince the
reader that the conflict truly marked
the turning point of China’s last golden
age, as the book’s subtitle suggests.
However, Platt is successful in reminding
modern readers of the many unknowns
that remain regarding the eighteenthand nineteenth-century worlds; the
capricious nature of the process by which
interstate relationships emerge; and the
dangers that arise when wealth bleeds
into politics to entice governments to
take action, however contrary to public
opinion those actions may be—a lesson
modern readers would do well to heed.
BENJAMIN E. MAINARDI

Admiral Gorshkov: The Man Who Challenged
the U.S. Navy, by Norman Polmar, Thomas A.
Brooks, and George E. Fedoroff. Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 2019. 304 pages. $38.95.

This book is long overdue. Few individuals have put their personal stamp on an
aspect of world affairs as conclusively as
Sergey G. Gorshkov, who almost singlehandedly developed the Soviet navy
from a gaggle of vessels and competing
strategies into one of the most formidable forces in maritime history. For
nearly three decades, the Soviet navy was
his navy and Soviet naval strategy was
his strategy. No other figure in maritime
history can quite compare in how
completely he created a military service.
For U.S. naval officers serving during the
latter half of the Cold War, Gorshkov’s
navy was the only real threat. It was not
a question of whether the Soviet and U.S.
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fleets would clash, but only of when. At
sea, U.S. tactical action officers served
as living computers, memorizing the
entire Soviet naval and air orders of
battle—from the peculiarities of ship
and aircraft types to weapons systems to
electronic sensors—to enable them to
deal with a bewildering complexity of
threats in as rapid and effective a manner
as possible. The U.S. Navy’s initial role in
the predicted war for Europe would have
been to move ten Army divisions and
their equipment across the Atlantic in ten
days while running a gauntlet of Soviet
submarines, fleets of Badger and Backfire
bombers, and cruise-missile-firing
surface ships. It is fitting that former
Secretary of the Navy John Lehman
wrote the foreword to Admiral Gorshkov,
as it was Lehman’s six-hundred-ship
Navy that was going to have to match
and defeat Gorshkov’s fleet. Under
Lehman, the U.S. Navy embraced a much
more offensive-minded way of thinking
and prepared not only to get the Army
across the Atlantic but to harry the
Soviet flanks while destroying the USSR’s
maritime forces wherever they were.
The authors have delivered a riveting
account of the growth of the Soviet
fleet. They chronicle how Stalin’s desire
for major warships gave way to a more
defensive, coastal, and submarinebased strategy, only to return to a big,
blue-water idea. Gorshkov’s forces
were designed and built neither for
maritime supremacy nor for sea control,
but these would come as the fruits of
victory if the Soviet navy could achieve
its mission: destroying the U.S. Navy,
primarily by sinking its aircraft carriers. Whether it could have done so
remains a matter of conjecture; that the
Soviets would have failed in the effort
remains a matter of faith among most
Cold War–vintage U.S. naval officers.
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Gorshkov joined the Soviet navy before
World War II and served extensively in
the Far East. He gained his first command and saw combat against the
Japanese while supporting Soviet ground
forces in 1938. It was during this period
that he had his first brush with disaster.
Gorshkov commanded an operation
that involved the towing of a newly built
destroyer to port. Things went wrong
and the ship was lost; his career was in
peril. However, support from his seniors
in the chain of command saved him.
As a young captain in World War II,
Gorshkov saw combat in Crimea and the
Black Sea. He displayed personal bravery,
and he played a role in the defense of
Stalingrad. After the war, and particularly after the Cuban missile crisis,
Gorshkov became adept at explaining
the role of the Soviet navy in defending
the homeland—at ever-increasing
distances from home waters. In doing so,
he also embraced and demonstrated the
power of warships as tools of statecraft.
Soviet port visits expanded to harbors
all over the globe, demonstrating
the USSR’s strategic reach, maritime
prowess, and suitability as a partner.
Admiral Gorshkov embraced technology, and there were areas in which
Soviet advances ran ahead of those of
the United States. These ranged from

fabricating the titanium hulls of Alphaclass submarines to putting gas turbine
engines into warships well before the
United States. He was able to acquire
massive amounts of matériel—steel
and electronics, among others—and
trained personnel to grow his fleet.
It can be easy to lose sight of all the
other challenges Gorshkov had to face
while he built his fleet. There were
political alliances to manage, political
enemies to avoid, and the couching of
every plan and decision in a manner
acceptable to party ideologues and
leaders. Polmar and company do fine
work in covering these aspects.
If there is a weakness in the work, the
authors identify and acknowledge it.
Although they make a valiant effort, it
is hard to reveal Sergey Gorshkov the
man. It is doubtful whether anyone
could have done a better job, but those
wanting to know about Gorshkov’s
personal life will have to wait.
An easy read and a compelling work,
Admiral Gorshkov is a welcome
addition to biographies of great
naval leaders, builders, and thinkers.
Gorshkov too often is neglected in
discussions of naval strategists; it is
high time for him to be included.
RICHARD NORTON
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RESPONSE TO “INNOVATION, INTERRUPTED: NEXT-GENERATION
SURFACE-COMBATANT DESIGN,” BY DAVID H. LEWIS, NAVAL WAR
COLLEGE REVIEW 75, NO. 1 (WINTER 2022), PP. 107–40

Sir:
While I enjoyed reading David Lewis’s highly informative article on innovation
in the Winter 2022 edition of the Naval War College Review, I was chagrined to
read his contention on page 120 that “American dive-bombers . . . were unknown
when the first American aircraft carriers were designed in the 1920s and early
1930s.” Unfortunately, although Professor Lewis is well versed in shipbuilding
technology, his knowledge of the development of U.S. naval aviation in the interwar years is less than comprehensive.
The first experimental dive-bombing practice against a moving target by U.S.
carrier aircraft took place in the fall of 1927. As I noted in Destined for Glory:
Dive Bombing, Midway, and the Evolution of Carrier Airpower (Naval Institute
Press, 1998), “The bombing scores obtained during the light-bombing exercise
against a moving target showed the high degree of accuracy that could be obtained through the use of dive bombing with relatively little practice.” Although
the F6C-3s that participated in this exercise carried relatively light bomb loads,
they were the forerunners of the ever-more-capable dive-bombing aircraft that
evolved into the SBDs of Midway fame. Had Professor Lewis been familiar with
these developments he could have used them as another example of how doctrine
changes in response to technological improvements in weapons.
During the pre–World War II era, the U.S. Navy—like other navies throughout
the world—viewed the “decisive action” of the next war in terms of what had happened at the Battle of Jutland in the First World War. It continued to focus on the
gunnery duel that was expected to be the determining factor in the outcome of
the great battle that would ensue when two opposing fleets met on the high seas.
Many of the fleet exercises, board games, and tactical studies conducted during
the 1920s were designed to evaluate various aspects of this engagement.
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In most scenarios, the gunnery duel would be preceded by a destroyer torpedo
attack initiated in an attempt to damage at least some of the opposing battleships.
The destroyers did not have to sink any of the dreadnoughts to be successful;
their job was to slow down the enemy line. Searching for a way to counter the
dreaded destroyer attack, the Navy conducted exercises using dive-bombers
against moving targets, and their success opened the door for light-bombing (as
it was known then) to be used for that purpose.
An even more important role for the dive-bomber was discovered during Fleet
Problem IX. It was conducted in March 1930 in response to the first carrierversus-carrier duels carried out during the exercises leading up to it—exchanges
that later would characterize the World War II naval war in the Pacific. The results during these duels showed that the carrier that was first to locate and attack
its counterpart in the opposing force was able to achieve air superiority, gaining
an overwhelming advantage for its own fleet. During the critique that followed
the conclusion of Fleet Problem IX, Rear Admiral Henry V. Butler, Commander,
Aircraft Squadrons, Scouting Force, described the situation now facing carrier
commanders. The opposing forces, he explained, were “like blindfolded men
armed with daggers in a ring[;] if the bandage over the eyes of one is removed,
the other [was] doomed.” The only solution was to locate the enemy carrier and
attack while the latter’s planes were still on deck.
With this knowledge, the Navy (via the Bureau of Aeronautics) began efforts
to develop the scout-bomber (a type unique to the U.S. Navy, and not mentioned
by Professor Lewis). That program ultimately resulted in the design and subsequent deployment of the dive-bomber known as the Douglas SBD (for ScoutBomber Douglas).

THOMAS WILDENBERG

AUTHOR’S RESPONSE TO “‘NOT SO!’ ON CARRIERS,” BY JAMES ALVEY,
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 75, NO. 2 (SPRING 2022), PP. 189–91

Sir:
I praise James Alvey for his detailed research on USS Ranger (CV 4) and his
knowledge of World War II aircraft carriers in general. Individuals interested
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enough in naval history to seek out primary sources in archives are rare and deserve support. We need more such dedicated researchers and writers.
However, as Alvey admits, my article was but a very brief survey of small aircraft carriers and the decisions to build them. I do not claim to have done original
research in primary sources; I prowl the archives only occasionally. I do not even
consider myself an historian; instead I am a defense strategist and a strategic/
security studies scholar. Therefore, I am a “user of history,” and I rely on the work
of the top historians in the field. My focus is on what lessons history may offer
for our deterrence of and preparation for future wars. History is the only real
laboratory for human decision-making, so, after critical evaluation, I incorporate
it into all my work.
The two questions I set out to analyze in my article were: “What is the history
of ‘small’ aircraft carriers?” and “Did small carriers prove effective in war?” Answering them necessitates discussing the decisions to build the ships in question
and assessing their effectiveness in the aggregate.
Norman Friedman, Emily Goldman, Charles Melhorn, William Trimble, and
the Belote brothers (one of whom was my professor, oh so long ago) are or were
top scholars in their fields. Charles Melhorn was also a naval aviator, so he could
assess USS Ranger from an experienced perspective. I did search for more-recent
sources, but I found none that contradicted the conclusions of these experts or
added much more than detail.
The sometimes-contradictory writings of Rear Admiral William A. Moffett,
USN, the father of naval aviation, reflect the fact that he routinely changed his
mind on the basis of incoming facts. He tried multiple methods of bringing airpower to sea: large carriers, small carriers, floatplanes, flying boats, and airships.
Some proved successful; some did not. He was lost in the April 1933 crash of the
naval airship USS Akron (ZRS 4) at sea; like Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, USN,
he was not afraid to test his own programs personally.
I am not going to spar with Mr. Alvey on all details. However, in writing that
there were six CVLs constructed, I could be considered technically correct—only
six carriers were designated CVL upon commissioning. Others, such as USS
Princeton (CV/CVL 23)—let us honor its heroic crew and those of the ships that
came to its aid—were built as CVs, but then redesignated CVLs after they were
operating at sea. Neither USS Ranger nor USS Wasp (CV 7)—both approximately
the same size as the CVLs—was redesignated. However, if I were to revise the article, I think I would adopt Mr. Alvey’s approach to counting CVLs. Thank you, sir.
One mistake he did not catch is that I identified USS Valley Forge (CV 45)
incorrectly as belonging to the Midway class rather than the Essex class. Another
reader took issue with my contention that the United States built 146 carriers (of
all sizes) during World War II, and proposed an alternative number. Establishing
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a total depends on whether one counts the CVEs built for the British and those
that were almost completed but were never commissioned. Let us just agree that
U.S. production was more than eight times that of imperial Japan.
On a related note, at the final meeting at which the top imperial Japanese
decision makers debated whether to start a war with the United States, held in
October 1941, the question of the U.S. potential and ability for war was asked.
The consensus answer was about seven to eight times that of Japan. Good assessment; bad choice.
Despite our differences over details, Mr. Alvey does not challenge my main
thesis. There is no operational evidence that a large number of small carriers can
substitute in effectiveness for a smaller (but proportional) number of large carriers.
No war or major naval operation has demonstrated that as fact. Therefore, we cannot just assume that they would today. Modeling and simulation are not evidence.
If you think me wrong, please challenge me on that! If any reader can prove me
wrong, please get in touch with me via sam.tangredi@usnwc.edu. In designing a
future fleet, this is a critical issue that still has not been addressed satisfactorily.
And, Mr. Alvey, if you would like to give a lecture on USS Ranger (CV 4) at the
Naval War College, I will sponsor you.

SAM J. TANGREDI

RESPONSE TO “WHAT WAS NIMITZ THINKING?,” BY JONATHAN B.
PARSHALL, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 75, NO. 2 (SPRING 2022),
PP. 92–122

Sir:
Jonathan Parshall’s fascinating article in the Spring 2022 Review on Admiral
Chester W. Nimitz’s decision-making attendant on the Battle of Midway rather
shortchanges the effect of Midway itself on the outcome of the battle. Parshall
does some outstanding, groundbreaking work in bringing mathematical analysis
(done by others) both to the explanation of the battle as it occurred and to a range
of counterfactual scenarios that serve to deepen our understanding of Nimitz’s
decision to commit to a battle. That said, the effect of the island of Midway on
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both Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s and Admiral Chūichi Nagumo’s decisionmaking needs to be appreciated.
Yamamoto intended the island to function as bait to lure the remaining
American carrier forces into battle. But it became more than that: an objective
in and of itself, as evidenced by the planned amphibious assault. This, in turn,
suboptimized the Japanese force deployment, with Nagumo’s carriers being dual
tasked both to reduce the island’s defenses and to be ready to engage any U.S. carrier forces sent out to defend the island. Multitasking is a dangerous proposition
for naval forces, especially if too few units are available. Had Nagumo had the full
six-carrier complement of the Kidō Butai, multitasking would not have been so
much of an issue, salvo equations or not.
As it was, Midway Island lured in the Japanese, such that it became a distraction, and thus served Nimitz’s carriers as bait. Yamamoto’s plan virtually guaranteed that Nagumo would be faced with a multitasking dilemma. If Yamamoto
simply had sailed the reduced Kidō Butai toward Midway without intending
to invade, the island’s malign influence on his and Nagumo’s decision-making
could have been avoided. Nagumo would not have been faced with the dilemma
of whether to disobey Yamamoto’s order to maintain an alert antiship package.
American advantages in intelligence and scouting and Japanese failures in those
functions might not have mattered so much.
Of course, the principle of striking effectively first still would have governed,
but the effects of the various exigencies that favored the Americans might not
have weighed as heavily if the Japanese had not been distracted by Midway itself.
In my Review article “Deconstructing Nimitz’s Principle of Calculated Risk”
(Winter 2015), I concluded that Nimitz was determined to engage Yamamoto at
Midway. His suggestion to Fletcher to move west to be able to get in a first strike
effectively negated the concept of calculated risk. Nimitz had good reasons for
doing this, as Parshall points out, but the crux of the matter is spelled out in the
OP 29-42 plan: “Operate with Task Forces available initially to the northeast of
MIDWAY . . . in order to seize opportunity to obtain initial advantage against
carriers which are employing their air groups against MIDWAY.” In other words,
the whole strategy revolved around catching Nagumo with his pants down, and
that is just what they did.

ROBERT C. RUBEL
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Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the Program
Manager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading
Program.

C

hief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Michael M. Gilday recently released an update to his professional reading program. The CNO Professional
Reading Program (CNO-PRP) now consists of twelve books, including a mix of
fiction and nonfiction titles covering military strategy, management, leadership,
technology, and other subjects relevant to the development of maritime professionals at all levels.
“A learning mindset is essential to accelerating our warfighting advantage,”
said Gilday. “A Navy that learns, adapts, and improves the fastest will be the most
successful. Knowledge sharing is essential to creating a learning culture.”
The goal of the program is to contribute to a culture dedicated to war
fighting and learning, while simultaneously supporting the personal and
professional development of sailors beyond that of their primary designator
or rating.
“We are driving a fleet-wide campaign of self-improvement,” said Gilday. “We
must foster an organization that supports and empowers Sailors to have an independent quest for knowledge through reading and information sharing. What
you know and how fast you learn is relevant in this era of strategic competition.”
The following books are included in the newly released update:
To Rule the Waves: How Control of the World’s Oceans Shapes the Fate of the
Superpowers, by Bruce D. Jones
A Brief Guide to Maritime Strategy, by James R. Holmes
China as a Twenty First Century Naval Power: Theory, Practice, and Implications, by Michael A. McDevitt

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2022

155

150

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 75 [2022], No. 3, Art. 1

Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post–Cold War Stalemate,
by M. E. Sarotte
The Sailor’s Bookshelf: Fifty Books to Know the Sea, by Admiral James G.
Stavridis, USN (Ret.)
Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War, by Paul Scharre
Fortune Favors Boldness: The Story of Naval Valor during Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM, by Vice Admiral Barry M. Costello, USN (Ret.)
The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors: The Extraordinary World War II Story
of the U.S. Navy’s Finest Hour, by James D. Hornfischer
World War II at Sea: A Global History, by Craig L. Symonds
Ashley’s War: The Untold Story of a Team of Women Soldiers on the Special
Ops Battlefield, by Gayle Tzemach Lemmon
Dare to Lead: Brave Work. Tough Conversations. Whole Hearts, by Brené Brown
Mindset: The New Psychology of Success, by Carol S. Dweck
Additional information about these books can be found on the CNO-PRP
website, www.navy.mil/CNO-Professional-Reading-Program/. Most are available
for loan at no cost to sailors in both e-book and digital audio format from the
Navy MWR digital library collection. Eligible patrons can download the books
at www.navymwrdigitallibrary.org/.
The motto of the CNO-PRP is Read Well to Lead Well. This slogan reflects the
notion that a key component of the professional development of all maritime
leaders is a career-long commitment to expanding their expertise via a selfdirected program of study and reflection on issues relevant to their unique
profession. The Navy Leader Development Framework notes that “[l]eaders
with the passion to make ourselves and our teams the best do not wait for
formal training or formal avenues—we get to it on our own. . . . The CNO’s
Professional Reading Program provides a jumping-off point to build knowledge about competence, character, and connections.”
Even in these days of incessant social media, streaming television dramas,
and wide-screen theatrical releases, the value (and comfort) of reading a book
(in hard copy or digital format) is still significant. The connection between the
written word and the mind of the reader is just as valuable today as it has been
for centuries. I encourage you to set a personal goal to read as many of the
great books on the CNO-PRP as you can over the next twelve to twenty-four
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months. By doing so you will become a better leader, better citizen, and better
human. Not bad for a few hours of effort each week. If you read well, you will
lead well!

JOHN E. JACKSON
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